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Abstract 
This thesis examines the ways in which ideologies of royalism, militarism, and Jihad 
influenced the behaviour of contending Muslim factions in the 1857 Indian rebellion. 
The historiography has focused almost exclusively on the ideological motivation of 
Muslims who fought against the East India Company, with little mention of the large 
number of Punjabi Muslims and North West Frontier Pathans who chose to collaborate 
with the British against their co-religionists. The dominant themes of anti-colonialism, 
nationalism, proto-nationalism and Jihad that emerge in the literature overlook the role 
of moderating factors that link ideology to behaviour. Another tendency has been to 
apply the essentially modern concepts of nationalism and its variants to a pre-modern 
Indian Muslim setting. This thesis addresses these gaps by providing a framework for 
analysing the ideological functions of royalism, militarism and Jihad for both pro and 
anti-British Muslims. Drawing on insights from political and cognitive approaches of 
decision-making, this study demonstrates how the dynamics of information processing 
moderated the relationship between these ideologies and the combat behaviour of the 
belligerents. It finds that the process produced different outcomes of behaviour for the 
key individuals and groups in the 1857 rebellion. The methodology employed is 
comparative case studies of four regions with the most active Muslim resistance and 
collaboration groups. This thesis hopes to contribute to the growing literature on new 
approaches to the study of the 1857 Indian rebellion. 
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Glossary 
Ahl al-kitab Possessors of the divine books (literally); adherents of the 
Abrahamic faiths, that is, Christians and Jews  
Akhbar Newspaper  
Akhund A spiritual leader in parts of Central Asia  
Amir Prince or King  
Azan Muslim call to prayer  
Badal Revenge; reciprocity  
Badshah King  
Baghavat Revolt  
Baluchi Of Baluchistan, a province of present-day Pakistan  
Bania Member of the Hindu trading or merchant community  
Chamar Member of an Indian low caste  
Chishti A Sufi Order within Islam  
Daffadar Native sergeant of Indian cavalry regiment  
Dar-ul-Harb  Adobe or zone of war  
Deobandi A movement within Sunni Islam that originated in India, which 
seeks to revive the practices and theological interpretations of 
early Sunni Islam; adherent of such a movement  
Derajat Common term for the Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan 
divisions of the Punjab in present-day Pakistan  
Deen Faith  
Dharam Righteous conduct and thought, or loosely, religion  
Dreeshak A Baluchi tribe  
Fakeer A Muslim ascetic  
Farman Royal edict  
Fatwa Religious edict usually issued by a recognised Muslim jurist  
Ghazi Muslim warrior; Jihad veteran 
Haram Prohibited under Islamic law  
Hanafi The largest of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence  
Hanbali One of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence  
Hindustan Variously refers to as the entire land of present-day India, or the 
Upper Ganges plateau; or the land mass east of the Punjab  
Hindustani Of Hindustan  
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Imam Mosque prayer leader; a Muslim leader considered by Shias to be 
a divine figure who is a successor of Prophet Muhammad  
Imambara Shia place of worship  
Imam ul-Muslimin  Commander of the faithful/Muslim community 
Jagir Land grant to reward services or acknowledgement of authority 
Jagirdar Holder of a Jagir 
Jihad Muslim spiritual struggle; armed action against non-believers to 
defend or advance the cause of Islam, however interpreted 
Jihadi A person who wages Jihad  
Kaffir One who does not believe in God/Allah 
Khalsa Baptised Sikhs  
Khanqa Sufi hospice  
Khillat A richly adorned robe bestowed as an award, usually by Royalty  
Khosa A Baluchi tribe  
Kirar A term associated with Hindu salesmen or money lenders  
Kotwal An Indian police chief of a town  
Khutba Friday prayer sermon which acknowledges the legitimate 
Muslim ruler  
Kufr State of disbelief  
Kuffar Plural of Kaffir  
Lashkar War band  
Leghari A Baluchi tribe  
Madrassa Muslim seminary; school  
Maharaja A Hindu King or Ruling prince  
Malik Tribal or village leader in South Asia 
Maliki One of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
Mannat Fulfilment of vows  
Maulana/Maulvi A Muslim held in respect for his learning  
Mazari A Baluchi tribe  
Mujaddidiyya A Sufi order based on the teachings of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, a 
leading Indian Muslim saint, who was also known as Mujaddid 
Alaf Sani  
Mujahid/Mujahideen  Muslim holy warrior(s) 
Mujtahid A recognised Muslim scholar, usually a Shia, who is capable of 
interpreting religious rulings from the Quran and the traditions 
of Prophet  
ix 
 
Mullah Muslim priest or learned person  
Munshi An interpreter or secretary in India  
Murid Disciple of a Muslim saint or holy person 
Mussalman Muslim  
Nang Shame; honour  
Naqshbandi  A Sunni Sufi order, which traces its spiritual lineage to Abu 
Bakar, the Caliph, and Prophet Muhammad's companion 
Nawab A Muslim ruling prince or nobleman  
Nazar A present or offering  
Nazarene Christian  
Nau Roz Persian New Year  
Pakhtunwali Pathan code of conduct; belief system; way of life  
Pashto The language of the Pathans  
Pathan Indian term for Pushtun or Pakhtun, the Pashto speaking tribes 
inhabiting northern Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan  
Pir A Muslim saint or holy person  
Piri-Muridi Pir-Murid relationship  
Qadri A Sufi order of Islam 
Qazi Judge  
Qazi-ul-quzzat Chief Justice  
Quraish An Arab tribe  
Quraishi An Arab name which indicates descent from the Quraish tribe 
in Arabia at the time of Prophet Muhammad; the Prophet 
himself was descended from the Quraish  
Raj Royal rule/government  
Rajah Hindu King, prince or regent  
Ramazan The Islamic month of fasting  
Ranghar Muslim Rajput  
Rissaldar Senior native officer in an Indian cavalry regiment  
Rissaldar-Major  Senior most native officer in an Indian cavalry regiment 
Sahih Bukhari A major compilation of the traditions of Prophet Muhammad 
by the Central Asian Muslim scholar, Imam Bukhari  
Sajjada nasheen Literally 'the Sitter-on-the-Prayer-Carpet'; successor of a saint  
Saligram The sacred form of Vishnu, a Hindu god  
Sardar Leader; head; chief  
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Sirkar Administrative district; also government  
Sepoy An Indian soldier in service with the British in India; distortion 
of Sipahi (soldier) in Persian and Urdu  
Sh'afi One of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence  
Shaikh A Sufi, patriarch or holy man  
Shia The second major sect of Islam along with Sunni; also a Muslim 
who belongs to the Shia sect  
Silsila Order; progression  
Subedar Governor of a Mughal province; native officer of an Indian 
infantry regiment  
Suharwardi A Sufi order  
Sunni The largest of the two main sects of Islam; also an adherent of 
Sunni Islam  
Swadharma Hindu term associated with righteous living, thought, and action  
Swaraj Self-rule  
Syed A descendant of Prophet Muhammad  
Taluqdar Head of a taluqa or land area controlled by lineage, usually in 
Avadh, India  
Tammandar Chief of a Baluchi tribe  
Tulsi A plant held sacred by Hindus  
Ulama Scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and of the Quran; learned 
men; mosque prayer leaders  
Vakil Lawyer  
Vizier The chief minister of a state  
Wahhab Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a Saudi scholar (1703-1792) 
who founded a movement in Islam, the influence of which also 
spread to the Indian sub-continent 
Wahhabi A follower of Wahhab; also movement associated with Wahhab  
Wali Title for the ruler of Swat, a former state in the North-West 
Frontier of present-day Pakistan  
Waliullah  An influential Indian Muslim scholar and leader (1703-1762) 
Waliullahi Of Waliullah; movement associated with Shah Waliullah 
Waqf Properties held in religious trust  
Zamindar Holder of zamin or land who acquires a right to a part of the 
agricultural produce; also a free hold owner of agricultural land 
xi 
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Introduction 
The Indian rebellion of 1857 still invokes the imagination and passions of many in 
Britain, India, and Pakistan. Colonial and post-colonial historians consider it a critical 
event in Indian history because of its various socio-cultural, political, religious, and 
economic dimensions, and their effects on the subsequent course of British colonial, 
Indian, and Pakistani history. The 1857 event has been variously interpreted by scholars 
as an anti-colonial war, Sepoy mutiny, India's first war of independence, a localised 
conflict, legitimist war of restoration, and a war of religion. Debates on its nature, 
causes, and effects have been continuing ever since. Although the events of the 
rebellion will be dealt with in some detail in subsequent chapters, a brief narrative is in 
order at the outset.  
The 1857 rebellion was not the first instance of armed uprising against the British. 
Instances of civil resistance included Rangpur uprising, 1783; Nagar uprising, 1830-31, 
Sanyasi and Fakir rebellion, 1763-1800, Moplah uprising, 1840s -1850s, Bhil rebellion, 
1819-1831, Koli rebellion, 1844-46, and Santhal hul, 1855-56.1 The purely military 
mutinies occurred at Manji in 1764, Tellicherry in 1780, Trichinopoly in 1785, Guntur 
in 1798, Vellore in 1806, Travancore and Hyderabad in 1812,  Java in, 1815, 
Barrackpore in 1824, Assam in 1825, Sholapur, Malgaon, and Peshawar in 1838-1844, 
Amritsar in 1850, Barrackpore in 1852, and Bolarum in 1855.2 But the 1857 rebellion, 
which too started off as a military uprising, was far more significant in magnitude, 
intensity and the number of casualties on both sides. It began with a series of protests 
and defiance by Indian Sepoys of the East India Company's Bengal Army at being 
ordered to use newly issued cartridges laced with cow and pig fat, which was offensive 
to Hindus and Muslims respectively. The first incident occurred at Berhampore (25 
February, 1857), followed by Barrackpore (31 March, 1857), and then at Meerut on 10 
May, 1857.3 What had been a military mutiny up to that point turned into a wider 
                                               
1 Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, From Plassey to Partition : A History of Modern India (Himayatnagar, India: Orient 
Longman, 2004), 160-165; Akshayakumar Ramanlal Desai, ed., Peasant Struggles in India (Bombay ; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 23, 75.   
2 S. L. Menezes, Fidelity and honour: the Indian Army from the seventeenth to the twenty-first century  (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 84-120. 
3 Noah A. Chick, Annals of the Indian Rebellion, 1857-58  (Calcutta: Sanders Cones and Company, 1859). pp. 
36, 60, 99. 
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rebellion as thousands of civilians also rose against British rule across Northern India, 
and the hitherto nominal Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar was proclaimed as the 
sovereign ruler of Hindustan on 12 May 1857.4 Even as other parts of British India, and 
the Bombay and Madras Presidency Armies remained mostly uninvolved, the effects of 
the 1857 rebellion reverberated throughout the land, putting in jeopardy the dominance 
of the English East India Company (hereafter EIC). Ironically, the rebellion was 
eventually put down largely with the help of Indians who remained loyal to the British. 
This thesis seeks to cast a fresh look at the events of 1857 to critically examine the 
question of Muslim participation, both as rebels as well as loyal soldiers helping the EIC 
to quell the rebellion. Muslim role in the conflict was critical, for although the initial 
violent protest was carried out by Hindu Sepoys, their Muslim colleagues soon joined in 
and proceeded to play a decisive role in the events that followed. By virtue of their 
dominance of the Bengal Army cavalry, the Muslim Sepoys became the strike force of 
the rebel army, whose combat performance therefore largely determined the outcome 
of the resistance against the British. The major political force behind the rebellion was 
similarly a Muslim leader - the  restored Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, who, 
apart from his role as the sovereign ruler of both the communities, was head of the 
Muslim polity in India, as well as its supreme religious leader. Much of the religious 
inspiration for the rebellion came from the Muslim clergy or Ulama, whose espousal of 
military Jihad attempted to mobilise not just all Muslims, but also Hindus to rise and 
destroy the British. But ‘Muslims’ were not a homogenous social category. The role of 
Muslims on the opposing side, especially those from British administered Punjab and its 
bordering North-West Frontier was equally significant, for without their enthusiastic 
support British success against the rebel Sepoys would have been doubtful, or at least 
inordinately delayed.  
Historiography and theories of the 1857 Indian rebellion 
The literature on 1857 is huge, with hundreds of reports, books, articles, diaries and 
memoirs that started appearing very soon after the commencement of the rebellion. 
The historiography and literature review for the current study is selective, in that it 
                                               
4 Syed M. Husain, Bahadur Shah Zafar and the war of 1857 in Dehli  (New Delhi: Aakar Books, 2006). 168-69. 
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focuses on the role of ideology and its impact on the militant behaviour of Muslim 
protagonists in the conflict. In order to arrange the material in conceptual order, this 
review organises the extant literature in terms of the ideological theories and 
movements that scholars implicitly or explicitly ascribe as motivators for the rebellion. 
The first part of the review analyses those works that treat Muslim role and motivations 
as part of the larger struggle which included Hindus against the British during 1857. The 
second half narrows the focus to Muslim participation and its ideological 
underpinnings. It is followed by an overview of the military dimension of 1857. 
Excluded from this review are works that focus on material factors as the prime 
motivators of the rebellion. These include Dirk Kolff, Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy,5 which 
concentrates on Sepoy labour issues in the North Indian military  market in the late 
Mughal and early colonial period, and Eric Stokes, The peasant and the Raj: studies in 
agrarian society and peasant rebellion in colonial India, 6 which focuses on agrarian discontent 
as a factor in the anti-British uprising. While not denying that the material factors that 
these pioneering works analyse may have played an important role in the rebellion, this 
thesis focuses solely on the ideological aspects of the conflict.  
Nationalism 
In one of the earliest documented works, J.W. Kaye argued that the 1857 rebellion was 
a popular attempt to overthrow foreign domination. The large-scale reaction was 
directed against the intrusive and innovative policies of an authoritarian EIC 
government, which had alienated the people by contravening Indian customs and 
religious beliefs. The religious leaders, royalty, Sepoys, and public at large shared the 
reaction, and were keen to restore the societal order of the past that lay in their 
memory.7 However, Kaye argues that the British represented a modern civilisation, 
while the uprising denoted a hostile response that was motivated by reactionary 
yearnings. V.D. Savarkar was the first Indian author to interpret the rebellion from a 
                                               
5 D. H. A. Kolff, Naukar, Rajput, and sepoy : the ethnohistory of the military labour market in Hindustan, 1450-
1850  (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
6 Eric Stokes, The peasant and the Raj : studies in agrarian society and peasant rebellion in colonial India  (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
7 J.W. Kaye, A history of the Sepoy War in India 1857-1858, 9th ed., vol. I (London: W.H Allen, 1880). 
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nationalist perspective, terming it 'The Indian War of Independence of 1857'.8 Contrary to the 
general belief prevalent in colonial circles, he did not view the greased cartridges that 
offended the religious beliefs of Hindu and Muslim Sepoys of the Bengal Army as the 
primary cause of the uprising, since the EIC had already ordered their withdrawal 
before the Sepoy breakout at Meerut. Savarkar argued that the violent reaction by the 
Sepoys and the public was due to British atrocities, which had aroused nationalist and 
religious passions.9 The violence against the British was justified on the principle of 
retributive justice, and since the British were the enemies of the Hindustani nation, they 
must be destroyed. The guiding principle of the revolutionary struggle of 1857 was 
swadharma and Swaraj, which was shared by Hindus and Muslims, and which motivated 
them to fight jointly against the British.10 Writing on the first centenary of the rebellion, 
P.C. Joshi re-emphasised the nationalist character of the uprising, although from a 
Marxist perspective, arguing that it sought the destruction of EIC rule in India and its 
replacement with an Indian state, which made the uprising a national revolt.11  
In a much earlier work, Syed Ahmad Khan, a member of the Mughal elite serving with 
the EIC during the rebellion, had discounted the nationalist impulse.12 In contrast to 
Savarkar, Khan avoided the term nation or national, referring to Hindus and Muslims as 
'natives', and alluded to the social and religious divisions among the two communities.13 
As a staunch EIC supporter, Khan suggested that the uprising, which he termed 
baghavat, could have been avoided if the British had appointed an Indian representative 
to the Legislative Council.14 Acting as an intermediary and informer, the representative 
would have been able to provide timely information to the government, which could 
have prevented the mutiny.15 Two other Indian accounts at the time similarly considered 
the event a temporary outburst rather than an outpouring of nationalism, and argued 
that it could at most be characterised as an incoherent aberration in the face of 
                                               
8 Vinayak D. Savarkar, The Indian War of Independence of 1857, (London 1909), Accessed 12 
September 2010. http://books.google.com/books?id=aNNGAAAAIAAJ. 
9 The Indian War of Independence of 1857. 6. 
10 The Indian War of Independence of 1857. 6. 
11 Puran C. Joshi, '1857 in our history', in Rebellion, 1857 : a symposium, ed. Puran C. Joshi (Calcutta: K P 
Bagchi & Co., 1986), 139. 
12 Sir Sayyid A. Khan, The causes of the Indian revolt  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
13 The causes of the Indian revolt; History of the Bijnor Rebellion (1858) Accessed 09 March 2012. 
http://www.columbiauniversity.org/itc/mealac/pritchett/00urdu/asbab/bijnor/index.html. 
14 The causes of the Indian revolt. 
15 The causes of the Indian revolt. 
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modernising British outlook and policies.16 Although such explanations acknowledged 
the anti-British sentiment, there was a clear denial that the 1857 war was either national, 
or a war of independence.17  
Proto-nationalism 
Much of the scholarship after the first centenary of the rebellion took up the theme of 
1857 as popular regional protest rather than a concerted national movement. Ranajit 
Guha lauds the rebellion as a subaltern struggle, and includes among subalterns not only 
the peasants, but also zamindars and others who were not members of the elite class.18 
Irfan Habib argues that the rebellion collapsed because of its subaltern nature. The 
rebels had no centralized leadership or organisation, nor any ideology, at least in the 
Marxist sense, and although equipped as a modern force, they lacked any real notions of 
modernity.19 According to Habib, the 1857 event could be characterised as something 
more than 'regional patriotism'; however, it was not nationalism, but a form of Indian 
patriotism that prompted the rebel sections to join the revolt.20 Religion was more of an 
abstract issue for them; the real issue was the fight against British imperialism. In a 
critique of the subaltern approach, Gayatri Spivak's 'Can the subaltern speak', questions 
whether it is possible to assume subaltern consciousness from acts of insurgency that 
can be accessed only through colonial documents, especially since these texts are full of 
representations of peasant rebels as criminals or mutineers.21 Under such circumstances, 
scholars should recognise not a single 'peasant consciousness', but a variety of 
                                               
16 Dosabhoy Framjee, The British raj contrasted with its predecessors: and an inquiry into the disastrous results of the 
rebellion in the North-west provinces upon the hopes of the people of India  (London: Smith, Elder and Co, 1858); 
pseudonym Hindu, The mutinies and the people; or Statements of native fidelity exhibited during the outbreak of 1857-
58  (Calcutta: I.C. Bose, 1859). 
17 Ramesh C. Majumdar, The Sepoy Mutiny and the revolt of 1857, 2nd ed. (Calcutta: Firma K. L. 
Mukhopadhyay, 1963). 
18 Ranajit Guha and Gayarti C. Spivak, eds., Selected subaltern studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988). 
19 Irfan Habib, '1857: Issues and Paradigms', in The Great uprising of 1857 : commentaries, studies and documents, 
ed. Syed Najmul R.  Rizvi and Saiyid Zaheer H. Jafri (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers & Distributors, 
2009), 19. 
20 '1857: Issues and Paradigms', 17-18. 
21 Gayatri C. Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak? ', in Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader, ed. 
P. Williams and L. Chrisman (New York: : Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 66-111. 
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intersecting identities derived from the economic, social, historical and political 
structures that peasant communities inhabited.22 
C.A. Bayly emphasises the need to take into account the sense of loyalty to locality and 
institutions that existed in pre-colonial India, but cautions against taking either a 
primordial or a westernised nationalist approach.23 He argues that 'glorification of the 
land and people was deeply rooted in the thought and literature of the subcontinent'.24 
He notes the existence of indigenous words and pre-colonial accounts that glorify the 
deeds of nobles and ordinary people who sacrificed their lives in defence or love of the 
territories, reflecting a sense of 'traditional patriotism'.25 According to Bayly, 'traditional 
patriotism was more than a feeling. It was associated with and fixed in particular locales, 
and inherited a set of doctrines concerned with political representativeness'.26 While 
there was a sense of attachment to the imperial systems at the centre, a 'regional 
patriotism' was also emerging with a commitment to specific regional or localised 
culture, which in turn led to distinct state formations such as Maharashtra.27  
Like Bayly, R.K. Ray in his Felt Community argues that a sentiment of patriotism existed 
in Indian society long before that of nationalism.28 All Indians participated in shared 
communities of sentiment, characterized by an ethnic and religious patriotism for their 
homeland. In 1857, Hindus and Muslims, despite adhering to different faiths, formed a 
'confederate people bent upon purging the shared land of an alien and impure 
presence'.29 Patriotism among the rebels of 1857 took the form of a combined Hindu-
Muslim religious crusade to protect their Dharma (Hindu way of life) and Deen (Muslim 
religion).30 Ray visualizes the uprising as a multi-layered phenomenon, which was partly 
a racial war of the local population against their white oppressors, ideologically 
packaged as a religious war between true and false religions. He argues that in the minds 
                                               
22 'Can the Subaltern Speak? '. 
23 C. A Bayley, Origins of nationality in South Asia : patriotism and ethical government in the making of modern India  
(Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). vii-viii. 
24 Origins of nationality in South Asia : patriotism and ethical government in the making of modern India: 11. 
25 Origins of nationality in South Asia : patriotism and ethical government in the making of modern India: 11. 
26 Origins of nationality in South Asia : patriotism and ethical government in the making of modern India: 79. 
27 Origins of nationality in South Asia : patriotism and ethical government in the making of modern India: 21-26. 
28 Rajat K. Ray, The Felt Community: Commonality and Mentality Before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism  
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
29 The Felt Community: Commonality and Mentality Before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism: 547-48. 
30 The Felt Community: Commonality and Mentality Before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism. 
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of most of the participants, whether Sepoys or civilians, the sense of religious 
differences significantly receded. Hindu contingents would elect Muslims as their 
representatives, while Muslim Sepoys accepted Hindu officers to lead them. Among the 
Muslims who voluntarily joined the rebellion under the impulse of joining a righteous 
war or Jihad, there was the same acceptance of the need for Hindus and Muslims 
uniting to fight for the common cause of overthrowing the British.31  
Characterisations of 1857 as an anti-colonial, nationalist or patriotic struggle seem to 
impute a kind of modern political consciousness that had not yet manifested in mid-
nineteenth century India. The proto-nationalist perspective's preoccupation with 
discovering the roots of anti-colonialism to provide a link to modern Indian nationalism 
has led to overlooking the divisions within and between the Hindu and Muslim 
communities. As Sabyasachi Dasgupta observes, this trend is evident in many of the 
published works since the 150th anniversary of the rebellion.32 Such versions of the 
conflict that attribute patriotism to communities and regions ignore the complex pattern 
of resistance and collaboration of different sections of Indian society with the Colonial 
Raj.33   
Muslim religious sentiment 
The idea that religious sentiment was the primary ideological drive for the rebellion first 
appeared in the writings of Colonial officials, notably John William Kaye's , History of the 
Sepoy War in India.34 This Muslim conspiracy theory became the precursor of numerous 
studies of the rebellion. Syed Ahmad Khan, perhaps out of eagerness to assuage 
prevailing British ire, rejected the Muslim conspiracy and Jihad explanation. Terming 
the Muslim fighters as vagabonds, drunkards and debauches, Khan questioned how 
such men who thought so little of religion could be called leaders of a religious war.35 By 
turning against the British who were their employers and benefactors, they had proved 
to be namak haram (faithless to the salt), and by slaughtering innocents, especially 
                                               
31 The Felt Community: Commonality and Mentality Before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism. 
32 Sabyasachi Dasgupta, 'The Great Uprising of 1857: Commentaries, Studies and Documents by Syed 
Najmul Raza Rizvi; Saiyid Zaheer Husain Jafri', Social Scientist 38, no. 3/4 (2010): 94-98. 
33 'The Great Uprising of 1857: Commentaries, Studies and Documents by Syed Najmul Raza Rizvi; 
Saiyid Zaheer Husain Jafri', 94-98. 
34 Kaye, A history of the Sepoy War in India 1857-1858, I. 
35 Khan, The causes of the Indian revolt: 56. 
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women, children and old men, they had brazenly violated the fundamental principles of 
Islam.36 He was equally dismissive of the Ulama who had issued fatwas for an anti-British 
Jihad in 1857, contending that they were few in number who, moreover, did not occupy 
a prominent place in the community before the rebellion.37 In Khan's opinion, a Muslim 
holy war or Jihad could not be declared against an enemy unless it clearly prevented 
Muslims from freely practicing their faith, and as the British had not done so, there was 
no reason to invoke a religious war against them.38 It was not enough that Muslim-
inhabited land was occupied by an alien power such as the EIC; there had to be clear 
measures by the latter against the religious freedom of Muslims for Jihad to become 
operative.39 
A focus on the Jihad factor returned with a number of works published after 1957. 
Ashraf, 'Muslim Revivalists and the Revolt of 1857', in P.C. Joshi, ed. Rebellion 1857 shows 
the role of the Wahabi and Farazi movements stemming from deep resentment against 
the British for violating Hindu and Muslim religious precepts.40 Iqtidar Alam Khan 
notes that Jihad was not limited to Wahabi influence, as many Sufis also took part in it.41 
He contends that the Muslim combatants were unconcerned about the doctrinal 
legitimacy of Jihad or the establishment of a theocratic regime; rather their prime 
motive was to join Hindu and Muslim chiefs and Sepoys with the aim of overthrowing 
the alien British rule.42 A strong religious sentiment in the 1857 rebellion is however, 
unmistakably reflected in the declarations and popular slogans of the Muslim 
combatants, the religious elite, and the Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar.43 
                                               
36 The causes of the Indian revolt: 56. 
37 The causes of the Indian revolt. 
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More work on the religious dimension of 1857 has appeared since 2007, following the 
150th anniversary of the event. In a seminal study that draws on a wide range of primary 
and secondary sources, Ayesha Jalal traces the historical evolution and meanings of 
Jihad in South Asia.44 Her central argument is that as Muslim political power declined in 
India, the military mode of Jihad, or 'lesser' Jihad, was increasingly resorted to, but this 
was at the expense of the spiritual, or 'greater' Jihad, that is, the struggle to be ethical, 
which is by far the more important form of holy war. Jalal's contention is based on a 
hadith (reports about the sayings and actions of Muhammad), according to which the 
Prophet Muhammad is said to have told his companions returning from a military 
campaign that they had been waging a jihad al-asghar, or the lesser war, and now have to 
conduct the jihad al-akbar, or the greater war against the inner forces which prevent 
humans from becoming ethical. However, Jalal's reliance on this narration to make the 
case for an ethical Jihad against its military form is a misconstrual, as Prophet 
Muhammad does not seem to be disapproving the warriors for waging the military Jihad 
on this occasion, but is rather only making the point that the Jihad to cleanse one's spirit 
is a more difficult undertaking. At any rate, the authenticity of the hadith is 
questionable, considering the nearly unanimous consensus among Muslim theologians 
and jurists that Jihad basically means armed warfare against non-Muslims and apostates. 
The Sahih Bukhari, considered as the most authentic compilation of hadith, is very clear 
about just such a meaning.45 Jalal does acknowledge the absence of her quoted hadith in 
the authentic hadith collections, but puts that down to the 'mind-set of the compilers 
and the political climate of the time'.46   
Jalal analyses in much detail the reasons why Jihad-as-armed-warfare has been 
practically ascendant in Muslim history. In India, the pattern for a political-military Jihad 
was set by the eighteenth-century philosopher, Shah Waliullah, and continued by his 
heirs in the North-West Frontier Jihad of the mid-nineteenth century against the Sikhs. 
Armed Jihad was again employed in 1857, on this occasion against the British by some 
of his family members and others. Yet, she asserts that even these two significant 
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instances of Jihad, especially the 1857 rebellion, reveal the 'temporarily expedient use 
the rebels made of religion'.47 In other words, the legal and ethical pre-requisites for 
waging Jihad were overlooked in favour of personal interests. Moreover, many among 
the Muslim community, including the Ulama, opposed this armed Jihad on religious 
grounds. Some Sunni Ulama were wary of their Shia counterparts because of the 
increasing influence the latter might manage through co-opting the Jihad leadership. 
Others 'made pragmatism a virtue and refused to proclaim a Jihad since success was 
hardly assured'; while still others, out of a need to preserve Hindu-Muslim unity during 
the rebellion 'blunted the millenarian edge of the movement'.48  
What Jalal does not take into account is that for the combatants themselves it is easy to 
conceive of Jihad as an armed struggle, since the 'Other' is clearly recognisable, the 
course of action is delineated, and the rewards of success are evident. By contrast, the 
concept of Jihad as an ethical struggle is vague and distracting, for it does not help 
soldiers on the battlefield, or the Muslim masses eager to join them in combat. It would 
seem that ethical righteousness would appeal more to those with an intellectual or 
mystical orientation, than those who face or court do-or-die situations.  
In another major study, The Last Mughal: The fall of a dynasty, Delhi 1857, William 
Dalrymple recasts the 1857 rebellion as a 'clash of rival fundamentalisms'.49 On the 
British side, this fundamentalism was represented by overzealous evangelical 
missionaries and the newly arriving Englishmen, who were increasingly replacing the 
earlier generation, which tended to appreciate Indian beliefs and practices. Opposing 
them were the Wahabi Muslims, who were however, divided on the issue of 
participation in the rebellion; while some among them joined the ranks of the 
Mujahideen, others remained indifferent. As the uprising gained momentum, the act of 
invoking the name of Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar served to unite the disparate 
population. Even though the uprising contained both Hindu and Muslim supporters, 
British hostility and retribution was directed more at Muslims due to the presence of the 
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Mujahideen element among them, and the use of Muslim rhetoric to justify a Jihad 
against the British.50 Dalrymple argues that differences between the orthodox Wahabi 
camp and the liberal Sufis, among whom he counts the Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah 
Zafar, amounted to a contest in which the Wahabi impulse for Jihad in 1857 overcame 
the peaceful orientation of the Sufis. In Dalrymple's view, this contest is an ongoing 
one, contemporary instances of which are the Jihadi movements in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, who follow the same Deoband  (a school of thought within Sunni Islam, which 
believes in a literal reading of the Quran, and is given to eradicating what it believes are 
heresies and misinterpretation of Islam) world-view that a number of Ulama 
represented in the India of 1857.51  
Contrary to what Dalrymple suggests, not all Muslims fighting in the name of Jihad 
during the rebellion were affiliated with the Wahabi or Deobandi movements, as it 
included members of several other orders. The distinction that he makes between Sufi 
Muslims who were supposedly reluctant warriors or oblivious to the conflict, and the 
belligerent faction is arbitrary, given that Muslims from different schools of thought, 
including the Sufis, were distributed across the pro-British and rebel factions. One of 
the major Sufi orders, the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiyya was closely associated with Muslim 
revivalism and militancy throughout Indian history.52 In fact, Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi 
(1564-1624), the leading Muslim scholar and Jihad ideologue was head of this order. 
Simon Digby, in his seminal work, Sufis and soldiers in Awrangzeb's Deccan: Malfuzat-i 
Naqshbandiyya, has shown that there were a number of instances of militancy on the part 
of ascetics and Sufis in the past.53 The major figure of Digby's work, Baba Palangposh, 
an ascetic who mixed personal piety and self-denial with participation in Aurangzeb's 
military campaigns in the Deccan, illustrates this orientation.54 Thus, prominent Sufis 
figures in India tended to view spiritual warfare as complementary, rather than 
antithetical to military Jihad.55  
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The complex question of the extent to which the rebel Sepoys and civilians were 
inspired by religion is re-examined in a recent study by Crispin Bates and Marina Carter, 
Holy Warriors: Religion as Military Modus Operandi.56 They avoid the general tendency in the 
historiography which seeks to link the revolt to Wahhabis and Jihadis, and instead 
highlight the role played by religious motifs in mobilizing the people for the struggle 
against British rule. Opposition to colonial subjugation too was articulated in religious 
terms. As the authors show, much of the vocabulary used by the Sepoys was derived 
from religion. At the same time, Bates and Carter note that religious fervour was fanned 
by the official church establishment in Britain to portray the military conflict as a holy 
war.  
More recently, there has been a fresh effort by a number of scholars who collaborated 
on a project organised by Edinburgh University, culminating in the multi-volume series, 
Mutiny at the Margins.57 The various volumes review the rebellion from diverse 
perspectives, focusing in particular on the socially neglected marginal groups and some 
of the geographic areas that have hitherto been unrepresented in colonial as well as 
Indian accounts. Volume four of the series, Military aspects of the Indian Uprising,58 is of 
particular relevance to the present study as it deals not only with the as yet unresolved 
matter of how to define the 1857 event, but also with the military nature of the conflict. 
The editors recognise the difficulty of discerning the reasons why so many Sepoys 
rebelled, and so many others chose not to, especially since those who fought on the two 
sides have, with two exceptions, left us no accounts of their experiences and motives.  
In an important chapter in this volume, Sabyasachi Dasgupta examines these 
exceptional Sepoy narratives published in the late nineteenth century texts, Sitaram 
Pandey's,  From Sepoy to Subedar,  and Durgadas Banerjee's,  Amar Jivan Charit,59 to make 
sense of the sentiments of the Sepoys. Both Sitaram and Durgadas served lengthy terms 
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in the Bengal Army, the former as a trooper and the latter as a clerk, and remained loyal 
to the British during the revolt. The authenticity of Sita Ram's narrative has not been 
satisfactorily established. However, Dasgupta suggests that even if it is more literary 
than archival in nature, it does reflect contemporary reality, and is therefore a useful 
document. Sitaram, who remained firm in his duty even when his son was sentenced to 
death for his participation in the revolt, was held up as an example for the Sepoys to 
emulate. Durgadas's narrative of his transformation from clerk to combat soldier during 
the crisis is significant in view of the colonial discourse about Bengali effeminacy. As 
Dasgupta argues, Durgadas was keen to portray his role as a valiant fighter to establish 
his martiality, and thereby that of the Bengali upper castes. These are valuable insights 
by Dasgupta, for they accord agency to the EIC Indian Sepoy. Whereas the bulk of the 
literature associates agency only with the rebel Sepoy, Dasgupta argues that many like 
SitaRam and Banerjee had their own motives for being part of the British military 
enterprise, and that these motives were non-material.   
Kaushik Roy's essay, Combat, Combat Motivation and the Construction of Identities: A Case 
Study, focuses on the dimension of brutality displayed by the combatants on both sides 
of the rebellion.60 Racial hatred on the part of the European soldier tended to become 
vicious when dealing with an Indian foe who was perceived as less than human and 
hence incapable of bravery and chivalry. Feeling otherwise by acknowledging the rebels' 
honour and courage in fighting effectively would have amounted to delegitimising the 
Raj. Addressing the relatively overlooked issue of combat motivation, Roy, in probing 
the mentality of the Sepoys speculates that the Bengal Army rebels shared religious, 
cultural and regional bonds which helped them to fight the British.61 While such a 
perspective helps explain the initial Sepoy impulse at the onset of the rebellion, it 
cannot account for why many of the rebel Sepoy regiments then disintegrated, or 
appeared not to offer stiff resistance. On the other hand, the Roy study can be credited 
for bringing religious, cultural and regional factors to the fore, as it can be reasonably 
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speculated that these would be closer to the hearts and minds of the Sepoys in the face 
of battle, as against abstract notions of nationalism or proto-nationalism.     
Gautam Chakravarty's, Mutiny, War or Small War? Revisiting an Old Debate, argues that the 
rebellion of  1857- 58, should not be labelled as a mutiny or conventional war but rather 
as a 'small war', a term used to explain wars by colonial powers of the nineteenth 
century. 62 These wars were fought not against regular armies belonging to stable 
political entities, but against an enemy with lower degree of organization, which limited 
itself to guerrilla activities, and was more difficult to deal with. The small wars were 
considered expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races, and  justified the use of 
large-scale violence that did not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. 
Chakravarty's argument is not very helpful  in understanding the nature of the 1857 
conflict as it fails to acknowledge the capacity of guerrillas and other sections of the 
population to be similarly wanton in their destruction and attacks on non-combatants. 
It also does not explain in the first place why subject people sometimes join up with the 
colonial power in combat against their own kind.  
Apart from the Bates and Carter monograph and the Mutiny on the Margins series, 
which provide useful points of departure for this thesis, the extant literature reviewed 
above is not of much help in understanding the concept of ideology and its relevance in 
1857. Representations of Muslim role continue to suffer from the tendency to portray it 
as a concerted and dedicated religious movement, as in jihadist explanations, despite the 
apparently mixed evidence. The nationalist, proto-nationalist, and some jihadist 
scholarship on the other hand, under-emphasises the significance of the Muslim 
religious factor in the conflict by viewing it merely as being in the service of anti-
colonialism or nationalism. The tendency to portray anti-colonialism or proto-
nationalism as nascent ideologies amounts to historical predetermination. Similarly, the 
idea that Hindus and Muslims were united in an ideology of common sentiment against 
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the British 63 tends to be vague, and at any rate begs the question what ideology or 
ideologies generated such a sentiment.     
Moreover, the geographical focus of existing works that is generally limited to Northern 
and Central India. Although this is the area where the rebellion erupted and reached its 
peak, it cannot explain why other regions, such as the Punjab and North-West Frontier 
did not rise against the British. Similarly, none of these sources address the key issue of 
why units of the Bengal Army that rose against the British ironically ended up fighting 
against mostly fellow Indian Sepoys: the Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, and Pathans from the 
North-West Frontier, who constituted the majority of the EIC Army in 1857 following 
the disbandment and mutiny of the Bengal Army. Nor do they explain a similar paradox 
on the other side, that of Muslims of the Punjab and North-West Frontier ignoring 
appeals from the Mughal Emperor and his army to join the resistance against the 
British. While the literature on the Bengal Army Sepoys is voluminous, nearly all of the 
works on 1857 ignore the role and motivation of the Punjabi and North-West Frontier 
Muslims who did not join the rebels. The limited works that exist, attribute their 
decision to collaborate with the British to such non-ideological factors as mercenary or 
contractual obligations.64 If Jihad was frequently espoused as the main driving force 
behind the anti-British uprising in North-West India - and the documentary evidence 
strongly suggests that these claims were consistently made by many of the participants - 
then the crucial question is whether it was an important issue for the pro-British 
Muslims of the Punjab and the North-West as well, assuming that the latter two groups 
would have been as conscious of their Islamic faith and the consequent salience of 
Jihad. Given that the Muslim-versus-Muslim aspect of the 1857 war did not centre on 
any avowed doctrinal issues, the question of how Jihad was interpreted and applied by 
the opposing Muslim camps becomes even more important. The historiography is also 
silent on whether the two Muslim camps were divided by different political, social and 
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religious ideological agendas, and if such differences can account for their divergent 
behaviour.   
Consequently, as Wagner has noted, there remains a need to revisit the central events 
and developments in the rebellion to consider new approaches, or seek new methods of 
answering old questions.65 In order to seek conceptual clarity about ideology, for both 
the rebels as well as the collaborators in diverse geopolitical settings, a new analytic 
framework that is based on models borrowed from the social sciences is proposed in 
the following section. Apart from promoting a better understanding of the concept of 
ideology as it functioned in 1857, such a framework facilitates comparative research  in 
the context of Indian Muslim society which was marked by similarities as well as 
differences, both within and across its different sections. 
Reconceptualising Ideology and Militancy 
Ideology is admittedly a nebulous concept that has been beset by a multitude of 
definitions and usage over time. In its early treatment, scholars tended to attribute 
neutral or negative meanings to ideology. The negative connotation, for example, 
described ideology as an elite mechanism for controlling and managing society - a 
conception that implied the undesirability of ideology in societies.66 It was usually with 
such a negative meaning that doctrines such as Marxism or nationalism began to be 
acknowledged as ideologies. However, from the 1960s onwards, the term ideology has 
been used to denote sets of coherent and consistent ideas that are independent of the 
positive or negative affects they might yield.67 But the move toward a more neutral 
conception of ideology has not stopped the trend to use ideology as doctrine, dogma, 
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political belief, or agenda, to refer to communism, fascism, liberalism,68 and Islam. 
Another trend involved employing the term in political, sociological, and psychological 
theories to describe patterns of political differentiation among masses, elites, and 
organisations.69 
Various scholars have attempted to delineate the diverse notions of ideology in order to 
render it a more robust theoretical and empirical concept. A recent effort in this 
direction comes from John Gerring, who defines ideology as a set of political ideas that 
are bound together with a minimal level of consistency, and that stand in contrast to 
competing sets of ideas.70 However, in order to make the meaning conceptually tighter, 
Gerring suggests that scholars add context-specific attributes so as to specify the range 
of usage.71 For example, ideology may be used to refer to thought, language, or 
behaviour, or all of these attributes simultaneously; or to describe competing political 
agendas or power relations.  
Building on Gerring's definition, ideology is defined here as a set of political, religious 
and social beliefs and values that promote a particular way of understanding the world, 
and shape relations between members of a group and out-groups, and among members 
themselves. This approach offers the advantage of linking ideological stances to specific 
groups by analysing the internal characteristics of key members in order to better 
understand the ideological functioning of the selected group.72 It also enables the 
inclusion in ideology of a number of more specific elements, especially those that are 
salient in armed conflicts, such as doctrines, narratives, and symbols. According to Ball, 
Dagger and O'Neill, ideology performs four core functions for its adherents: 
explanatory, evaluative, orientative, and programmatic.73 The explanatory function raises 
the awareness of a particular group of people that a certain issue deserves their 
attention. Ideologies explain to the 'in-group' why social, political or religious conditions 
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are as they are. Since individuals often seek explanations in times of crisis, ideologies are 
particularly appealing to the group that perceives itself to be under threat. The second 
function is evaluative, whereby the ideology assigns blame for the prevalent 
predicament of the in-group to some 'out-group'. The out-group is identified with a 
certain behaviour that, according to the narrative offered by the ideology, undermines 
the well-being of the in-group. The orientative function of ideology is concerned with 
generating a group identity by identifying and highlighting the common characteristics 
of those individuals who adhere to, or are potential adherents of the in-group ideology. 
The fourth function of ideologies is a programmatic one in which the ideology offers a 
specific program of action that claims to remedy the in-group's predicament, and urges 
its adherents to implement that course of action.74  
Three types of ideologies form the focus of this study: Royalism,  culturalism, and 
religiosity. This selection is based on the observation that they represented the core of 
Indian Muslim beliefs at the time about how society was structured, how it ought to be 
structured, and their own place in it.  
Royalism is defined as adherence or attachment to a monarchy, or to the principle of 
monarchic government.75 A group, which, regardless of its political or religious 
orientations, supports a monarch or monarchy, especially in times of war, may be 
termed Royalist.76 Conceptualised thus, royalism is a form of political ideology. 
Culturalism as defined by Eriksen and Stjernfelt is 'the idea that individuals are 
determined by their culture, that these cultures form closed, organic wholes, and that 
the individual is unable to leave his or her own culture, but rather can only realise him 
or herself within it'.77 Culture here is defined as the behaviours and beliefs characteristic 
of a particular social or ethnic group.78 However, the Eriksen and Stjernfelt definition is 
too restrictive, since as Berg-Schlosser and Morlino point out, it is unusual for a group's 
social characteristics to be so entrenched that an individual member may find his exit 
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option unthinkable.79 On the other hand, social groups are seldom ever perfectly 
homogenous as member expectations, values and activities tend to vary. However, in 
societies that are differentiated on ethnic or class lines, it becomes very difficult for 
members of a group to have close social ties with other groups that do not subscribe to 
that group's collective social aspirations and programme.80 A system of differentiation 
that is based on class, ethnic, and caste lines is close to Weber's concept of social 
stratification, which holds that such systems are sustained on the basis of wealth, power, 
and prestige in society.81 In the context of India, tribal and military groupings were the 
norm in Muslim, and for that matter, Hindu society. Two forms of social ideology can 
be ascribed to the tribal and military structures: tribalism and militarism. Tribalism is 
defined as an affinity for, and commitment to strong ties between members of a tribe, 
clan, or extended family,82 and militarism as attachment to, and glorification of a 
professional military class, military spirit, and the pursuit of military ideals.83   
Religiosity refers to an individual or community's attachment to religion across a range 
of dimensions. Although there is no consensus on the nature and type of religious 
dimensions, Glock,84 Verbit,85 King,86 and Lenski,87 provide a rich framework, from 
which the following dimensions are adapted for this study: Devotional, which entails 
adherence to 'popular' or folk rituals, including conversion/allegiance through Sufis 
(Muslim mystics), ritual recitation of the Quran, and veneration of Prophet Muhammad 
and his progeny; Intellectual, which denotes knowledge of the basic tenets of one's 
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religion, and a continuous struggle to understand religion better; and Doctrinal, which 
refers to the acceptance of the prescribed doctrines of one's religious denomination or 
school of thought. The present study adds the concept of Jihad as a dimension of 
religiosity- treated here as the resort to arms for the purpose of advancing or defending 
Islamic beliefs and practices, however interpreted, to this framework as a type of 
ideology that can be assessed in terms of its intellectual, doctrinal, and devotional 
dimensions.  
As with the initial attempts to conceptualise ideology, the term militancy is beset with 
value-laden meanings. In current usage, militancy generally denotes armed action by 
non-state actors, and often terrorism. In a recent attempt to interpret the term more 
objectively, so that it can be applied to the actions of different actors in varied 
scenarios, D'Arcy proposes a  definition of militancy as 'an action or activity that is 
grievance-motivated, adversarial, confrontational, and collectively carried out'.88 In the 
grievance-motivated sense, militants do not seek adventure, or personal gain. Rather, 
they are motivated largely by a desire to protest against something, and to pursue a 
perceived need for change. Militancy is also 'adversarial' in the sense that it treats others 
not as potentially amenable to being convinced or won over, but rather as intransigent 
adversaries to be pressured, and if possible, defeated by means of struggle. Militancy 
may be confrontational in that, rather than avoiding conflict and seeking 
accommodation and compromise, it seeks to initiate or intensify conflict. Finally, 
militancy is a collective act that is not typically carried out by individuals acting 
independently, but rather as group members in concert with fellow members.  
D'Arcy identifies four types of militant action, which can be undertaken discretely, or in 
combination: Symbolic defiance, physical confrontation and destruction, and 
institutional disruption. In the symbolic mode, militants adopt defiance through 
'symbolic' or 'theatrical' acts, designed to publicly reject the legitimacy of some person, 
practice, policy or institution. In the physical confrontation mode, the actor engages in 
some form of armed conflict with adversaries or authority figures, which may include 
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acts of destruction and damage of property belonging to or associated with an 
adversary. Institutional disruption refers to acts that attempt to disrupt the functioning 
of some institution, by boycotting work for example, or carrying out protests, or 
preventing officials from performing their duties. As D'Arcy maintains, 'almost all cases 
of militancy can be classifiable in terms of at least one, and sometimes more than one of 
these four modes'. 89  
There are several advantages of adopting this framework in examining the military 
nature of the 1857 conflict. It  incorporates the actions of not only the Sepoys who took 
up arms against their EIC employers, but also of their counterparts on the other side. 
Secondly, it includes the actions of para-professionals and warrior bands such as the 
police levies and the irregular war bands and regiments raised by tribal chiefs in some of 
the affected regions. Third, it has the scope to include the activities of the  religious and 
political elite, more so as militancy incorporates adversarial political and religious actions 
that are short of armed confrontation. Thus, it has better explanatory power than the 
restrictive labels of war, limited war, small war, or mutiny etc., that pervade the 
literature. 
This study proposes a framework for analysis in which the, social, religious and political 
dimensions of ideology are correlated, and are linked to militant action through the 
process of information processing and dissemination, and courses of action. This 
framework is applied to the contending Muslim Sepoys, royalty, and Ulama in their 
respective capacity as representatives of the military, political and religious elite of 
Indian Muslim society. Such a comparative ideology approach to understanding Muslim 
behaviour in the 1857 conflict has not previously been attempted. As part of this 
agenda, this study contributes to the existing historiography on Muslim participation 
and motivation by re-examining the ideology of Jihad to discover in what ways and to 
what extent it was a factor, both in the Muslim versus British and the Muslim versus 
Muslim aspect of the rebellion.  
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Research questions 
The central question that this thesis seeks to address is how ideology functioned among 
the key Muslim participants in the rebellion of 1857 - both those who rose against the 
East India Company as well as those who fought on the side of the British to suppress 
the rebels. In order to answer this central question, it will draw from the theoretical 
literature discussed above and the primary sources listed below and will ask two sub-sets 
of questions. It will explore, first of all, how the ideologies of royalism, culturalism, and 
Jihad were understood, expressed and utilised by the contending Muslim Sepoys, royalty 
and Ulama during the 1857 rebellion. Secondly, it will examine the issues associated 
with the interpretation and pursuit of these ideological dimensions, and how the key 
groups and their leadership coped with them. This thesis is organised thematically 
across four regions: Delhi (including Meerut); Avadh; Punjab (including the princely 
states of Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla); and the North-West Frontier (the Pathan 
majority districts of British Punjab, and the epicentre tribal areas between these districts 
and Afghanistan). It was in these regions where the rebellion was fought, and its 
outcome decided. Delhi and Avadh were the epicentres of the anti-British resistance, 
led respectively by the Mughal and Avadh royalty and supported by large sections of the 
landed elite, religious figures, and the public. By contrast, the Punjab and the North-
West Frontier on its fringe remained loyal to the British, and formed the mainstay of 
the British military power that confronted the rebel movement and ultimately put it 
down, largely with the help of the Punjabi Muslims and Frontier Pathans. A focus on 
these areas thus provides us with the scope to examine the ideological motivations that 
prompted the contrasting behaviour of collaboration versus resistance. 
The Punjab and Frontier were distinct from their counterparts in terms of their 
administration, political status, societal structure and history, even as they shared other 
characteristics like religion and caste. Though the North-West Frontier was an 
administrative part of British Punjab, it is treated as a separate region for present 
purposes because of its unique history, different ethnic makeup, and the nature of its 
political interactions with other Indian entities and outside powers. Punjab and Avadh 
had been recently absorbed into British India, but were otherwise very dissimilar; and 
while both Avadh and Delhi had been monarchies, which in Delhi was at least 
symbolically intact at the time of the rebellion, Avadh royalty was recently displaced by 
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direct British rule. On the other hand, there was much that was common between 
Avadh and Delhi: a shared military history from earlier pre-British times, common 
language and social customs, and a similar military culture. Hence the regional 
categorisation also enable us to explore how the differences as well as similarities among 
the Muslims of these areas came into focus and influenced their capacity for militancy 
during the 1857 conflict.   
Sources used  
This thesis draws upon a number of primary sources, which include published archival 
material. The Indian sources focusing mainly on Delhi and Avadh, a number of which  
are in Urdu, consist of monographs, diaries, newspapers, religious edicts, statements, 
and proclamations. Monographs by those who witnessed the rebellion, or had access to 
others who did, include Zahiruddin Dihlavi, Dastan-e-Ghadar (a narrative of 1857);90 
Moinuddin Hasan Khan, Khadang-i ghadar (the arrow of the mutiny);91 Syed Ahmed 
Khan, Causes of the Indian revolt;92 Sitaram Pandey, From Sepoy to Subedar;93 Kanhaiya Lal, 
Tarikh-i baghavat-i Hind 1857: maharbah-yi azim (History of the Indian revolt, 1857: The 
Great War),94 and the multiple volumes of Freedom struggle in Uttar Pradesh.95  
Sita Ram's book is a rare narrative by a Sepoy employed in the Bengal Army, who 
remained loyal to the British throughout his long service, including the rebellion years. 
The original version was reportedly written in 1861 by Subedar Sita Ram Pandey on his 
retirement from the Bengal Army, at the behest of his commanding officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel James T. Norgate. According to the preface of Norgate's 1873 English edition, 
a copy of the original manuscript was given to him by Sita Ram's son, which was 
subsequently translated into English, with more editions subsequently appearing in 
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print.96 Moinuddin Khan's narrative is based on his observations and experiences as the 
chief of police in Delhi during the tumultuous events of 1857. The book was however, 
published posthumously after his death in 1885, in accordance with his wishes.97 Zahir 
Uddin Dihlavi, another Delhi resident, who was associated with a courtier of Bahadur 
Shah Zafar prior to the rebellion is believed to have written his account sometimes 
during his retirement from EIC service, although the exact date has not been 
determined.98 Kanhaiya Lal's, Tarikh-i baghavat-i Hind 1857: maharbah-yi azim is a 
comprehensive and carefully researched account of the key episodes and personalities in 
the rebellion. Although Lal was careful not to be critical of the British, he does attempt 
to present an unbiased view, particularly of the events surrounding the fall of Delhi and 
its aftermath. Syed Ahmed Khan, the most prominent Indian Muslim loyalist during the 
rebellion, wrote The Causes of the Indian revolt under the original Urdu title, Asbab Sarkashi 
Hindustan in 1858, followed by the English version in 1873.99 Among all the major 
figures of the rebel movement, the most extensive data relates to its supreme leader, 
Bahadur Shah Zafar. The most popular Urdu newspapers reporting from Delhi in 
support of Bahadur Shah Zafar during the rebellion years were the Dilli Urdu Akhbar 
and the Sadiq-ul-Akhbar.100 Some of the editions are preserved in the National Archives 
of India, New Delhi, which are also available in print.101  
For Indian sources that concentrate mainly on Avadh, the richest collection of primary 
materials being utilised is the multiple volumes of Freedom struggle in Uttar Pradesh.102 The 
six volume series are a rich repository of archival documents, diaries, letters, intelligence 
reports, parliamentary papers, and proceedings of the foreign, political, revenue, and 
judicial departments. Together they provide a comprehensive account of the events in 
Uttar Pradesh for the period 1857-59. These sources, in addition, contain a number of 
                                               
96 Pandey et al., From sepoy to subedar; being the life and adventures of Subedar Sita Ram, a native officer of the Bengal 
army, written and related by himself. 
97 Khan and Faruqi, Khadang-i ghadar. 
98 Asghar Hussain Khan Ludhianwi and Salahudin Ahmad, Dastan-e-Ghadar (Story of the Mutiny) 
(1955), reprinted in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), 1857: Roznamche, Muasir Tehriren, 
Yaddashten (1857: Diaries, Memoirs and Contemporary Writings) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2007), p. 864. 
99 Khan, The causes of the Indian revolt. 
100 M. Atique Siddiqi, Attharah sau sattavan, akhbar aur dastavezen  (Dihli: Maktabah-yi Shahrah, 1966). 
101 See Attharah sau sattavan, akhbar aur dastavezen. 
102 Rizvi, Freedom struggle in Uttar Pradesh: source material: Eastern and adjoining districts; Freedom struggle in Uttar 
Pradesh: source material: Western districts and Rohilkhand; Rizvi and Bhargava, Freedom struggle in Uttar Pradesh: 
source material Awadh: 1857-59; Freedom struggle in Uttar Pradesh: source material 1857-59. 
25 
 
royal proclamations by the Begum of Avadh which address several matters concerning 
Avadh-British relations, the mistreatment of Avadh royalty by the British authorities, 
and refrains to the Sepoys and the general public to unite against the British and destroy 
them.  
Colonial accounts by comparison are too numerous to mention, but the ones often 
consulted for this research are works by George Bruce Malleson,103 Charles Ball,104 
Noah Alfred Chick,105 John William Kaye,106 G. W. Forrest,107 Frederick S. Roberts,108 
Sir William Muir.109 Official sources include Records of the Delhi Residency and 
Agency,110Selections from the records of the Government of the Punjab and its dependencies : Trial of 
Muhammad Bahadur Shah, Titular King of Delhi, and of Mogul Beg, and Hajee, all of Delhi, for 
rebellion against the British Government, and murder of Europeans during 1857,111 and the series, 
Mutiny Records Correspondence - in two parts,112 and Mutiny Records Reports - in two parts.113 The 
Trial proceedings which appeared in 1870, and are available in print contain not only 
the deposed Emperor's statement and those of witnesses against him, but also 
numerous copies of his routine missives issued during the rebellion years, as well as his 
proclamations against the British. The Records of the Delhi Agency spanning 1807-57 
contain directives, reports, and exchange of official correspondence by successive EIC 
Residents, their deputies, and senior members of the EIC administration on revenue 
and governance matters concerning Delhi. More importantly, they discuss the nature 
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and course of the EIC relationship with Bahadur Shah Zafar in the crucial years prior to 
the rebellion.   
Barely utilised by historian of the 1857 rebellion, but invaluable for this thesis, the 
Mutiny Reports, and its companion volume, Mutiny correspondence have an extensive 
amount of  material on the Punjab and the North-West Frontier. Published over the 
period 1857-58, this material, which was initially maintained in the archives of the 
Punjab Civil Secretariat, has been available in print since 1911. It has recently been 
reproduced and compiled by Lahore-based Sang-e-Meel Publications, titled, Mutiny 
Records Correspondence - in two parts,114 and Mutiny Records Reports - in two parts.115 The official 
reports and correspondence were authored by an assortment of colonial officers, who 
included deputy commissioners, commissioners, secretaries of the government of India, 
and army officers. They contain a vast amount of information related to British military 
plans, administrative measures, troop recruitment, and assessments of the security and 
political situation in the Punjab during the course of the rebellion. Although there is 
only cursory mention of Punjabi Muslim and Pathan motivation, the detailed data on 
the latter's recruitment, organisation, and military activity warrants careful re-
examination to discern the underlying ideological motives for their pro-British and anti-
rebel attitude during the rebellion. Similarly useful sources on the Punjab and the 
North-West Frontier are the various District Gazetteers of British Punjab which, though 
published after the rebellion, have useful information on the rebellion years that 
complements the data in the Mutiny Records series. These gazetteers too have been 
compiled from various district headquarters and reprinted by Sang-e-Meel 
Publications.116  
The availability of all this data in print, combined with a historical case studies approach 
that draws on methodologies from the social sciences, has mitigated the need for 
archive visits for the purposes of this thesis.
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Chapter 1: Delhi 
Introduction 
As the centre of the 1857 rebellion, Delhi witnessed the most decisive military 
operations between the rebel Sepoys and the EIC Army. The city contained the largest 
concentration of Sepoys through the critical phase of the war against the British. It 
served as the seat of Mughal power where the Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, a hitherto 
nominal potentate, had reasserted himself as the Mughal sovereign at the onset of the 
rebellion. This chapter examines the question of how the ideologies of royalism, 
culturalism, and  religiosity motivated the Sepoys, Ulama and royalty of Delhi to rise 
against the British. It argues that the idea of royalism as a political ideology strongly 
appealed to the three groups, but was ultimately unsuccessful as a political programme 
on account of the Emperor's failure of leadership, a counterproductive ideology, and an 
inability to gain powerful allies against the British. The Sepoys, though dedicated to the 
restoration of his rule, were handicapped due to a sense of alienation that they 
experienced from the breakdown of a military ideology that fell apart as a result of their 
uprising, and for which they could not subsequently develop a substitute ideology. 
Consequently, they experienced loss of morale, professional pride, and military 
cohesion, which adversely affected their combat performance, and in turn limited their 
ability to spearhead the royalist cause. The Ulama on their part, successfully rallied the 
Sepoys with calls for Jihad, but the anomalies in their religious beliefs, and the gap 
between their pronouncements and subsequent conduct revealed an ambivalent 
commitment to Jihad. As this chapter will show, no ideological strand by itself 
adequately explains the behaviour of the actors, as all three played their role as 
motivating factors at different stages of the rebellion for each of the actors.  
 
Sepoys 
When the first batch of rebellious Sepoys comprising a large Muslim component of the 
3rd Light Cavalry poured into Delhi on 11 May 1857, one of their first acts was to 
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restore Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar to the Mughal throne.1 In this situation of 
political uncertainty, and no political programme of their own, there was no-one else 
the Sepoys could turn to for leadership. From that day onwards, the rebel Army and its 
leadership displayed a consistent commitment to the restoration of Bahadur Shah Zafar, 
whom they believed was the rightful ruler of Hindustan. Even when the Emperor 
appeared ready in the end to surrender to the EIC authorities, the Sepoy commander, 
General Bakht Khan pleaded with him not to give himself up, and made the offer that 
he accompany the remnants of the Sepoy Army out of Delhi so the war could be 
resumed elsewhere under the royal leadership. However, Bahadur Shah Zafar was 
adamant, and the Sepoy Army had to leave without him. Although the main force was 
still intact, and a number of Sepoys proceeded to join the war in Avadh where their 
colleagues of the former Bengal Army were engaging the British, the large Delhi force 
was left without a supreme leader for the rest of the war, and the Royalist cause they 
associated with him.  
During the earlier phase of the war, sometimes in July 1857 when Sepoy numbers had 
increased in Delhi, a Court of Administration was set up by the Sepoys to manage the 
military and civilian affairs of the city.2 Its membership consisted of two Sepoys each of 
the cavalry, infantry and artillery wings of the Army, as well as four civilians, presided 
over by the commander-in-chief of the Army.3 All matters before the Court were to be 
decided by majority vote, and in case of dissension, the issue was to be referred to the 
Emperor, whose decision would be final.4 According to Mahmood Farooqui, the object 
and functions of the Sepoy Court indicated early attempts at governance,5 while M. 
Atique Siddiqi has gone so far as to suggest that their charter of duties amounted to 'the 
first constitution of India'.6 However, rather than as an organ of political governance, 
the Administrative Court functioned like an EIC administrative body whose 
composition and procedures the Sepoy leadership would have been familiar with.7 It 
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was little more than an ad hoc arrangement to manage the administrative affairs of 
Delhi, including procurement of funds and arranging supplies. As a body, it appears to 
have been concerned only with 'doing away with mismanagement and removing 
disorder from the civil and military establishment'.8 The Court was ill-equipped to 
perform an effective political role. As career soldiers, Sepoy members of the Court held 
an apolitical outlook as part of their military culture. At Delhi, the princes, royal 
advisors, and the Emperor provided the required political leadership. Being outsiders 
who had no exposure to court politics, and for whom the key figures of the city were 
strangers, the Sepoys were hardly in a position to exercise political authority.  
In their primary role, the Delhi Sepoys were organised under two military formations: 
the Bareilly and Neemuch brigades, commanded by Bakht Khan and Hira Singh 
respectively, both of whom were former Subedars in the Bengal Army.9 The brigades 
consisted of some fourteen thousand Sepoys from several regiments that had  rebelled 
in Bareilly, Neemuch, Meerut, and in Delhi itself.10  Their performance however, 
suffered on several counts. A number of incidents were observed in which senior Sepoy 
officers interfered with each other's battle plans, and even failed to come to the 
assistance of a fellow commander's forces. There was also confusion over who was in 
command of which regiment made worse by the duality of command between Prince 
Mirza Mughal, and Bakht Khan with the former as commander-in-chief, and the latter 
as Lord Governor General.11  
The crisis of military leadership and cohesion had set in as early as May, 1857, when the 
Sepoys rose against their British officers at the Meerut Cantonment. As a consequence, 
the Sepoys experienced a sudden institutional and leadership vacuum which had 
                                               
8 Surendra N. Sen, Eighteen fifty-seven  (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information & 
Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 1957). 75. 
9 Selections from the records of the Government of the Punjab and its dependencies : Trial of Muhammad Bahadur Shah, 
Titular King of Delhi, and of Mogul Beg, and Hajee, all of Delhi, for rebellion against the British Government, and murder 
of Europeans during 1857: 187. 
10 Khurshid M. Rizvi, Tarikh-i jang-i azadi-e Hind, attharah sau sattavan : Dihli, Mairath, Avadh aur Ruhilkhand  
(Rampur: Rampur Raza Library, 2000). 284. Translation mine; For a detailed breakdown of the regiments 
see Muir and Coldstream, Records of the Intelligence Department of the Government of the North-west Provinces of 
India During the Mutiny of 1857: 79-80. 
11 Selections from the records of the Government of the Punjab and its dependencies : Trial of Muhammad Bahadur Shah, 
Titular King of Delhi, and of Mogul Beg, and Hajee, all of Delhi, for rebellion against the British Government, and murder 
of Europeans during 1857: 82-83. 
30 
 
hitherto been occupied by the EIC, and that created a state of alienation and confusion. 
As Durkheim's social theory postulates, in times of social change and upheaval, clear 
societal standards and expectations for individuals vanish; that without clear rules, 
norms, or values, people feel anxious, rootless and confused, or experience what is 
termed as a state of 'normlessness'.12 The violent eruption by the Sepoys not only 
disintegrated their structure as an organised EIC force, it also damaged military esprit de 
corps and the sense of belonging that the men felt as members of well-knit units. As their 
ties with the EIC  broke, the men faced the prospect of surviving in an environment 
that was unfamiliar and ambiguous. There was no central authority or delegated 
command they could relate to, and from which they could draw an alternative military 
culture. Bahadur Shah Zafar, who had been restored to the Mughal throne at the behest 
of the Sepoys themselves, turned out to be an inept leader who moreover, remained 
aloof from the former Bengal Army now under his command. The Sepoy Army's non-
commissioned and junior officers, suddenly thrust into the roles of generals and 
colonels, had no experience of managing the morale of such a large body of troops, or 
of conducting military warfare at the higher level. A deficit of trained and committed 
leadership, weak chain of command, competing loci of authority, and disorganisation 
and ad hoc-ism in fighting formations created demoralisation among the Sepoys, 
adversely affecting their behaviour. The Sepoys regularly disobeyed their officers, failed 
to organise into battle formations, and neglected to wear their uniforms.13 Many of 
them lost their will to fight during forays against the EIC force, throwing away their 
weapons and running away, or pretending to be wounded.14 There were instances of 
Sepoys deserting, or opting out of the conflict, and others attacking the British half-
heartedly.15 Being unable to completely shed their past EIC military culture, Sepoy units 
could be seen marching to military tunes which had been taught to them by their British 
officers, and displaying EIC colours and uniforms.16 Some of the Sepoys started styling 
themselves as colonel and general sahibs, prompting a concerned Delhi citizen to 
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remark, 'writing to them creates a lot of problems as one does not know which mode of 
address will please them, and which will displease them'.17 The Sepoys were frequently 
quarrelling with each other, refusing to obey their senior officers, and avoiding combat 
on various pretexts.18 Sepoy factions were divided on the issue of supporting Bakht 
Khan, who had been appointed as their commanding general by the Emperor, so much 
so that a delegation even approached the latter, complaining that Bakht Khan was 
unsuitable to lead the Delhi Force.19 The situation became so uncertain that military 
orders and operational directives that should have been the sole prerogative of senior 
officers in the rebel Army were sometimes issued by junior ranks who were not trained 
to lead. A stark instance of this was a military plan announced by a Muslim Daffadar 
addressed to all military officers in Delhi, advising them on how to form their ranks in 
battle and the tactics to be employed.20 This trend was evident among their Sepoy 
counterparts in Avadh as well, as we shall see in the next chapter. The importance of 
cohesion in fostering and maintaining a sense of militarism will be highlighted in the 
following chapters on the Punjab and the North-West Frontier, where its existence was 
an important factor in combat effectiveness as opposed to its relative absence and 
resultant lack of fighting spirit among the Sepoys under discussion here.  
The state of the rebel Bengal Army currently active in Delhi had been very different in 
the past. Until the 1857 uprising, the Bengal Army Sepoys bore a long EIC military 
tradition going back a hundred years.21 A strong military culture developed in the Bengal 
and other EIC Presidency Armies over the period. Based on kinship ties, regimentation, 
chain of command, and professional training, military units fostered a sense of 
belonging and pride as the Sepoys went through years of shared experience of 
peacetime service and combat. The culture of discipline, cohesiveness, and pride of 
performance that emerged came to define their distinct militarism, serving as a guide 
map for their behaviour. The mainly high-caste Hindu and Muslim Sepoys who joined 
these units considered the profession of arms not merely a means of livelihood, but a 
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source of privilege and pride. It was an attractive outlet for these martial tribesmen who 
valued a life with scope for adventure, high status, security of service, and respect and 
honour from their families and tribal communities. 
Sepoy association with their British officers was not always harmonious. By the mid 
nineteenth century, strains began to appear in the relationship. It has been suggested 
that camaraderie between the European officers and Sepoys weakened as many of the 
officers were transferred to newly raised regiments, and some of the ablest opted for 
EIC political service as British India gained newer territories.22 Those who had arrived 
from other regiments were generally unfamiliar with these Sepoys, and relatively 
indifferent to their sensitivities.23 EIC military expansion, which led to an induction of 
personnel from the Punjab, posed a potential threat to the monopoly of the Rajput, 
Brahmin, Mughal, Syed, and Pathan tribesmen of Avadh, Bihar and Rohilkhand, who 
formed the traditional recruiting base of the Bengal Army.24 There was also an increase 
in the proselytising activity of some military officers and European missionaries, which 
had been largely benign till the 1830s.25  
The significance of the service factor in the Sepoy motivation to rebel has been over-
emphasised. Officer turnover in the regiments, though greater than before, was a 
routine feature of military life, so that the Sepoys and the newly posted officers would 
have been able to adjust to one another. Sepoy attachment to their regiments as 
symbolised by flags, bands, parades and manoeuvres remained in place, and continued 
to be a source of pride and inspiration. New inductees from the Punjab, drawn mostly 
from Sikh soldiers of the disbanded Army of Maharajah Ranjit Singh, and Punjabi 
Muslim tribes were few in numbers, and did not markedly alter the existing ethnic 
composition of the EIC regiments.26 Similarly, proselytization attempts were not 
widespread, and they continued to be officially discouraged by EIC authorities.27 Much 
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of the missionary work being undertaken was, at any rate, directed at the civilian 
population.28 Thus, even as service ties appear to have weakened,  the military culture 
that bound the Sepoys with their regiments and British officers essentially remained 
intact.  
What sparked the rebellion had less to do with service grievances than with cultural and 
religious issues. Matters between the Sepoys and their British commanders came  to a 
head on the issue of greased cartridges to the Bengal Army. As news started to spread 
among the Sepoys that these cartridges, first manufactured in 1856, were laced with cow 
and pig fat, which was repugnant to Hindus and Muslim respectively, protests and 
violent reactions erupted in various cantonments, starting with the famous incident 
involving Sepoy Mangal Panday of the 34th Bengal Native Infantry at Barrackpore in 
March, 1857.29 The disobedience recurred at Meerut on a much larger scale when the 3rd 
Bengal Light Cavalry, a predominantly Muslim regiment, refused to handle the 
cartridges at a parade ordered by their commandant on 24th April, 1857.30 Of the ninety 
Sepoys on parade, five accepted the ammunition for the drill, but the others, most of 
whom were Muslims, refused to obey the order.31 All eighty five were shackled, had 
their uniforms ripped off, and were then court-martialled and sentenced to ten years of 
prison with hard labour.32 From the British perspective, this was standard punishment 
for a gross and deliberate disobedience of the code of military conduct. The Sepoys on 
the other hand, considered the treatment a direct attack on their sense of honour at 
being humiliated in full view of their colleagues and the entire military garrison at 
Meerut. Reaction came swiftly as the condemned men cursed their British officers, and 
urged their colleagues to defy them.33 The spectacle and appeals had a strong effect, as 
the next day, the 3rd cavalry troopers who had witnessed the punishment rushed to the 
jail where their colleagues were being held, freed them, and proceeded to attack and kill 
the British officers and destroy their homes before setting off for Delhi. It is now a 
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well-known story, but the question is, what provided the ideological motivation behind 
this act of rebellion. Damaged pride and honour from the incident was merely the 
catalyst, as has often been argued, the actual grievance being the violation of their 
religious beliefs through the use of the repugnant cartridges. The Sepoys were 
convinced, says the extant literature, that the British were determined to destroy their 
religion through the cartridges and other attempts to coerce or deceive them to give up 
their religion and convert to Christianity.34 In short, religion - or 'deen and dharam' -  is 
regarded as the motivating ideology behind the revolt of the Sepoys.35 Several 
statements and behaviours attributed to the Sepoys during the course of the rebellion 
attest to the significance of the religious factor in their resistance. The Sepoys often 
mentioned with bitterness the attempts by the EIC authorities to interfere with their 
caste and religion, and vowed to kill the Europeans whenever they chanced upon 
them.36  
It might be pointed out however, that it was a stronger motivating factor for the Hindu 
Sepoys, especially the Rajputs and Brahmins among them, than for their Muslim 
counterparts. The high caste Hindus were very sensitive about losing their social and 
religious status. Any act that violated the strict rites and sanctions laid down by their 
faith, whether by their own volition or unconscious deed or that of others to defile 
them, would result in permanent ostracism and disgrace. Thus sharing food or utensils 
with a low-caste person, or consciously or unconsciously touching or eating meat, all 
the more if the latter was beef or tallow, which, as a product of gao-mata (the sacred 
cow) was inviolable, would bring indelible calamity. However, the Muslim Sepoys' 
contention that the greased cartridges were a core religious issue for them was a 
misperception. 
It is overlooked in the extant literature that the Muslim Sepoys should have had no 
reason to fear loss of religion by merely handling lard-laced cartridges. A pig and its 
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derivatives are of course haram (impermissible) for Muslims, but eating or biting pork 
(or for that matter any other prohibited substance) unknowingly, or under threat of 
severe punishment or death does not deprive a Muslim of his faith.37 Even if the deed is 
deliberate, a person is promised divine forgiveness provided there is realisation that a 
sin or transgression was committed, and a sincere resolve made to not repeat it. No 
purification ritual, elaborate penance, or priestly sanction or intercession is required for 
the cleansing process. The pig-fat content in the controversial cartridges was not 
unequivocally established in the first place, and there were repeated British assurances 
and steps to allay Muslim and Hindu fears on that account.38 Even if the EIC authorities 
were being disingenuous, the affected Muslim Sepoys had a number of courses open to 
them to safeguard their faith. They could have petitioned the authorities to stop the 
distribution of cartridges. Indeed, that is what some of them reportedly did, but this 
recourse was not accepted by their commanding officer.39 In that case, the men could 
simply have resigned from service as it was a strictly volunteer Army, or agreed to use 
the cartridges to avoid severe punishment, and quit after the event. Compared with 
what their Hindu colleagues faced, Islam provided them greater flexibility in rituals and 
rites as well as easier methods of atonement for sins or undesirable acts, and did not 
deny them religious identity if they transgressed under threat or use of force, or 
deception by others. So the issue of religion being a motivating ideology for the Muslim 
Sepoys needs to be looked at more carefully.                                                                                         
The issue of European missionary activity and enforcement of Christianity in India was 
the other major Sepoy grievance against the EIC, as this was directly related to their 
allegation that they were being forced to convert. Christian evangelism, which was 
benign until the early 1800s, had started to intensify in the 1830s with the circulation of 
religious tracts deemed offensive to Hinduism and Islam, and the establishment of 
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missionary societies.40 Although there was no prohibition in Islam on members of other 
faiths to preach their religion among the Muslim community, where Christian 
evangelists overstepped was in publishing literature that occasionally included content 
which was either uncomplimentary or insulting to Islam.41 When the missionaries 
occasionally used intemperate language against Hindu gods or Prophet Muhammad, 
they met with outright hostility.42 Missionary preaching in public places and distribution 
of religious tracts were also largely unsuccessful as few Hindus or Muslims took note of 
these activities.43 Similarly, chapel preaching was unsuccessful because hardly any Hindu 
or Muslim dared to go to such places for fear of condemnation by their communities.44 
Consequently, there was very seldom a case of conversion from Hinduism or Islam to 
Christianity in Northern India.45  
The question inevitably arises as to why then the Muslim Sepoys invoke the issue of 
religion so vehemently and persistently against the British, when the religious grounds 
for doing so were weak? This was not merely a case of religion serving a rhetorical 
function, but rather one of heuristic processing with the Sepoys making perfunctory 
religious judgements on the greased cartridges and Christian evangelism. According to 
the heuristics or low-information processing model, knowledge plays only a marginal 
role in shaping opinions and attitudes about issues.46 The concept is based on the 
assumption that people tend to be cognitive misers and minimise the stress entailed in 
decision-making and attitude-formation.47 Accordingly, most individuals do not attempt 
to develop an in-depth understanding of issues which would require significant 
cognitive effort. Instead, they tend to collect only as much information as they think is 
necessary to make a given decision. They rely on cognitive shortcuts or heuristics to 
efficiently sift through the complex or large amount of information.48 Examples of 
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heuristics include religious or ideological predispositions, cues from the external 
environment about which issues are important or how they should be interpreted, and 
perceptions of others' opinions or attitudes. Thus the Sepoys avoided detailed 
information processing, and relied on the simple heuristic rules in order to persuade 
themselves of the validity of their religious grievances against the British. In a heuristic 
mode, Muslim Sepoys retained the partial knowledge of Quranic prohibition on pork, 
while avoiding the caveats in the sacred text that made it permissible or excusable. They 
similarly regarded the first available information on missionary efforts at conversion as a 
basis for their outrage, disregarding rejoinders in the sacred texts that Muslims ought 
not to feel insecure on account of their faith, and should simply ignore any attempts at 
conversion. However, the initial religious information once absorbed, served to 
motivate them in their struggle against the British. This belief was then sustained 
through what has been termed as confirmation bias, or belief bolstering, that is, the 
tendency to preserve an existing belief by avoiding reflection on prior judgements and 
disregarding any disconfirming evidence or information.49   
Though the cartridge issue served as the initial religious motive, once revenge had been 
exacted on that account through killing and destruction sprees at Meerut and Delhi, the 
Muslim Sepoys needed an additional stimulant to maintain their fighting spirit through 
the course of the conflict. This need was fulfilled through resort to Jihad. In order to 
obtain the necessary justification and inspiration for a holy war, they nominated the 
Ulama as their leaders, wherever such individuals could be found and were willing to 
provide guidance and inspiration. At Delhi they approached the Emperor, telling him 
that the English were 'depriving them of their Hindu and Muslim religion', and seeking 
his protection and blessings for their armed struggle.50 Considering that Bahadur Shah 
Zafar was also the symbolic head of the Islamic faith in India, this was an attempt on 
the part of Sepoys to obtain his sanction for the sacred cause. In the same spirit, the 
Sepoy leader, General Bakht Khan, who had become a murid (disciple) of one Maulvi 
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Sarfaraz Ali, sought the latter's spiritual blessings for the uprising.51 Bakht Khan then 
played a decisive role in rallying the Delhi Ulama to issue a fatwa (edict) of Jihad against 
the British.52 His close relationship with Maulvi Sarfaraz Ali prompted him to 
acknowledge the Maulvi as head of the Mujahideen in Delhi, and petition the Emperor 
to encourage Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, the royal physician and principal advisor to the 
Emperor, as well as other prominent members of Delhi society to join Maulvi Ali in 
military operations against the British.53 
However, we should be cautious about seeing too much of the Jihadi spirit among  the 
Sepoys, because, apart from instances of bravery that it instilled at the individual level, 
the spirit of Jihad did not strongly manifest at the group level. There was a shared 
awareness among the Muslim Sepoys and their leadership that theirs was a composite 
Army, in which the Hindu participation was critical, and so caution was needed to avoid 
too emphatic an expression and pursuit of Islamic Jihad. While Jihad was thus not a 
significant external influence on the Sepoys as a group, its value as an intrinsic source of 
inspiration for the individual Sepoy would have been greater. An instance illustrating 
this occurred on the 1st of August, 1857, when a number of rebel combatants, which 
would have included Sepoys as well, rallied out of the gates of Delhi to give battle to the 
besieging British force at the outskirts of the city. As reported, the attackers' 'religiuous 
zeal was rekindled by loud cries from the minarets of the city mosques' while they 
shouted the Muslim battle cry of Allah-o-Akbar'.54 There were also some instances of 
British regiments encountering individual rebel Sepoys in command of a group of 
Mujahideen, and attired in green robes, symbolising Islamic identity and zeal. 
Mujahideen of The men fought viciously but failed to drive the British force from its 
positions.55 Apart from such utilty of Jihad as an extrinsic motivator, it retained an 
intrinsic value as a psychological tool of inspiration for the Sepoys, similar to what has 
been described in Terror Management theory. According to this theory, people are 
motivated to resist the terror of death by investing in belief systems or ideologies like 
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Jihad that instil life with meaning, such as security and identity.56 Muslim Sepoys in the 
1857 rebellion would have been able to take up the role of Ghazis who could gain 
glorified status as Jihad veterans. Another way to manage the terror of death is through 
a belief in the promise of immortality, which provides the sense that one is part of 
something greater than oneself - than life itself.57 This element of terror management 
corresponds with the notion of martyrdom, which entails sacrificing one's life in the 
name of God in exchange for the divine promise of immortality. Either type of 
motivation provided salvation and spiritual fulfilment for the Muslim warrior, and was 
the most potent psycho-religious weapon he could muster in battle.  
 
Royalty 
It is often claimed that Bahadur Shah Zafar's initial reaction at the outbreak of rebellion 
in Delhi had been one of surprise and disapproval. When the first batch of rebellious 
Bengal Army Sepoys from Meerut approached him to assume de facto authority as the 
Mughal sovereign and lead them against the British, he responded that he had not called 
them up, and reprimanded them for acting in a 'wicked' manner.58 In Dalrymple's view, 
the incident indicates the helplessness and pressure Bahadur Shah Zafar was 
experiencing due to Sepoy assertiveness and manipulation.59 During his trial following 
the failed rebellion, the Emperor himself claimed in defence that he had been acting 
under coercion of the Sepoys, and was forced to affix his seal on various orders at their 
behest.60 Yet there is enough indication that Bahadur Shah's decision to assume 
leadership of the rebellion was not made in haste, nor under Sepoy pressure. As we shall 
see later, he had enough reasons of his own to feel aggrieved against the EIC. As for the 
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Sepoys, the situation before the Sepoy Army's advent in Delhi was unclear, and even 
though news of their unrest and outbreaks at Barrackpore, Berhampore and Meerut 
might have reached him, Bahadur Shah Zafar could not be certain of their motives and 
capabilities. But after the Sepoys arrived in Delhi, he realised the magnitude of their 
surge and accepted their allegiance and military services upon hearing their persistent 
requests to spearhead their cause. When they told him, 'come lead us, we will win the 
entire Hindustan for you, he seemed convinced of their resolve, and placed his hand on 
their heads in the traditional acknowledgement of his blessings'.61 Moreover, there were 
no European soldiers in Delhi at the time, and the local EIC troops had already joined 
the rebel Sepoys from Meerut, so there was apparently little or no immediate risk for 
Bahadur Shah Zafar in assuming the mantle of leadership in such a situation.  
The matter of being coerced to sign royal orders was rebutted by a personal courtier 
who testified at the trial that no one had access to the royal seal, which the Emperor 
always kept in his private chambers.62 It is highly unlikely that the Sepoys were in a 
position to force the Emperor to sign any documents against his will as they hardly 
stood to benefit from such a deed. They and their commanders were dependent on the 
Emperor's leadership as evidenced by the urgency with which they had reached Delhi in 
order to obtain his sanction, and their continuing acknowledgement of him as the 
sovereign ruler of Hindustan. They could thus ill afford to intimidate or defraud him. 
On his part, the Emperor certainly seemed conscious of the steadfast Sepoy allegiance, 
and did not hesitate in asserting his authority over them as evident in his numerous 
directives. He was quite successful at having those of his orders or wishes, which he 
considered crucial, implemented. None of the notables whom he summoned could 
refuse his call, and he would not hesitate in making drastic and controversial changes in 
leadership.63 In other words, it was loyalty to the monarchy or royalism that worked as a 
powerful bond between Bahadur Shah and his Sepoy followers, and that was used by 
Bahadur Shah Zafar to assert his authority. 
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But Bahadur Shah's cultural predisposition as the embodiment of Mughal comportment 
marred his relationship with the Sepoys. He frequently criticised them for not displaying 
the mannerism that was expected in the court of a Mughal monarch by indulging in 
such acts as barging into the royal chambers without permission, and not taking off 
their shoes in his presence.64 In a special directive to Prince Mirza Mughal, he castigated 
the Sepoys of the 54th BNI for bivouacking in the royal gardens, and promptly ordered 
their removal.65 In another missive, he ordered Mirza Mughal to arrange for their 
quarters outside the city precincts.66 Bahadur Shah Zafar's relationship with General 
Bakht Khan similarly suffered from occasional cultural tension. When Bakht Khan 
presented himself at the palace to offer his services, Bahadur Shah Zafar and his 
courtiers noticed his failure to observe the required obeisance in the royal presence by 
walking up to the Emperor without explicit permission, and holding his hand.67 The 
display of assumed familiarity infuriated a courtier, who pushed Bakht Khan back, and 
the two then nearly drew their swords at each other.68 The Emperor was reluctant to 
bestow Khillat on Bakht Khan, but changed his mind on the recommendation of some 
of his advisors, and acknowledged Bakht Khan's status by awarding him a sword on the 
occasion.69 Subsequently, he was appointed as the Lord Governor General of the rebel 
Army at Delhi.70  
The Emperor's mistrust of Bakht Khan resurfaced towards the end of the rebellion. 
When the fall of Delhi became imminent, and Bakht Khan asked the Emperor to 
accompany him and his still largely intact force out of Delhi and continue the war 
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elsewhere, Bahadur Shah Zafar refused the offer at the behest of Hakim Ahsanullah 
Khan. The latter cautioned the Emperor about the risks associated with a journey full of 
hardship and uncertainty.71 Confronting Bakht Khan in the Emperor's presence, the 
Hakim accused him of harbouring an ambition to usurp power for himself, and avenge 
his Afghan kinsmen who had been defeated by the Mughal ancestors of Bahadur Shah 
Zafar.72 Such counsel might not have had the desired effect if the Emperor had not 
been harbouring misgivings of his own about the General's Rohilla Afghan lineage. 
Cultural factors thus undermined the relationship between the Emperor and the Sepoys. 
The cultural factor also influenced Bahadur Shah's attitude towards the British, and 
motivated him to rise against them when the opportunity arose in the form of the 
Sepoy rebellion. His troubled interaction with the British can be traced to the beginning 
of his rule in 1837, when the EIC officials, who had been careful in observing protocols 
and courtesies in the courts of local rulers in the past, started curtailing these rituals.73 
Lord Auckland even insisted on being treated as an equal by Bahadur Shah Zafar by 
making his visit to the Emperor conditional upon the latter returning his call.74 
Offended at the slight, Bahadur Shah Zafar refused the Governor General's offer, and 
the meeting never materialised.75 Lord Auckland was also adamant that the Emperor 
should dispense with the practice of bestowing Khillat and requiring Nazar.76 The 
customary Nazar by the EIC resident on behalf of the Governor-General and 
Commander-in-chief on the occasions of Eid, Nau Roz, and Bahadur Shah's birthday 
was discontinued.77  
Bahadur Shah Zafar was equally adamant on projecting his royal status and 
commitment to high cultural norms. Despite occasional EIC curbs and snubs, he strove 
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to uphold Mughal comportment and expected all those he dealt with, including EIC 
officials, to acknowledge and respect these norms. Court rituals and courtesies were an 
integral part of the Mughal cultural ideology,  highly valued for the expressions of 
respect, honour and grandeur they conveyed about a Mughal sovereign. These practices 
moreover, had a political significance in that they conveyed to all concerned the state of 
relations and status of each party in the elaborate system of exchanges at court.78 As a 
Mughal sovereign, Bahadur Shah Zafar considered it his exclusive privilege to bestow 
titles and distinctions on visitors and distinguished officials,79 and to receive their Nazar. 
He felt insulted at the repeated and deliberate breach of Mughal protocol by the British, 
which amounted to demeaning his royal status. He could not tolerate the encroachment 
upon his dignity,80 and vented his frustration on a number of occasions. In February 
1838, he wrote to Queen Victoria, complaining that 'the etiquette and tokens of respect 
which former governors always observed towards this house have been completely 
abolished', and expressing the hope that the 'ancient customs and usages belonging to 
the Imperial family of Hindustan will be restored'.81 A month later, he wrote to the 
Lieutenant Governor of the North West Province, reminding him of the British 
government's assurance to his grandfather, Shah Alam II that the 'honour, dignity and 
happiness of the Mughal Royal House will always be upheld by it'.82 In 1843, he 
demanded of the governor general to 'restore the practice of presenting nazar to him', 
direct the EIC officials to stop treating the 'descendants of Timur' on equal terms, and 
'revert to the practice of presenting themselves to Mughal royalty as supplicants'.83 
However, the British remained unreceptive to his cultural sensitivities, and consequently 
there was a standoff between the two sides.  
Another point of contention with the EIC was its subversion of Mughal political status 
and norms. The dominant issues were that of succession to the Mughal throne, and the 
future standing of Mughal royalty. Dispute over the succession first surfaced in 1856 
upon the unexpected death of Mirza Fakhru, the acknowledged crown prince at the 
                                               
78 Fisher, 'The Resident in Court Ritual, 1764-1858', 425. 
79 Krishnaji N. Chitnis, Medieval Indian History  (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 2003). 68. 
80 Spear, Twilight of the Mughuls: studies in late Mughul Delhi: 76. 
81 Cited in Husain, Bahadur Shah Zafar and the war of 1857 in Dehli: 145. 
82 Ashraf, Muslim attitudes towards British rule and Western culture in India in the first half of the nineteenth century: 
43. 
83 Husain, Bahadur Shah Zafar and the war of 1857 in Dehli: 140-41. 
44 
 
time. Bahadur Shah Zafar demanded of the EIC Resident to appoint Mirza Jawan 
Bakht, his son from his wife Zeenat Mahal, as the next heir. To buttress his case, the 
Emperor attached a declaration of support by the other princes in favour of Mirza 
Jawan Bakht.84 However, Mirza Kavaish, the eldest prince, complained to the EIC 
Resident that the Emperor had extracted the signatures from the Princes in return for 
monetary inducements, and put forward his counter claim to succession as the eldest in 
the line of succession.85 Thereupon, the Governor General rejected Bahadur Shah 
Zafar's suggestion to appoint Mirza Jawan Bakht, and instructed the Resident to 
confirm Mirza Kavaish as the Crown Prince.86 The decision was intended to indicate to 
the Emperor that EIC's political considerations were more important than his personal 
preference. Mirza Kavaish's request was only accepted on the condition that he would 
not be given the title of Badshah, and would be referred to as the Prince instead.87 He 
would also have to vacate the Red Fort and receive a reduced monthly stipend from the 
EIC.88 These measures had important implications, for as Lord Canning, the Governor 
General (1856-1858) and subsequently Viceroy of India (1858 to 1862) described the 
situation, 'after all these actions … there is nothing left to show that the British Rule is 
in any way subject to the will of the Badshah'.89  
The lack of political sovereignty that Bahadur Shah had to contend with was not a new 
development. The process was well under way in the reigns of his father and 
grandfather. His grandfather, Shah Alam II had become dependent upon EIC 
protection following his defeat at the battle of Buxar (1764), and the subsequent EIC 
capture of Delhi from the Marathas in 1803. Henceforth, his authority was restricted to 
his residence in the Red Fort, where he could hold audience and give and receive nazar, 
but could only exercise control over his household.90 His son and Bahadur Shah Zafar's 
father, Akbar Shah II, was allowed to bear the title of Emperor like Shah Alam II, but 
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his authority was similarly confined to the Red Fort.91 What mattered most to them was 
the preservation of their symbolic status and its acknowledgement by the British, and 
not a de facto royal status, which they were not inclined to seek given the ascendant 
status of the EIC, and the possibility that they might face further financial withholdings 
by the British if they raised such issues. Bahadur Shah Zafar had similar experiences, but 
with an important difference. Unlike his predecessors, who could at least expect the 
continuation of a line of monarchs, however powerless, as well as retention of their title 
as Emperors, Bahadur Shah Zafar knew that he was the last Mughal monarch, whose 
status had moreover been downgraded to that of King, and whose heir had in fact 
already given up any claims to Mughal kingship upon British pressure, accepting instead 
the lower status of prince, and agreeing to permanently vacate the Red Fort upon his 
succession.92  
Although Bahadur Shah Zafar never demanded the restoration of de facto Mughal 
sovereignty from the EIC, he would have been conscious of the symbolic political 
significance underlying the succession and status issues, considering his outspokenness 
on this account with the British. Even as he seemed to be seeking mere vestiges of 
political authority, not pursuing these would have amounted to forfeiting the basis on 
which he or his successor could repossess full sovereignty at an opportune moment in 
future. Failure to uphold his dignity and status would also not have been welcomed by 
the population, including the Muslims, who still regarded the Mughal Emperor as head 
of the Muslim polity in India,93 with the divine right to rule.94 The idea that the Muslim 
King or Sultan in India had divine attributes, which justified his right to rule was 
borrowed from Islamic Persian culture,95 and it remained popular among the North 
Indian Muslim community96 well into the 1850s. Yet, this idea as we shall see, held no 
attraction for the Muslims of the Punjab and the North-West Frontier for reasons that 
will be explored in those regional chapters. When the rebellion broke out in May 1857, 
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it altered the entire political environment, rendering the succession and status issues 
irrelevant.97 Henceforth, Bahadur Shah Zafar's political outlook and strategy were 
geared towards the overthrow of the EIC. The rebellion marked a turning point in his 
political ideology, which changed from the notion of nominal sovereignty to that of 
substantive sovereignty. In pursuit of the latter, he resorted to a balance-of-power 
strategy. His balance-of-power strategy seemed to have been based on two premises. 
The EIC could not be trusted because of its unlimited political and military nominal 
ambitions, and its propensity to destroy Indian cultural and religious practices. 
Secondly, no Indian state, including the resurrected Mughal entity, was able to defeat 
the EIC on its own, but would achieve the capacity if it formed an alliance with the 
others in order to offset the British preponderance. As an instrument of royalist 
ideology, balance-of-power sought to reinforce the anti-British sentiment generated by 
the Sepoy uprising. At the same time, it aimed at creating an alliance system that was 
flexible in terms of distribution of power, rather than one with a monopoly of Mughal 
authority.  
The political environment precluded a restoration of the old empire as it existed during 
the era of the great Mughals. The regional states had long since broken away from the 
Mughal centre and established strong subsidiary alliances with the EIC. In order to woo 
them to his side, Bahadur Shah Zafar had to offer these states alternative security 
arrangements that would be mutually beneficial. In a quest to gain allies, the Emperor 
turned to the nearby states of Bullubgarh and Jhajjar. A number of missives were sent 
to the Rajah of Bullubgarh directing him to appear in the royal court at Delhi so that 
details of the state's co-operation in assisting the war effort could be worked out.98 The 
Rajah was also asked to send his cavalry and infantry to augment the troops at Delhi, 
and to make a financial contribution.99 Despite repeated calls however, the Rajah kept 
putting off a meeting, and failed to contribute any funds or troops, claiming his 
preoccupation with maintenance of law and order in his state, and the paucity of 
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resources.100 Relations cooled following Bullubgarh's hesitation in extending assistance, 
prompting a rebuke by Bahadur Shah Zafar.101 Cooperation was similarly sought from 
the Rajah of Jhajjar, but he too avoided sending any money in response to the 
Emperor's request.102 By September 1857, when the war had clearly swung in favour of 
the EIC and disaffection set in among the Delhi Sepoys, Bahadur Shah Zafar 
approached the Rajahs of Jaipur, Bikaner and Alore for assistance, even offering to 
transfer his sovereign authority to them if they would agree to form a coalition 
committed to destroy the British.103 Overtures were also made to the rulers of Iran and 
Afghanistan to support the uprising. A Mughal emissary purportedly carried a letter by 
Bahadur Shah Zafar to the Emperor of Persia complaining of the excesses and 
mistreatment by the British, and seeking Persia's military and financial help in the war.104 
The moves failed to elicit positive responses as the states were conscious of the 
ascendant British power, and the Emperor's limited capacity to match or exceed the 
advantages that they held  by virtue of their alliance with the British.  
Compared with his political ideology which was marked by ad-hocism, Bahadur Shah 
Zafar appeared to pursue a more sustained religious agenda. Throughout the rebellion 
he resorted to religion as a tool of inspiration and mobilization against the British 
through several proclamations invoking the theme of religion-in-danger on behalf of 
both Hindus and Muslims. The accusations pertained to proselytization attempts, 
insults to Hinduism and Islam, punishment of Hindus and Muslims for being true to 
their faiths, and violation of established religious practices. The cartridge defilement 
issue, which had become the casus belli for the rebellious Sepoys, was also taken up by 
Bahadur Shah Zafar. In one of his farmans, he repeated the universal charge that the 
British had 'ordered the Brahmins and others of their Army to bite cartridges, in making 
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up of which fat had been used'.105 Offering his interpretation of the Muslim Sepoys' 
reaction, the Emperor stated that though 'the Mussalman soldiers perceived that by this 
expedient the religion of Brahmins and Hindus only was in danger… they also refused 
to bite them'.106 This was a remarkable explanation, which was at odds with the belief of 
the Muslim Sepoys themselves, who claimed that the fat content in the cartridges was 
just as offensive to them as it also contained pig fat, and was thus a deliberate attempt 
to destroy their religious identity. Bahadur Shah Zafar was implying that Muslim Sepoys 
were motivated by a sense of cultural solidarity with their Hindu colleagues, rather than 
by any perceived threat to their own religiosity from the greased cartridges. In other 
words, the fat-laced cartridge was not, per se a critical religious concern for Bahadur 
Shah Zafar.   
Bahadur Shah Zafar could ill afford to alienate the Hindu Sepoys who formed the 
majority of his Army in the war, or the large Hindu population which was similarly loyal 
to him. He had therefore to be careful not to hurt their religious sensibilities. On the 
other hand, he possibly felt he could set aside the Muslim Sepoy grievance about the 
alleged pig-fat content in the cartridges on the basis that Islam did not deprive Muslims 
of their religious identity for handling prohibited substances like pork, if the act was 
done inadvertently or under compulsion.107 Yet, he appeared convinced in one of his 
Farmans that 'the English will utterly overthrow our religion if they remain in India', and 
appealed to the Hindus for the sake of 'Ganges, Tulsi and Saligram'; and to Mussalmans 
by their 'belief in God and the Quran' to unite in slaughtering the English, 'for by this 
alone will the lives and faith of both be saved'.108 The Hindus were assured that in 
deference to their religious feelings, 'the slaughter of kline will cease', and to enforce it, 
'a solemn agreement has been entered into by all the Mussalman chiefs of Hindustan, 
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binding themselves that if the Hindus will come forward to slay the English, the 
Mussalmans will from that very day put a stop to the slaughter of cows'.109 Further, 
'those of them who will not do so, will be considered to have abjured the Quran, and 
such of them as will eat beef will be regarded as though they had eaten pork; but if the 
Hindus will not gird their loins to kill the English, but will try to save them, they will be 
as guilty in the sight of God, as though they had committed the sins of killing cows and 
eating flesh'.110 By prohibiting and threatening to ostracise Muslims for beef slaughter, 
Bahadur Shah Zafar was inverting the basic Muslim belief that they could eat anything 
that had not been declared haram in the Quran.111 
Several other calls were made by the Emperor to annihilate the British in the name of 
religion. One of these described the EIC besieging force deployed on the ridge outside 
the city gates as 'kaffirs' and 'debased heathens who have not been meted their rightful 
end', and who must now be destroyed.112 In another instance, Bahadur Shah Zafar 
urged his Army to 'destroy the enemies of religion', and declared, 'whoever colludes 
with the enemies of faith will be a culprit in the eyes of God and the Prophet, and will 
be punished accordingly'.113 There was an irony in the message, however. The besieging 
force not only had Europeans, but also a significant number of Muslims from the 
Punjab and North West Frontier. Together with their Sikh and Gurkha colleagues, the 
Muslim component was larger than its British counterpart.114 Since the Emperor made 
no distinction between them, he apparently considered all as 'kaffirs'. Yet the term 
cannot be applied to any Muslim, or even Christians and Jews as they hold the status of 
ahl al-kitab (people of the divinely ordained books, that is, Christians and Jews) in Islam, 
and hence cannot be considered non-believers or kaffirs.115    
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Pejorative terms like kaffir, heathens, and destroyers of religion served several useful 
purposes. Such terminology formed the language of war, designed to divert attention 
and debate from the complex issue of who could wage war in the name of Islam, and 
indeed, against whom it was permissible. Imputing negative attributes and actions to the 
opponents made them appear extremely dangerous and inhuman, which enabled their 
destruction by the royal Army without guilt. The 1857 rebellion was no exception, 
during which Bahadur Shah Zafar attempted to employ such terminology as a rallying 
call in his Farmans in order to  boost his Army's morale. Since he was simultaneously 
appealing to the Hindu community, he reconstructed the concept of Jihad to evoke 
their support as well.  
The linkage between Bahadur Shah Zafar's religious orientation and an intrinsic 
motivation for Jihad is difficult to establish. His sectarian identity was ambiguous, 
containing elements of Sufism, Sunni-ism and Shi'a-ism. He was known to visit Sufi 
shrines, particularly those of the famous saints, Nizamuddin Auliya and Bakhtiyar 
Kaki,116 and claimed to be a Sufi himself, even attracting a number of murids (disciples), 
which included some Sepoys of the EIC regiments stationed at Delhi.117 The process of 
initiation involved the provision of a document to each disciple listing Bahadur Shah 
Zafar as his Sufi master, and the names of those Sufis to whom the Emperor's Sufi 
order could be directly traced. The practice came to the notice of the EIC Resident at 
Delhi, who forbade the Emperor to initiate any more murids from the EIC Army. 
Despite the EIC ban, a religious link had been established between the Emperor and his 
murids in the Sepoy Army.118 Bahadur Shah Zafar's Sufi practice had the approval and 
encouragement of the Sufis  of Delhi, who firmly believed that Mughal Emperors had a 
divine right to rule.119 The Emperor's Pir was one Ghulam Nasir-ud-din, whose father 
had been the Pir of Bahadur Shah Zafar's father.120 Bahadur Shah Zafar moreover 
served as patron of the tomb complex of Khwaja Qutb Sahib, a Chishti saint in the 
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Delhi suburb of Mehrauli.121 The Sufi connection had important implications, for it lent 
legitimacy to Bahadur Shah's use of religion during 1857. In the words of one of his 
close advisors, the Sufi masters of Delhi, because of their respected stature in society 
were able to 'impress upon the minds of the people that the Emperor was the divine 
vice-regent in spiritual matters upon earth, and that it was a creditable act to adopt him 
as their spiritual guide'.122 The Delhi Urdu Akhbar, the city's leading newspaper, which 
regularly chronicled the events of the rebellion went to the extent of eulogising the 
Emperor as 'one of the leading saints of the era who has been approved of by the divine 
court', and calling upon 'the Army and the people to consider the approval of the 
Emperor as akin to the approval of God and His Prophet'.123  
The orthodox Sunni Ulama of Delhi, on the other hand, suspected Bahadur Shah Zafar 
of being a Shi'a for his devotion to Imam Ali, and his regular participation in 
celebrations of the Shia festival of Muharram.124 A large contribution he had made to a 
Shi'a shrine in Avadh was treated as further evidence of his Shia faith.125 The Ulama 
even threatened to delete his name from their Friday sermons, and to excommunicate 
him from Islam for his Shia leanings.126 This prompted the Emperor to issue a denial 
through a pamphlet, supported by a note from Mirza Ghalib.127 Considering the 
difficulty of ascribing his religious identity to a specific sect, it became possible for 
members of all three denominations (Sunni, Shi'a, and Sufi) to claim him as one of their 
own. Royal visits to, and patronage of sacred sites such as Sunni and Shia mosques, and 
hospices or tombs of venerated saints neutralised the occasionally acrimonious 
orthodox Sunnis, and increased the adoration and respect of the wider Muslims 
community.128 Bahadur Shah Zafar's association with religious symbols and public 
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displays of religiosity enabled him to foster what has been termed as the 'cult of the 
sovereign', a Timurid tradition that symbolised not only the religious but also the 
political reverence of Mughal sovereigns.129  
At the same time that Bahadur Shah Zafar was leading the resistance movement and 
making attempts to guide and inspire his followers by capitalising on their religious and 
political support, he was reportedly considering the possibility of a settlement with the 
British. As early as June 1857, he sought the advice of his inner most circle, consisting 
of Queen Zeenat Mahal, the Princes, and his closest advisors, Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, 
and the court Vakil, Amir Abbas on the matter.130 Other trusted nobles were 
summoned to gauge their opinion as well. After much deliberation, a unanimous view 
emerged that the royal government should disassociate from the Bengal Army Sepoys at 
Delhi, and align itself with the British.131 Following some hesitation on the Emperor's 
part to take such a critical decision, his advisors suggested that it would be best to first 
assess how EIC officials react to a proposal of friendship.132 Consequently, Bahadur 
Shah Zafar directed that a letter be written to the British indicating his sincere desire for 
a rapprochement, the reply to which would then determine the specific course to be 
adopted.133 There was however, no response to the initiative. In September 1857, when 
the conflict appeared to be drawing to a close, Bahadur Shah Zafar contacted the 
British with a specific offer to surrender, allow the EIC troops entry into the city, and 
hand over to them those of his Sepoys who had murdered European women and 
children, provided that the Emperor's life and that of his wife and son by her were 
spared, and Bahadur Shah Zafar re-installed on the throne.134 Nothing came of it, 
because by then the British forces surrounding Delhi were probably confident that they 
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were on the verge of victory, and hence saw no benefit in any negotiation or 
compromise with him.  
Ulama  
Of all the actors involved in the rebellion, the North Indian Ulama made the most 
extensive use of Jihad as an ideological tool against the EIC in their capacity as 
guardians of Islam in India. However, a close examination of their proclamations and 
behaviour reveals a significant amount of ideological ambivalence and confusion, which 
diluted the effectiveness of Jihad as an ideology against the EIC. Their Jihadist ideology 
provides a useful point of comparison with their peers who were active in the Punjab 
and the North-West Frontier, and in a seemingly similar position to influence the 
religious ideas and behaviour of the Sepoys and royalty in those regions. 
The Ulama grievances against the EIC are traceable to EIC policies and the work of 
European missionaries in the decades leading up to 1857. As the EIC established its 
authority in the North West Provinces, especially after de facto control over Delhi in 
1803, it started embarking upon policies that had critical implications for Indian society, 
including the Muslim clergy. Traditionally, education of the Muslim community had 
been the monopoly of the Ulama, who imparted religious education blended with the 
study of Arabic and Persian through a network of madrassas and private tuition. The 
system was able to function with local donations and the patronage and grants of 
Mughal Emperors and regional potentates.135 EIC authorities initially patronised Muslim 
and Hindu education, following the educational policy announced by Governor General 
Warren Hastings.136 In 1835 however, Western education and English were introduced 
in government schools, and funds that were hitherto available for the traditional sources 
of education, including madrassas, were increasingly diverted to government schools.137 
These measures imperilled the future growth of madrassa instruction. Based on 
religious lessons and basic literacy, it was the only form of education the Ulama were 
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equipped to provide, and remained the sole option for Muslim youth as well. The EIC 
sponsored government schools were beginning to attract potential Madrassa students, 
lured by opportunities for better education and employment in British India.138 Another 
obstacle to traditional madrassa education appeared in the form of the Delhi College. 
The college, which opened in 1825, was established by the EIC for providing European 
education alongside Oriental instruction to the local elite.139 It was especially attractive 
for the Indian youth aspiring for service with the EIC.140 The students, some of whom 
were Muslim, not only viewed it as an opportunity for gainful and prestigious 
employment, but also as a 'means to upward social mobility'.141 The Ulama now faced 
the prospect of losing out this influential segment of Muslim youth to institutions like 
the Delhi College. The patronage and financial support of Indian rulers and local 
communities that the Ulama used to receive was also drying up due to deteriorating 
economic conditions of the Muslim community.142 Consequently, prospects of Ulama 
employment, and the strong socio-cultural and religious bonds that tied them with the 
larger Muslim community through traditional educational institutions were increasingly 
at risk.143      
Following these initial changes, English was introduced as the official language of 
British India during 1836-37. The measure endangered the employment of a large 
number of Muslims as Munshis, Qazis, and Kotwals. These appointments required 
mastery of Persian and Urdu,144 which were mainly taught by the Ulama. Cognizant of 
avoiding drastic changes in the administrative system, the British continued to hire 
Muslim functionaries, especially the Qazis, as they were needed to assist the courts in 
the application of Muslim law to Muslim litigants.145 However, unlike the past when 
they were held in high esteem by Muslim rulers, the Qazis were to now work as mere 
assistants to the British judges. Until the arrival of the British, the Muslims and Hindus 
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were governed by their respective religious laws as determined by their religious 
communities. But under the British they were subjected to different laws, which were 
controversial for both communities. Particularly alarming for the Muslims was the 
Anglo-Mohammedan law, which modified the Sharia law, creating a hybrid system with 
selective implementation of the Sharia.146 As interpreters and custodians of Islamic law, 
the Ulama had enjoyed the monopoly and honourable status associated with their role, 
which was now decreasing. At the same time, they faced a challenge from the emerging 
Muslim scholars, who were claiming that the old Islamic law and education could not 
cope with modern discoveries and developments, and needed to be replaced.147  
Confiscation of Muslim properties, establishment of orphanages for native children, and 
expanding missionary activity by the EIC were similar causes for suspicion. When the 
EIC established a number of orphanages, it was perceived as a deliberate strategy to 
convert Hindu and Muslim children to Christianity.148 Moreover, as part of its land 
settlement process, the EIC had taken over a number of mosques, shrines and 
madrassas which were unable to provide property deeds, and demolished some 
mosques for road construction, or handed them to missionaries for their housing or 
conversion to churches.149 Prior to 1813, EIC laws did not permit Christian missionary 
activity on British Indian soil.150 During that year, the British parliament passed a 
resolution permitting missionary work in India, and the first Anglican Bishop was 
ordained at Calcutta in 1814, followed by the entry of European missions in 1832-33, 
apparently under EIC patronage.151 The missionary activity that ensued was not 
confined to preaching the principles of Christianity, but also included attacks on Muslim 
beliefs and practices.152 The Delhi chaplain, Midgley Jennings, was specially resented for 
his threats to take over many of the mosques in Delhi, and aggressive attacks on Islam 
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and the person of Prophet Muhammad.153 The missionaries appeared to be attracting 
some members of the Hindu lower and untouchable castes. This segment of the 
population formed a large pool of potential converts for Muslim missionaries as well, so 
the competition to attract them would have been intense.  
Christian proselytization did not appear to be making much gain, but the conversion of 
two prominent Hindus caused alarm, not only for the Hindu elite and clergy of the 
city,154 but also for their Muslim counterparts who would have feared that some 
influential Muslims might similarly succumb. Fervid evangelicalism convinced them that 
the missionaries were making a concerted effort to dilute the appeal of Islam in India.155 
The acrimony gave rise to a polemical duel with the missionaries. On the 10th and 11th 
of April, 1854 a public debate was arranged at Agra between the German missionary, 
Karl Gottlieb Pfander, and the Indian Muslim theologian, Maulana Rahmatullah 
Kairanawi, assisted by Dr. Wazir Khan, a medical doctor serving at the local 
government hospital.156 Centred on Muslim criticism of the Bible, the debate attracted a 
large audience of Muslims and Europeans. While Pfander attempted to persuade his 
opponents on the authenticity of the Old and New Testaments and the belief in Trinity, 
his Muslim rivals tried to negate the central precepts of Christianity by claiming that the 
Bible had been corrupted, and Muslims should not be shaken in their faith because of 
Christian proclamations.157 
The spirited stance at the debates did not however, develop into a concerted movement 
to counter the EIC/Christian socio-religious activism. The fear of increasing 
marginalisation generated different coping strategies. Some Ulama compromised with 
the situation by taking up positions with the government whenever such opportunities 
arose, while others remained aloof. Then there were those Ulama who were conscious 
of the need to review the status of Indian Muslims under the EIC, a non-Muslim 
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power, and devise an appropriate strategy. The main issue for such Ulama who were 
resentful of the encroaching EIC power, was whether Jihad had become obligatory to 
counter the British/Christian threat. The question first arose in 1803, when Lord Lake 
captured Delhi after defeating the Maratha Army, and made Emperor Shah Alam II a de 
facto prisoner of the British.158 Apparently concerned about the state of subservience to a 
non-Muslim power, Shah Abdul Aziz, a religious luminary who was the son and 
spiritual successor of Shah Waliullah, the pre-eminent Muslim ideologue of his time, 
pronounced the EIC's possessions in India dar-ul-harb (the zone of war).159 Issued 
sometimes after 1803, the fatwa clearly implied that it had become incumbent upon 
Muslims to wage an anti-British Jihad, or if they were somehow unable to do so, to 
proceed on Hijrat (migration from a territory where Muslims face non-Muslim 
occupation). Although the term Jihad does not appear in the declaration, Jihad and 
Hijrat are the obvious consequences when a territory has been declared as subject to 
war. Some of the passages in the fatwa though are contradictory, mitigating the 
powerful impact the declaration might otherwise have conveyed. In one instance in the 
fatwa, Shah Abdul Aziz decried the existing situation for the 'absence of any check on 
the Christian officers' such that 'in administration and justice, in matters of law and 
order, in the domain of trade, finance and collection of revenue - everywhere the Kuffar 
are in power'.160 Yet, he allowed Muslims to accept service with the domineering and 
exploitative British.161 The British were  accused of  'demolishing  mosques without the 
least hesitation' and not letting any Muslim or zimmi enter any town or city in their 
control without permission. On the other hand, he grudgingly acknowledged that 'there 
are indeed certain Islamic rituals like Friday and Eid prayers, Azan and cow-slaughter 
with which they do not interfere'.162   
In another passage, the Maulvi bestowed the extraordinary title of 'Imam ul-Muslimin' on 
Emperor Akbar Shah II.163 This was despite the fact that no Emperor, including 
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Aurangzeb who had a reputation for religious zealousness, ever received the honorific 
since it was reserved for Muslim rulers who could trace their ancestry to Prophet 
Muhammad, and were recognised as spiritual heads by the Muslim community. The 
concept of Hijrat was also turned on its head by allowing Muslims to pursue economic 
profit and interest and other similar benefits which were not allowed in a Muslim 
country, but which they could indulge in as long as the non-Muslim authorities did not 
interfere with their religious rights. The most trenchant criticism of these contradictions 
came from Shah Muhammad Ismail, a nephew of Shah Abdul Aziz, and a religious 
scholar in his own right: 'Under the conditions specified you declare that India is not 
dar-ul-harb, but you then contradict your own words and call India dar-ul-harb only as far 
as regards the validity of accepting interest by the Muslims of the country. This amounts 
to pious fraud for worldly prosperity'.164  
Given such internal divisions, it is unsurprising that Jihad as espoused by the leading 
Muslim ideologue at the time lost much of its effectiveness as a mobilising tool, even as 
the concept remained the core component of Muslim ideology. The tool was however 
repeatedly used, as can be discerned in the conduct and statements of the Ulama during 
the rebellion years, many of whom were followers of Shah Abdul Aziz. Several of these 
Ulama issued fatwas extolling Jihad, mobilised the general population and Sepoys 
against the British, and endorsed and abetted Bahadur Shah Zafar's authority as the 
Mughal sovereign. At Delhi, a Jihad proclamation was signed by thirty Ulama, including 
a number of disciples  of Shah Waliullah's family.165 The proclamation declared that in 
view of the British siege of Delhi and their military operations, Jihad against them had 
become incumbent upon all able-bodied residents of Delhi, and indeed all 
Hindustanis.166 Although it remains undetermined if all the Ulama whose names 
appeared on the Delhi fatwa actually took part in the Jihad, or even signed the 
proclamation, the names of Liaquat Ali, Sadr ud-Din Azurda, and Dr. Wazir Khan are 
identified as some of the leading figures of Jihad in several accounts of the rebellion.167 
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The three, along with many others were subsequently tried and sentenced by the British. 
Maulvi Liaquat Ali became active at Allahabad in early June 1857, following the 
rebellion by the Sepoys of a Bengal native infantry and detachments of cavalry and 
artillery. At the height of the war, he commanded about four thousand rebels, and was 
appointed as Viceroy of Allahabad by the Emperor.168 Being a former madrassa teacher, 
he was very successful in attracting both civilians and Sepoys to his camp and 
motivating them against the British.169 The Maulvi issued two proclamations of Jihad in 
June 1857 that were widely circulated in Allahabad and surrounding regions.170  
The first proclamation, written in rhyme, draws inspiration from injunctions of the 
Quran and examples of Prophet Muhammad to wage war against enemies of Islam, and 
makes a case for why Muslims must engage the British in combat.171 Muslims are 
reminded of the opportunity the current situation provides them to restore Islam to the 
glory it enjoyed twelve hundred years ago; of the promised rewards of paradise that 
await them if they fall in battle; and conversely of condemnation to hell if they fail to 
take up arms in the name of Islam.172 Those who are destitute or unable to fight are 
exhorted to contribute to the holy cause by donating money or providing succour to the 
holy warriors, as they too would be rewarded by God.173 There is a rejoinder that Islam 
is losing its strength in India, that if our predecessors had not embarked on Jihad, they 
could not have conquered India in the first place; and that it was by the sword and not 
through slothful behaviour that they had become ascendant in this country.174 The 
second proclamation directs its readers to follow any individual who assumes the 
responsibility of leading the Jihad, and to consider him as an Imam.175 The people were 
assured that sufficient arms and munitions of war had been provided by Birjis Qadr, the 
regent of Avadh, and by Bahadur Shah Zafar, the Emperor of Delhi, under whom the 
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people of various religions and denominations of Hindustan had united to expel the 
Nazarenes and Kuffar.176  
The content of the two proclamations reveals the ideological confusion in the minds of 
the Muslim clergy about the exact religious status of the British vis-à-vis Islam. If they 
were indeed Nazarenes, theological caution was required in pronouncing Jihad against 
them given their status as 'people of the book', who were consequently treated as 
believers by the Quran. Labelling them Kaffir, or conflating them with the latter was 
problematic, as Islam reserves the term for non-believers, which includes Hindus, but 
not Christians or Jews. In the same contradictory vein, the proclamation concludes by 
inviting 'Muslim brothers' to flock to Allahabad, put the Kuffar in the city and its 
vicinity to the sword, and enjoy the benefits of an Islamic rule.177 That left open the 
question of whether Hindus were to be included in the struggle, much less the state of 
those Hindus who were already fighting alongside Muslims. The numerous references 
to the virtues and necessity of Jihad, and the notion of Muslim superiority in the 
declaration would not have appealed to the followers of Hinduism; nor would they have 
accepted the establishment of an Islamic government as the Maulvi appeared to be 
suggesting.    
The confusion in Maulvi Liaquat Ali's Jihad ideology is also apparent from the 
testimony following his capture and trial by the British in 1872.178 Given his visible role 
as a prominent leader of the rebellion, he was not in a position to deny his involvement 
when questioned. Consequently, he pleaded guilty but with the caveat: 'some people had 
persuaded me to do my best to stave off the mischief that must ensue in the absence of 
authority and order'.179 He also claimed to have prevented the killing of Europeans and 
Indian Christians as well as the destruction of property and public utilities during the 
rebellion.180 This seems to be an attempt to alleviate the stress he was undergoing at the 
trial, having to justify wrongful or un-Islamic acts. By admitting that only part of what 
he did was wrong, the Maulvi was consciously or unknowingly diverting his prosecutors 
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from the more serious aspects of his actions during the conflict. Maulvi Liaquat Ali also 
testified that he was not motivated by a desire for personal gain during the rebellion; 
rather, he was simply chosen by the people for his religious influence, and was told if he 
did not do as requested, he would incur the displeasure of his Emperor.181 The attempt 
to shift responsibility for his conduct to his supporters, and indirectly to Bahadur Shah 
Zafar, amounted to distracting his British accusers from his own role and from the 
forceful ideological content of his proclamations. By claiming that someone else made 
him do what he did, the Maulvi was inadvertently acknowledging that he had a choice 
about how to respond in the situation, but failed to choose wisely.  
The second prominent figure associated with the Jihad, Mufti Sadr ud-Din Azurda, was 
the Sadr Amin of Delhi, having been appointed to that post by the British prior to the 
rebellion.182 Along with his judicial role, he was an examiner at the Delhi Anglo-Oriental 
College, and a leading religious and literary figure of the city.183 He was known to 
possess considerable diplomatic skills, a trait that was effectively put to use throughout 
his service at Delhi, including the tumultuous rebellion period. Being close to both the 
Emperor and the EIC resident, he used to play an important mediating role between 
the two in the pre-rebellion years.184 He is however, one of the most controversial 
Ulama of 1857, whom both the rebel and anti-rebel factions could claim as one of their 
own. Some of Azurda's close Ulama friends had signed the Delhi fatwa together with 
him. That did not deter a party of Sepoys of the rebel Army from attempting to raid his 
house on the suspicion that he was collaborating with the British.185 Ironically, the 
British did not trust Azurda either, and put him on trial for being a fatwa signatory. He 
was charged for the act, and for inciting the public against the British. Azurda denied 
the charge, claiming he had been forced to sign under pressure of the rebel Sepoys. In 
an ingenious move, he disclosed that a close examination of his signatures would reveal 
he had misspelt an Urdu word by not inserting two dots over two letters, so that instead 
of its meaning 'with satisfaction' alongside the signatures, the word could just as easily 
                                               
181 Subaltern Lives: Biographies of Colonialism in the Indian Ocean World, 1790-1920: 129. 
182 Rampuri, 'Maulana Fazl-e Haq Khairabadi aur 1857 ka fatwa Jihad', 874. 
183 Saiyid Athar A. Rizvi, Shah `Abd-al-`Aziz: puritanism, sectarian, polemics and Jihad  (Canberra: Marifat, 
1982). 96. 
184 Dalrymple, The last Mughal: the fall of a dynasty, Delhi, 1857: XIX. 
185 M. Dayal, Celebrating Delhi  (New Delhi: Ravi Dayal Publisher, 2010). 33. 
62 
 
be interpreted as 'with duress',186 which is what he intended. The trick also probably 
worked to his advantage with his own side, as his fellow signatories might have thought 
that he meant 'with satisfaction', but forgot to insert the two dots! Although the British 
court could not thus prove his complicity in the fatwa matter, half of his property was 
ordered to be confiscated.187  
This strategy of ambivalence in matters of invoking armed Jihad was possibly 
deliberately adopted to minimise the distortion arising from a state of mixed loyalties, as 
Azurda, like many others, was a former employee of the EIC who had benefited from 
government service, and developed close associations with their former employers. At 
the same time, he had an affinity with the Mughal Emperor for the nostalgic and 
glorious past he represented, and which was still valued by the Muslim gentry. When 
Bahadur Shah Zafar was restored to the throne as Emperor, Azurda saw it as an 
opportunity to gain access to the royal court for suitable employment. Yet, when it 
became apparent to him after arriving in Delhi that the situation was not as favourable 
for the Emperor and his rebel Army, and the possibility of a British victory remained, 
he was careful to avoid too close a contact with Bahadur Shah Zafar,188 thus keeping his 
options open. 
The third Jihad notable, Dr Wazir Khan, had been an assistant surgeon at a hospital in 
Meerut from where he defected to join the Rebellion in 1857.189 As discussed above, he 
had been closely involved in the Pfander debates in the early 1850s. Once Agra came 
under rebel attack, Wazir Khan became an active participant, travelling to Delhi, Bareilly 
and Avadh to join the military operations in progress, and serving in the company of 
such Rebellion leaders as Bakht Khan, Feroze Shah, Khan Bahadur Khan and the Nana 
Sahib.190 When captured and put on trial by the British, he tried to exonerate himself, 
like many others, partly by laying blame elsewhere while disclaiming any part himself. 
Wazir Khan's unease with Christian missionary activity would have been the most likely 
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motive for his subsequent involvement in the Rebellion. On the other hand, his 
statement of denial indicates that he was either a reluctant Jihad warrior who could not 
admit his role because of a sense of guilt; or that he had been a genuine believer in 
Jihad, but subsequently became convinced of making the wrong decision. Either state 
of mind indicates a weak commitment to the pursuit of Jihad by trivialising his role in it. 
If concern for personal well-being or fear of death was the prime motivator, then he 
was negating the very spirit of Jihad, which entails readiness and resoluteness to the 
extent of laying down one's life for the sacred cause.  
Conclusion 
The three ideological strands of royalism, culturalism and religiosity came into sharp 
focus at Delhi where the Sepoys, the Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar, and the Ulama 
appeared to fervently employ these ideologies as sources of inspiration in the war 
against the EIC. The Sepoys were the most dedicated to royalism, although they did not 
have any vision of what a monarchic arrangement they wanted after the Mughal 
triumph, and had to suffer setbacks due to insufficient support from Bahadur Shah 
Zafar. A culture of militarism motivated them against the British, but the structures on 
which it was based and the fighting spirit such structures promoted had been destroyed 
by the rebellion, creating confusion and demoralisation which adversely affected their 
subsequent combat performance. Religiosity was a more enduring ideology for the 
Sepoys, and although it could not substitute for a cohesive military ideology, it was a 
source of intrinsic inspiration for the individual combatant. Bahadur Shah Zafar, held 
forth to the right to rule, or Mughal royalism through pursuit of a balance of power 
strategy with the neighbouring states. He was likely contemplating a segmentary system 
with much of the power devolved to the states if that was the cost that had to be 
incurred to bring them onto his side against the British. But his efforts in that direction 
were hampered by the state of ambivalence he was experiencing as evident in his 
simultaneous attempts to compromise with the British, and by the staunchly pro-British 
states he was attempting to woo. Moreover, he was an inept commander-in-chief whose 
lack of leadership traits and a failure to devise effective military strategies to defeat the 
British sealed the fate of the rebellion. His religious outlook and policies on the other 
hand, positively contributed to the war effort by encouraging and maintaining Hindu-
Muslim harmony, which created a large and united front against the enemy. But that 
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entailed innovative ways of interpreting Jihad, which made the concept controversial, 
and which in turn would have discouraged many of the spirited pro-Jihad believers 
from joining the war. The Jihad tool was more enthusiastically employed in the conflict 
by the pro-emperor Ulama as compared to the other actors. However, it did not have 
the desired effect beyond rhetoric because of the ambivalent interpretations of the 
concept by the Jihadist Ulama, and the indifference of  the wider Ulama community, 
which was itself divided on the legitimacy of Jihad in the circumstances surrounding 
1857.  
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Chapter 2: Avadh 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the ideological orientations and behaviour of the Avadh Muslim 
elite during the rebellion of 1857-59. The first section describes the political 
environment and social structure of Avadh society, setting up the context for the study. 
The main part that follows seeks to understand how royalism, religiosity, and 
culturalism influenced the attitude and conduct of the Sepoys, royalty and Ulama of 
Avadh towards one another and the British. It needs to be explained why the large and 
well-trained army of Avadh failed to drive out the British despite being united in their 
hatred for the latter. Although the Nawab of Avadh had been exiled from the state well 
before the rebellion began, the Begum of Avadh appeared to have successfully filled the 
leadership vacuum by providing sound leadership; yet except for a few instances she 
could not succeed in leading a  solid effort against the British, which needs to be 
explained. The Ulama at Avadh were the most active of all religious elite in India in 
espousing and employing Jihad against the British. Yet, why was it that despite the 
fervour, their resistance too met with failure?   
 
Background 
Throughout its history, Avadh occupied a prominent position in North India due to its 
strategic location, rich agricultural base, potential for military recruitment among the 
local Brahmin, Rajput and Muslim population; and a vibrant administrative, intellectual 
and religious elite. It was governed as a province under successive Delhi Sultanates and 
subsequently, the Mughal Empire.1 Dynastic princely rule, which had been the norm 
since 1722,2 assumed the status of a kingdom in 1818 with British encouragement,3 an 
arrangement that lasted till 1856 when the last Nawab, Wajid Ali Shah, was compelled 
                                               
1 Stephen M. Edwardes and Herbert  Garrett, Mughal Rule In India  (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & 
Distributors Limited, 1930; repr., 1995). 174. 
2 Kidambi S. Santha, Begums of Awadh, 1st ed. (Varanasi: Bharati Prakashan, 1980). 1. 
3 Muhammad Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims  (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969). 505. 
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by the British to abdicate his throne. Avadh was a favoured destination of Muslim 
scholars, poets, jurists, and artists from Iran and Central Asia, as well as Delhi, 
particularly during the late Mughal period when the traditional Mughal patronage of 
skilled immigrants declined as a result of eroding Mughal power. The newcomers were 
attracted to the state due to the patronage of its Nawabs, and the greater opportunities 
that it offered compared with other regions of India. Most of the local Muslims, 
however, had converted from Hinduism under the influence of Avadh ruling elite or the 
proselytising activity of religious scholars and missionaries.4 According to the earliest 
census records, Muslims comprised about eleven per cent of the total population, with 
Hindus making up the vast majority.5 However, in Lucknow city itself, Muslims were 
more numerous at forty per cent of the local population .6   
The soldier class of Avadh was drawn from the Brahmins, Rajputs, Ranghars (Muslim 
Rajputs), Syeds, and Rohilla Pathans of the province, who formed the manpower for 
the army of Avadh Nawabs as well as the EIC's Bengal Army.7 The largest component 
of the Bengal Army, the Bengal Native Infantry (hereafter BNI) mostly consisted of 
Avadh Hindu soldiers, while its mounted counterpart, the Bengal Native Cavalry, was 
predominantly Muslim.8 The Avadh Sepoys had strong links to the Avadh countryside, 
being small farmers themselves who hailed from the numerous villages and jagir (rural 
estates) settlements strewn throughout the state.9  
The Ulama of Avadh society were divided into Shi'a and Sunni denominations. Of 
these, the Shi'a enjoyed considerable prestige, wealth and power, and dominated the 
state judiciary.10 A number of them were zamindars, but preferred the role of court and 
judicial officers in Lucknow and Faizabad, as serving in urban centres provided greater 
                                               
4 Kishori S. Lal, Indian Muslims: Who are They, (Voice of India, 1990), Accessed 23 April 2013. 
http://voiceofdharma.org/books/imwat/ Chapter 3. 
5 J. Charles Williams, The report on the census of Oudh, vol. I (Lucknow: Oudh Government Press, 1869). 
Para 115 Table F. 
6 The report on the census of Oudh, I. Para 116. 
7 Francis G. Cardew, A sketch of the services of the Bengal native army, to the year 1895  (New Delhi: Today & 
Tomorrow's Printers & Publishers, 1971). 5. 
8 Chick and Hutchinson, Annals of the Indian rebellion, 1857-58; containing narratives of the outbreaks and eventful 
occurences and stories of personal adventures: 10-11. 
9 I. Habib, 'The coming of 1857', Social Scientist (1998): 7. 
10 Juan R. Cole, Roots of North Indian Shiìsm in Iran and Iraq religion and state in Awadh, 1722-1859, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), Accessed 19 September 2013. 
http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft0f59n6r9/. 272. 
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opportunities for influence and prosperity.11 The authority of the chief mujtahid (leading 
Shi'a cleric, guide and religious scholar) of Lucknow was recognised and respected not 
only in Avadh, but throughout North India.12 Supervision of popular gatherings in 
Imambaras, regular observance of public and private Shi'a ceremonies, as well as delivery 
of sermons fostered a strong socio-religious bond between the Shi'a religious elite and 
the public. The Avadh royalty, belonging to the Shi'a faith themselves, openly 
patronised the Shi'a Ulama and institutions under them.13 The Sunni Ulama exerted a 
similar influence over the majority Sunni population, and despite the doctrinal 
differences between the two sects, they appeared to co-exist with their Shi'a 
counterparts without apparent tension. 
Avadh royalty consisted of Nawab Wajid Ali Shah, his primary and secondary wives, the 
Queen mother, and the princes. Within this clique, the Nawab was the locus of 
authority, although traditionally Queen mothers held some influence, as did an 
occasional favourite chief or secondary wife. Begum Hazrat Mahal, who was a 
secondary wife at the time of the rebellion, gained much prominence after Nawab Wajid 
Ali Shah's abdication and exile in 1856. She first entered the royal household as a 
concubine with a humble family background, and then graduated to spousal status. She 
came to prominence when the rebellion events started unfolding in 1856.14  
The Ulama, particularly those who were Syeds and had been enjoying preferential 
treatment for their revered status under the Shi'a Nawabs, saw their social, religious and 
political status greatly curtailed upon British annexation.15  
 
Sepoys 
The Bengal Army Sepoys serving in Avadh were deeply disaffected when Nawab Wajid 
Ali Shah was forced to abdicate and leave the state on exile as the British annexed the 
                                               
11 Roots of North Indian Shiìsm in Iran and Iraq religion and state in Awadh, 1722-1859. 284. 
12 Roots of North Indian Shiìsm in Iran and Iraq religion and state in Awadh, 1722-1859. 284. 
13 Roots of North Indian Shiìsm in Iran and Iraq religion and state in Awadh, 1722-1859. 38. 
14 George Hutchinson, Narrative of the mutinies in Oude  (London: Smith, Elder & co., 1859). 22. 
15 Cole, Roots of North Indian Shiìsm in Iran and Iraq religion and state in Awadh, 1722-1859. 80. 
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state and set up their own civil and military administration in Lucknow.16 Sepoy 
sympathy with the Nawab was strong since as many as sixty thousand had seen service 
with the royal Avadh army under supreme command of the Nawab.17 Upon British 
annexation and consequent disbandment of the royal army, only one third of them 
found employment with the British, while many of the rest refused to join the newly 
raised British force, because they hoped the Avadh ruling dynasty would be reinstated.18 
Those Sepoys who had joined the EIC army also felt alienated from their new 
employers because of unfamiliar military procedures and a standard of discipline they 
could not identify with.19 But they did not retaliate against the British at this juncture. 
This was due in large part to the Nawab releasing all his troops and officials from his 
allegiance at the time of his departure from Lucknow, and directing them to be obedient 
and loyal to the British rulers.20 Consequently, while there was some disquiet among the 
troops at the time, no attempt was made to rebel.21 Instead, it was the series of events in 
the mainly Avadh manned EIC regiments at Berhampore and Barrackpore on 27 
February,22 and 29 March 1857 respectively,23 followed by the much worse occurrence 
at Meerut on 10 May 1857, which set off the full-scale Sepoy rebellion. The British had 
fourteen native regiments of infantry, six of cavalry, and seven batteries of artillery 
under their command in Avadh, all of which were to mutiny in 1857.24 The European 
part of the EIC force at Avadh consisted of only one infantry regiment and a company 
of artillery.25 By contrast, the strength of the insurgent Sepoys was sixty to seventy 
thousand infantry and cavalrymen, with forty or fifty artillery Sepoys.26 The entire rebel 
force was deployed in nine formations, the largest portion of which was commanded by 
Begum Hazrat Mahal and her chief advisor, Mammu Khan, from a base near 
                                               
16 Chick and Hutchinson, Annals of the Indian rebellion, 1857-58; containing narratives of the outbreaks and eventful 
occurences and stories of personal adventures: xxvi. 
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22 Narrative of the Indian mutinies of 1857, Compiled for the Madras Military Male Orphan Asylum,   (Madras: 
Asylum Press, 1858). 2. 
23 Narrative of the Indian mutinies of 1857, Compiled for the Madras Military Male Orphan Asylum: 5. 
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Faizabad.27 The remaining troops, some of whom were led by the Mughal prince, Firoze 
Shah, were widely dispersed throughout Avadh.28 An administrative council comprising 
fourteen members, four of whom were Muslim officers of the former Bengal Army, 
was also set up to administer the affairs at Lucknow.29  
In parallel with the Delhi Sepoys, the initial impulse by Avadh Sepoys on account of the 
controversial cartridges had been due to the feeling of outrage that the latter shared as 
members of the Bengal Army community. But as in Delhi, the Avadh brotherhood-in-
arms or military cohesiveness unravelled when they rose in rebellion. Unit cohesion, 
which has been defined as 'the bonding together of members of a unit or organisation 
in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the 
mission',30 could not be developed in the aftermath of the initial surge. As Epps 
postulates, 'cohesion is the only condition that ensures the survival of military 
formations in combat situations in the face of overwhelming odds and situations that 
are [perforce] ambiguous and stressful'.31  
Research has shown that there is a correlation of cultural cohesiveness with combat 
performance.32 The incohesive state of the Avadh rebel force as evidenced by its 
haphazard deployment and lack of sufficient will to withstand combat, hence severely 
limited its effectiveness as a fighting force. Despite an overwhelming numerical 
superiority, the rebel army suffered defeat on many fronts across the state. The only 
major victory it scored was at Chinhat on 30 June 1857, where it routed an EIC force.33 
The first major setback occurred during the siege of Lucknow, in which about eight 
thousand rebel Sepoys and several hundred civilians had surrounded the British, who 
were forced to take refuge in the EIC Residency when the rebellion broke out at 
Lucknow. However, except for a few concerted attempts to storm the British defences 
during the first few weeks of the siege, the Sepoy army was unable to maintain pressure, 
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and could not break through. So much so, that they failed to interdict the force 
despatched by the British to relieve and evacuate the besieged British soldiers and 
families. At the battle of Amorrah in Avadh on 5 March 1858, a Sepoy force of fourteen 
thousand appeared on the flanks of the nearby EIC military detachments, but failed to 
press the advantage, while the EIC force quickly recovering from the surprise 
appearance went into attack and routed the rebel force which retreated in disorder, 
leaving all its guns and other equipment behind.34 In another major development, 
remnants of rebel Sepoy regiments who had made their way into Avadh, were defeated 
at Sultanpore, and driven across the Goomti during August 1858.35 A similar pattern 
ensued across various theatres of war across the state. 
The rebel army confronting the British was amply equipped and well positioned for 
attack and defence, but failed to overcome the enemy. The lack of an integrated  
structure diminished the value of its superior numbers and the strategic advantage it 
held by fighting on familiar territory. The Sepoys were operating in dispersed 
formations with hardly any coordination between them, and apparently lacked a well 
thought out strategy for defeating the British. There was also a deficit of leadership, and 
in this respect the situation was worse than at Delhi, where there were at least two 
native brigade commanders. In the military, leadership can be a matter of life and death, 
so military culture places tremendous importance on developing and maintaining the 
ability to lead under conditions of stress. People in the military, particularly those in the 
kind of circumstances experienced by the Avadh Sepoys during the turmoil of 1857-59, 
need leaders who are able to make decisions, to communicate, and crucially to 
understand and promote group norms and values - an area in which the Avadh army 
was severely lacking. 
The crisis of leadership in the Avadh army was exacerbated by a mix of rebel Sepoys 
who had been absorbed in the EIC force at Avadh not long ago with stragglers from 
various other EIC military units, as well as the Bengal Army Sepoys, who, upon 
retreating from Delhi, had joined the Avadh military effort. Such an amalgam was 
                                               
34 George H.D. Gimlette, A postscript to the records of the Indian mutiny: An attempt to trace the subsequent careers 
and fate of the rebel Bengal regiments, 1857-1858  (London: H.F. & G. Witherby, 1927). 16. 
35 A postscript to the records of the Indian mutiny: An attempt to trace the subsequent careers and fate of the rebel Bengal 
regiments, 1857-1858: 16. 
71 
 
formed up in haste and without prior planning; nor did it have sufficient time to 
materialise as a cohesive force before engaging the British. Thus, the rebel force in 
Avadh could not generate the sense of military bonding that characterises military units 
which have a history of shared experience, and whose members have established 
attachments with traditional symbols such as common badges, flags, and uniforms. In 
this respect, the state of the army was similar to that of its rebel counterparts in Delhi 
and Meerut as shown in the previous chapter.  
A dispirited condition in the Avadh military had set in with the first acts of rebellion. 
The sudden and violent eruption disintegrated their structure as an organised EIC force, 
which damaged their morale and the sense of belonging that these men had felt as 
members of closely knit units. As their EIC military culture collapsed, the men faced the 
prospect of surviving in an unfamiliar and ambiguous military environment. They were 
unable to raise alternative structures that were as cohesive, and from which they could 
derive an alternative military culture. Their former supreme commander, Nawab Wajid 
Ali Shah was in exile and apparently in no position to lead the rebellion.  
Another consequence of the fragile Sepoy military outfits was the collapse of group 
norms such as discipline and clarity of mission, which are essential features of military 
culture. This in turn produced a sense of alienation, and depleted the esprit de corps of the 
men which was reflected in their anomalous behaviour during combat. A number of 
rebel regiments were observed marching in battle at Kanpur and Lucknow to British 
military tunes, displaying their former EIC regimental flags, and wearing the campaign 
medals they had earned under British service in India and abroad.36 The 41st BNI 
attacked the fort at Fatehgarh to the strains of 'The Girl I left Behind Me', while the 
troops of Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah used 'The Bluebells of Scotland' as a slow march, 
and he took the salute to 'God Save the Queen'.37 Rebel sepoys of the 10th Irregular 
infantry retained their EIC regimental flag throughout their campaigns, until it was 
subsequently captured at Lucknow by an EIC European cavalry regiment.38 Remnants 
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of several other rebel regiments, including those that had retreated into Nepal in 1859, 
demonstrated the lingering attachment they felt for their former regiments by retaining 
symbols of the latter.39 There were also incidents such as the one at Fatehgarh, where 
Sepoys of the former 10th Oudh Irregular Infantry were flying an embroidered Muslim 
flag, ironically alongside their former British colours.40 
Several other instances of anomalous behaviour arising from the Sepoys' attachment to 
an older military culture were observed during the war. While in some regiments the 
officers were murdered with atrocity, great care was taken in others to conduct them to 
safety. In some cases, rebel Sepoys offered British officers command of Sepoy 
detachments and asked that they lead them under the service of Emperor Bahadur Shah 
Zafar.41 There were also reports of Sepoys demanding the ranks and regalia of their 
British officers as the condition for safe conduct.42 Particularly surprising were incidents 
where the bulk of a regiment, or the older native officers, with tears in their eyes, would 
swear loyalty to their officers, and then proceed to kill them.43 At Faizabad, the 15th 
Irregular Cavalry after incarcerating their British officers overnight, purportedly with a 
view to killing them, changed their minds the next day and even arranged for them to 
leave on boats supplied by the Sepoys.44 But just after letting them depart, they sent a 
message to another rebel regiment, the 17th BNI, which was in the path of the 
departing party of the British, to slay them, upon which the Sepoys of the 17th BNI 
intercepted and attacked the boats, shooting down most of the occupants.45  
Just as the Sepoys at Delhi, the Muslim Sepoys of the rebel army at Avadh perceived 
this war as much of a religious cause as their Hindu colleagues. From the start of the 
rebellion till its very end, the Avadh Sepoys were consistent in the claim that the British 
were embarked upon a grand plan to deprive them of their religion by making them use 
the defiled cartridges, whether by force or deception. Several instances of this sentiment 
were observed during the rebellion. Amidst an encounter at Lucknow, a group of 
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Sepoys when asked by a British officer why they had mutinied, gave the typical 
response, 'we are fighting for our religion, which you meant to destroy'.46 Upon being 
challenged, 'in what manner have we threatened your faith', the immediate rejoinder 
was, 'by giving us greased cartridges.'47 For the British, such an attitude amounted to 
outright disloyalty as they saw themselves as the providers for these men, who had been 
given employment which was especially honoured in Indian society, and which had 
brought other benefits such as pensionable service and the opportunity to work with 
their own clan chiefs and kinsmen. The Sepoys on their part were infuriated that despite 
having constantly put their lives at risk fighting on behalf of the EIC, their religious 
beliefs had been so blatantly violated in attempting to convert them to Christianity by 
tricking or forcing them to use the repugnant cartridges. The Sepoys therefore reckoned 
that if they failed to stop the British, they might be subjected to similar misconduct by 
the latter in future.  
However, the cartridge incident was not as important from an Islamic standpoint for 
reasons that were explained in the previous chapter. Yet, as in Meerut, Delhi and other 
stations where the Sepoys had arisen, it was the perception of violated religion that 
mattered, not the doctrinal caveats that made it a doubtful Islamic cause for a holy war 
or Jihad against the British. But here the cartridge story assumed importance for 
additional reasons. For the Sepoys, most of whom hailed from Avadh, the state's 
annexation and its consequences had conditioned their minds to believe that the British 
were capable of committing any absurdity, including depriving them of their religion 
through the supply of greased cartridges. The action of the British Government with 
respect to Avadh had destroyed their faith in the British, so that they were ready to 
credit the latter with any nefarious design. Hence, even when their British officers kept 
reassuring them that the greased cartridges would not be issued again, and that they had 
already been withdrawn, the Sepoys did not believe them, and kept insisting the British 
were bent upon destroying their religious feelings.48 But by refusing to consider the 
possibility that the British did not take the measure on purpose, knowing fully well how 
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deeply their Hindu and Muslim Sepoys revered their faiths, the Sepoys were bolstering 
their own belief.  
The pattern of denigrating Christianity and Europeans thus continued, and a number of 
proclamations against the British began to appear near the military barracks in 
Lucknow, where a large number of Sepoys lived.49 One such poster exhorted all 
Muslims and Hindus to rise and murder the British; another denounced those Indians 
who 'remain passive as born of the pigs of Europeans, born of crows, despised by the 
Gods, hated and spat at by all true sons of Mahabeer Jee, and Muhammad'.50 Although 
religious attachment and emotion was an important motivator, it could not have the 
desired effect on its own, as a strong military culture which was lacking in this case, was 
equally vital for instilling and sustaining their will-to-fight.  
As compared with their counterparts at Delhi, the Avadh Sepoys' ideological 
commitment to Royalism was complex. The Avadh Sepoys and their leadership did 
affirm a collective belief in the restoration of Mughal sovereignty, and pledged their 
loyalty to Bahadur Shah Zafar once the latter had been restored to his seat in Delhi. 
Their primary loyalty till then had been with Nawab Wajid Ali Shah, who had the status 
of king himself. Since the Nawab had ceased to be a factor in Avadh politics in view of 
his exile, and had not appointed a successor, the only apparent choice open to the 
Sepoys for leadership was Bahadur Shah Zafar. At the local level, they pledged 
allegiance to Begum Hazrat Mahal, and to her son Birjis Qadr, but only on the 
condition that Birjis Qadr obtain sanction from Bahadur Shah Zafar to rule on the 
latter's behalf, and not as an independent sovereign like Nawab Wajid Ali Shah. 
However, the Sepoys were thereby undermining the authority of Begum Hazrat Mahal 
to exercise direct authority in the state in violation of the principle of autonomy of 
leadership, which did not bode well for their relationship with the Begum. Another 
complicating factor in the Sepoy pursuit of Royalism was the attachment of a number 
of Sepoys with Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah, a leading member of the Ulama active in the 
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rebellion at Avadh, who had set up his own government in the state which appeared to 
pose a challenge to the political legitimacy of the Avadh Begum. 
 
Royalty 
Compared with other regions of North India, the EIC influence had appeared in Avadh 
much earlier when the EIC forces defeated the combined army of the Mughal Emperor, 
Shah Alam II, Mir Qasim, the Nawab of Bengal, and Nawab Shuja-ud-Daula of Avadh 
at the battle of Buxar (1764), and as one of the consequences, obtained significant 
concessions from Shuja-ud-Daula through the treaty of 1801.51 The treaty forced Avadh 
to cede its territories of Rohilkhand and Allahabad, which were incorporated into 
British India, and to hand over control of its army to the EIC.52 Henceforth, the  
Nawabs were bound to act upon the advice of the Company officials in the internal and 
external affairs of the state.53 These procedures put the state under de facto control of the 
British, paving the way for eventual British annexation in 1856. British attitudes and 
policy changes tended to ignore the sentiments and traditions of local rulers and 
nobility.54 The increasingly haughty and autocratic attitude of British authorities towards 
Avadh royalty was particularly galling for the latter, who had acceded to every British 
demand, and now felt deprived of whatever importance they held until the annexation.55  
Begum Hazrat Mahal's  role in the rebellion has its antecedents in the events 
surrounding her husband, Nawab Wajid Ali Shah's abdication in 1856. Upon being 
forced to choose between signing over the accession of the state and its outright 
annexation by the British, the Nawab had wavered and beseeched the British resident to 
withdraw his ultimatum, but without success.56 His final decision not to sign the 
instrument of accession seems to have been influenced by the Queen mother and 
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Begum Hazrat Mahal herself.57 Hazrat Mahal did not accompany the Nawab on his exile 
to Calcutta, the reasons for which are not clear. Her decision to remain at Lucknow 
could have been a matter of personal choice; or perhaps the King did not want her to 
accompany him; or the Queen mother, who had decided to proceed to England in the 
meantime to plead her son's case with Queen Victoria,58 might have wanted Hazrat 
Mahal to remain behind and manage the royal affairs in her absence and that of the 
Nawab. At any rate, the Begum remained at Lucknow, where she quickly filled the 
power vacuum and emerged as the most prominent leader of the rebellion at Avadh.  
Soon after the Sepoy surge at Lucknow, Begum Hazrat Mahal moved to have her son, 
Birjis Qadr, the heir apparent, installed on the throne. However, the final decision as 
mentioned above, was made by the Sepoys. Begum Hazrat Mahal would have been 
aware of the political vulnerability of Bahadur Shah Zafar at the time. The Mughal 
military effort at Delhi was making no headway against the British siege force at the 
outskirts of the city, which had now been greatly augmented with loyal troops from the 
Punjab, the North-West Frontier, and Nepal. Yet, the fact that regardless of his limited 
or ineffective jurisdiction, Bahadur Shah Zafar was perceived as the central figure of the 
rebellion around whom all Indians opposed to the British had coalesced, influenced her 
decision to not press a claim of kingship for Birjis Qadr. Perhaps, the Begum 
envisioned the eventual revival of an earlier arrangement during the eighteenth century, 
when the Avadh Nawab functioned as a de-facto head of the Mughal government in his 
capacity as grand vizier of the Mughal Emperor.59 Or perhaps she hoped to achieve a 
fully sovereign status for Avadh royalty in the event the restored Mughal authority 
ultimately collapsed, and was prepared to bide her time until that point.   
The Begum's relationship with the Sepoys under her command was complicated, not 
least because of their assertiveness in the matter of Birjis Qadr's investiture. While in 
Nepal with the retreating remnants of her army in 1859, she complained about the 
arrogant attitude of her troops to the Nepalese prime minister and commander-in-chief: 
'On the one side I had the British as enemies, on the other, the troops made us as 
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goats'; 60 and that 'it was neither my pleasure nor my son's that he was made a King... if 
my son had been [the real] King, the troops would have been under his orders; whereas 
he is under their orders'.61 The alienation had become evident in the earlier phases of 
the war when during an encounter with the British at Lucknow in 1857, the Begum 
berated the Sepoys for their lack of courage: 'the whole army is in Lucknow, but it is 
without courage; why does it not attack; is it waiting for the English to be reinforced, 
and Lucknow to be surrounded'?62 Appealing to their sense of manly pride, she even 
'taunted them by an offer of breeches, which are worn in India by the gentle instead of 
the hardy sex'.63 On another occasion, when her chiefs demanded recognition and 
remuneration for their role in the rebellion, she lashed out at them in these words: 'Ye 
wretches that plunder the city and destroy my people; ye that trample the weak and fly 
from the strong, and you clamour for pay and reward? How can I pay when the 
Treasury is within the Baillie guard? How can I reward you when the enemy is as fear-
striking as a lion in his den? And yet ye brag and boast, ye murderers of innocent babes, 
killers of unresisting women, and massacre-agents of the weak fugitives and prisoners. 
Shame and thousand curses upon ye... Go away, ye barking dogs, and do not show your 
black faces until better deeds prove that ye are men'.64  
Begum Hazrat Mahal's refrains did occasionally seem to succeed in inspiring some 
confidence among the Sepoys, which accounts for why they did not abandon her 
altogether, and a number of them chose to remain with her, accompanying her in exile 
in Nepal. Her trail of resistance which led all the way to Nepal demonstrates a more 
sustained commitment to royalist ideology than that of her counterpart, Emperor 
Bahadur Shah Zafar, who, as we have seen in the previous chapter, gave himself up to 
the EIC authorities relatively early in the war, even though the bulk of the forces under 
his command were not ready to give up. 
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Throughout the course of the rebellion, Begum Hazrat Mahal issued or authorised a 
number of proclamations concerning an array of issues. These proclamations provide 
useful insights into the beliefs and values that formed her ideology and that motivated 
her behaviour towards the British, the Nepalese authorities, as well as her compatriots. 
One such declaration was a spirited response to Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 
announcing direct control of India by the British crown. Severely criticising the 
measure, the Begum appealed to fellow Indians not to be misled by the change from 
EIC administration to direct British rule: 
The laws of the Company, the settlement of the Company, the English 
servants of the Company, the Governor-General, and the judicial 
administration of the Company, are all unchanged … Our ancient 
possessions they took from us on pretence of distributing pay; and in the 
seventh article of the treaty they wrote on oath that they would take no 
more from us. If the arrangements made by the Company are then to be 
accepted, what is the difference between the former and the present state of 
things? These are old affairs; but, recently, in defiance of treaties and oaths, 
and notwithstanding that they owed us millions of rupees, without reason 
and on the pretence of the misgovernment and discontent of our people 
they took our country and property, worth millions of rupees. Further, it is 
written in the proclamation, that they want no increase of territory, but yet 
they cannot refrain from annexation. If the Queen has assumed the 
government, why does her Majesty not restore our country to us when our 
people wish it? It is well known that no King or Queen ever punished a 
whole army and people for rebellion; all were forgiven, and the wise cannot 
approve of punishing the whole army and people of Hindustan, for so long 
as the word 'punishment' remains, the disturbances will not be suppressed. 
There is a well-known proverb, Murta kya na karta (A dying man is 
desperate). It is impossible that a thousand should attack a million, and the 
thousand escape.65  
Hazrat Mahal might have been hoping that Queen Victoria might yet restore the Avadh 
regent under British patronage with all political and military powers to be retained by 
the British - a situation that existed in the state prior to the rebellion. This is what she 
appears to be alluding to in her proclamation when complaining about Queen Victoria 
for 'not restoring our country and property'. She also seems to be implying that if 
Queen Victoria's amnesty scheme was generous enough to extend to all Hindustanis, 
she and her followers might yet avail of it. The feeling of having no choice but to 
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continue fighting would then presumably cease. Following the successive failures of 
Avadh royal forces to defeat the British, the Begum had begun contemplating a 
conclusion of the war that would enable her to retire from her political role, and obtain 
a pension for her son before transferring power to the British.66 She even sent overtures 
of peace to General Outram, but the General declined to accept her terms, following 
which, she determined to continue the war, and launched further preparations for 
resistance.67  
Taking up the issue of religion in her counter-proclamation, Hazrat Mahal challenged 
the Christian religion and vehemently criticised the various measures to impose it upon 
Hindustanis:  
In the proclamation [by Queen Victoria] it was written that the Christian 
religion was true but no other creed would suffer oppression, and that the 
laws would be observed towards all. However, that religion is true which 
acknowledges one God and knows no other. Where there are three Gods in 
a religion neither Mussalmans nor Hindus -nay, not even Jews, Sun-
worshipers, or Fire-worshipers, can believe it true. To eat pigs and drink 
wine, to bite greased cartridges and to mix pig's fat with flour and 
sweetmeats, to destroy Hindu and Mussalman temples on pretence of 
making roads, to build churches, to send clergymen into the streets and 
alleys to preach the Christian religion, to institute English schools, and pay 
people a monthly stipend for learning the English sciences, while the places 
of worship of Hindus and Mussalmans are to this day entirely neglected; 
with all this, how can the people believe that their religion will not be 
interfered with? The rebellion began with religion, and for it millions of 
men have been killed. Let not our subjects be deceived: thousands of men 
wore deprived of their religion in the North-West, and thousands were 
hanged rather than abandon their religion.68  
Herein was a strong affirmation of the Begum's belief that Christianity was a false 
religion that was moreover being forced upon the Hindus and Muslims; yet religion was 
the raison d'être of the latter, who would die, and were indeed dying for it rather than give 
it up. But there was an irony in her dismissal of the central Christian tenet of Trinity. 
Fellow Hindus, on whose behalf the Begum was also making the proclamation, similarly 
did not believe in the unity of God, and in fact worshipped more than three deities. 
Judging by that standard, it was the Hindus who in Muslim estimation could qualify as 
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disbelievers, and thus subject to potential ostracism or war; and not the Christians who 
were commonly believed to be 'people of the book' according to the Quran, which 
accorded them the status of believers.69 Apparently, socio-cultural solidarity with 
Hindus, which had come about as a result of a long period of cooperation and 
coexistence, coupled with political necessity and the strategic imperative of cementing a 
military alliance against the British, necessitated innovative ways of interpreting Islam 
and Christianity in order to achieve her goals of defeating the British. A similar irony is 
evident in her denigration of the British and other Europeans in India for drinking 
wine. Alcohol was not a prohibited substance for them, but rather for the Muslims, as 
Islam prohibits it ,just as it does pork.70 The Muslim royalty and aristocracy in India on 
the other hand, were well-known for alcohol consumption. Among Avadh royalty itself, 
only Nawab Wajid Ali Shah, and his father, Nawab Amjad Ali Shah were non-drinkers, 
while their predecessors were conspicuous in their excessive use of wine, which was 
often witnessed in public gatherings.71  
Another impassioned proclamation, which was issued by Birjis Qadr, and addressed to 
the Muslims of Avadh, Kosheya, Rampur and Moradabad, reinforced the emotions and 
beliefs expressed in earlier declarations.72 It also appeared to be an attempt to dispel any 
impression the Muslims might have about the status of Christians as fellow believers. 
Citing from the Quran, the proclamations states, 'O ye, the people who follow the 
religion [Islam] do not make the Jews and Christians your friends. He who forms 
friendship with them becomes positively one of them, inasmuch as the friend of a Jew 
is a Jew and that of a Christian, a Christian. Certainly God does not guide the tyrants, 
i.e., the infidels in the path of righteousness'. Supporting the injunction, the 
proclamation argues, 'This sacred text plainly shows that the forming of friendship with 
the Christians is an act of infidelity and that consequently he who is on friendly terms 
with them is not at all a Muslim'. It is thus 'the bounden duty of all the Muslims who are 
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the brethren of each other, to become the implacable enemies of the Christians. The 
non-execution of this duty by the Muslims will lead to the loss of their faith and they 
will in consequence become apostates'.  
Addressing those who had misgivings about the kind of treatment they would receive 
from the British if the latter managed to re-establish their power, Birjis Qadr cited a 
reassurance from the Quran: 'those whose faith is defective lose no time in forming 
friendship with the Christians under the apprehension lest the absence of such 
friendship should entail some misfortune on them,' yet 'God will shortly grant victory to 
the Muslims or give such a turn to events that they will repent of their folly in having 
entertained groundless doubts'. The Muslims are then cautioned that if they act in a 
'cowardly, effeminate and irresolute' manner and 'not be in union with each other, the 
English will overcome them, hang and shoot them, blow them up…apprehend their 
families, dishonour their females…plunder their property, try to make them Christians, 
burn or throw into the filth the holy Quran and other religious books, pull down the 
mosques, and put an end to the very name of Islam'. To lend doctrinal weight to these 
assertions, the pamphlet informs the Muslims that the proclamation has been 'upheld by 
the followers of both Sunnis and Shi'as'.73  
This was a powerful reaffirmation of the Islam-in-danger belief, but with a twist: it 
attempted to evoke a Muslim equivalent of the Hindu loss-of-caste argument resulting 
from the British issue of the cartridges, by making a case that Islam was similarly in peril 
under the British. The declaration in fact, goes further by clearly declaring that 
Christians are the enemies of Muslims as enjoined in the Quran, so that by implication, 
even if the cartridge incident did not constitute a sufficient religious cause for a Muslim 
uprising, it was incumbent upon Muslims to consider Christians as their inherent 
enemies, and thus destroy them.74 However, instead of striving for ideological clarity on 
how Muslims should treat the British/Christians, reliance on such verses for the 
purpose of mobilising the Muslims would have ironically added to the Muslim 
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confusion on the relationship with the Christian community, since as shown above, 
there are also verses in the Quran clearly empathetic to Christians.  
Religious, political and social beliefs were similarly expressed in another proclamation 
by Birjis Qadr. Addressed to all inhabitants of Avadh, the pamphlet, issued on 25 June 
1858 declared that 'all Hindus and Mussalmans are aware that four things are dear to 
every one of them - first, religion; second, honour; third life; and fourth, property'. It 
assured them that the new Avadh government fully respected these rights, and allowed 
everyone to 'remain steadfast in his religion…and uphold his honour according to his 
worth and capacity, be he a person of high descent of any caste or denomination: Syed, 
Mughal, Pathan or Shaikh among the Mussalmans, or Brahmin, Khatri, Bais or Kaith 
among the Hindus; all these retain their respectability according to their respective 
ranks, and all persons of a lower order such as Sweeper, Chamar, Dhanook or Passee 
cannot claim equality with them'. In this same proclamation, the British were accused of 
violating these four beliefs by 'depriving the Hindus and Mussalmans of their religion 
and wanting them to become Nazarenes (Christians)'. Under their influence, 'thousands 
of people have embraced Christianity and are continuing to do so'. The British 'consider 
the honour and respectability of every person of the higher orders equal to those of the 
lower orders, nay, in contrast to the latter, they treat the former with contempt and 
disrespect, and at the instance of a chamar (a member of the untouchable community) 
force the attendance of a Nawab or Rajah, and thus subject him to indignity'. Moreover, 
the British 'hang the respectable people, destroy their families, and raze their homes, 
leaving them with nothing'. Further, 'wherever they go, they disarm the people, and 
hang, shoot or blow up anyone they like, and deprive anyone they choose of his faith 
and honour'. The zamindar class is also advised to be wary of British measures to 
extract revenues, as this is a subterfuge to control the rural elite 'so that the British … 
might force them to become Christians, or hang or dishonour them'. Consequently, 'the 
Hindus and Mussalmans are hereby warned, that whosoever among you wishes to 
protect his faith, honour, life and property, should come forward to fight alongside the 
Sirkar [the Avadh government] against the English'.75  
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This was a remarkable enunciation of the cultural ideology of not only the Avadh 
royalty, but the prevalent socio-cultural beliefs of Indian society. Accusing the British of 
treating chamars and Nawabs alike as an insult to the high-born was an expression of the 
entrenched social divisions that existed in Indian society, and that were being projected 
with the same passion as the other matters raised in this proclamation. Such 
proclamations also amounted to a strategy of vilifying the enemy by portraying him as 
less than human, so that the pitch of hatred that is required to destroy him by all means, 
even if such tactics may be prohibited by one's own religion, can be maintained.    
The themes of religion-in-danger and resentment against British treachery were also 
invoked by the Avadh royalty in a number of missives to the Maharajah of Nepal in 
order to seek his alliance.76 Addressing two letters to the Maharajah dated 9 and 11 May 
1858, Birjis Qadr denounced the British for 'breaking the treaty [with Avadh], 
dethroning my father, Wajid Ali Shah, and sequestering his state, palaces, and 
everything he had'. The British were accused of 'committing every sort of violence, and 
pulling down temples, mosques, Imambaras, and [other] sacred places'. The threat to 
religion posed by the British was taken up in some detail, informing the Maharajah that 
'the British some time ago attempted to interfere with the faith of both the Hindus and 
Mussalmans by preparing cartridges with cow's fat for the Hindus, and that of pigs for 
the Mussalmans, and ordering them to bite them with their teeth…. The Sepoys 
refused, and were ordered by the British to be blown away from guns on the parade 
ground. This is the cause of the war breaking out…' Appealing to the Hindu 
Maharajah's religious sentiments, Birjis Qadr stated that he was 'convinced that you pay 
great attention to religion and faith; and … are also aware that the British do not care 
either for the religion or life of the Hindus and Mussalmans, and their cunning and 
treachery…is not unknown to you'. The Maharajah was invited to 'preserve the 
standard of religion…and join in killing the British, which is the only way to save the 
religions of both the Hindus and Mussalmans'.77 In a similar vein, the Viceroy of 
Lucknow, Muhammad Khan approached the Maharajah, accusing the British of 
'depriving the inhabitants of this country [Hindustan], of their religion, faith, 
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dominions', and inviting him to 'enter into agreements to kill, and get rid of, these 
infidels'.78  
In addition to eliciting the religious sympathy of the Maharajah, who was a Brahmin 
himself, this was an exercise in realpolitik. Avadh was completely isolated at the time 
and needed an ally, or at least a non-belligerent state in the vicinity where some of its 
defeated or deserting Sepoys could seek refuge.  Since Nepal was already allied with the 
British, there was a possibility that such diplomatic moves might persuade the 
Maharajah to intercede with the British to not chase the Avadh Sepoys seeking asylum 
in his territory. But the Maharajah, who remained committed to the British throughout 
the course of the Indian rebellion, played a critical role in suppressing the Avadh rebels. 
The Gurkha troops of Nepal took active part in a number of successful campaigns in 
Avadh, especially at Gorakhpore and Lucknow.79 By 1859, Maharajah Jang Bahadur 
knew that the Begum was isolated and appeared to be fighting for a lost cause. He saw 
no benefit in invoking British displeasure by letting the Begum's troops, who had taken 
refuge in Nepal, launch attacks on the pursuing British force. According to Kaye's and 
Malleson's account, the Maharajah 'not only informed the armed rebels who had 
entered Nepal that he would afford them no protection, but he allowed British troops 
to cross the border into Nepal to disarm the considerable body that had gathered 
there'.80  
 
Ulama  
Compared to the Sepoys and royalty, the Ulama were more vociferous in the cause of 
Jihad. In Avadh, the resistance was spearheaded by Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah, Maulvi 
Sarfaraz Ali, and Maulvi Liaquat Ali, who remained the most zealous religious leaders in 
the state during the rebellion years. Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah led a large force of five 
thousand irregular cavalry, some infantry, and nine artillery guns, and fought a number 
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of battles against the British at Lucknow, Faizabad, Shahjahanpur and Rohilkhand.81 He 
was a disciple of one Mihrab Shah, a Sufi Shaikh at Gwalior, from whom Ahmadullah 
Shah had taken a pledge to wage Jihad against the British.82 Before his arrival in Avadh, 
Ahmadullah had issued a circular in Madras which called upon 'all true believers to rise 
against the English infidels and drive them from India', declaring that the only way this 
could be accomplished was through a Jihad; that moreover, 'whoever fell in such a war 
would be venerated as a martyr, while anyone who held back would be execrated as an 
infidel and a heretic'.83  
When the Bengal Army Sepoys at Faizabad rebelled on 8 and 9 June 1857, they 
promptly placed the Maulvi as their head.84 A similar tendency on the part of Sepoys to 
elect Ulama to lead them was in evidence at Delhi as shown in the previous chapter. As 
the rebellion spread, Maulvi Ahmadullah attracted a large following of disciples who 
built a cult of invulnerability around him, which he apparently encouraged himself. At 
Muhammadi, Ahmadullah declared himself an independent ruler on 15 March 1858 and 
ordered the coins to be struck in his name. There he joined the rebel leaders, Azimullah 
Khan, Prince Firoze Shah, and Ismail Khan. General Bakht Khan became his vizir, 
Maulvi Sarfaraz Ali Jaunpuri his qazi-ul-quzzat (Chief Judge), and Nana Rao Peshwa was 
made the diwan (Chief Revenue Officer). The other members of the council were 
Maulvi Liaqat Ali Ilahabadi, Dr. Wazir Khan Akbarabadi, Maulvi Faiz Ahmad Badauni 
and Prince Feroz Shah.85 Ahmadullah Shah's political ambitions were revealed earlier 
during his stay at Aligarh where he was said to have declared that he would 'sit on the 
throne and issue his own coins, the whole army will obey him, and the treasure will also 
be under his control'.86 This political agenda obviously brought him into conflict with 
Begum Hazrat Mahal. 
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The setup of Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah's own government suggests that he distrusted 
the Avadh royal government, and was pursuing his own political ambitions as evidenced 
by minting coins in his name, and requiring the khutba (Muslim Friday sermons) to be 
read in his name (invocation of the Muslim ruler's name during the Friday congregation 
prayer). Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah's relationship with the Avadh government tended to 
be fragile. Mummoo Khan, Begum Hazrat Mahal's advisor, viewed the Maulvi as a 
potential threat to his position as commander of the Avadh forces, and succeeded in 
having him imprisoned for a while.87 Ahmadullah Shah's establishment of his 
government at Shahjahanpur created a rift with Prince Firoze, Bahadur Shah Zafar's 
eldest son as well, who had in the meantime joined the rebel army in Avadh.88 
Consequently, both parted ways with Ahmadullah Shah after this development. 
Ahmadullah Shah's quest for political empowerment, which, since it appeared 
independent of Begum Hazrat Mahal's government, indicates that the Maulvi, even as 
he never refused to acknowledge the principle of royalty as personified by the Begum, 
was pursuing a  different political ideology.  
Not all members of the Avadh Ulama seemed to harbour similar political ambitions, 
and the religion-in-danger belief was a far greater motivation for them to fight against 
the British. Ahmadullah Shah's peer, Maulvi Liaquat Ali authored a proclamation calling 
upon all Hindus and Muslims to 'be ready to destroy the English for the purpose of 
defending their respective religions, otherwise neither will the faith of anyone remain, 
nor their lives, property, children or honour be safe'.89 The proclamation accuses the 
EIC officials of asking Queen Victoria's permission to 'kill fifteen Moulvees and Pundits 
out of every hundred in India, as well as five hundred thousand of Hindu and Muslim 
Sepoys and Ryots', as that would enable them to 'make all the people of India Christian 
in a short time'. Queen Victoria is vilified as 'that ill-starred polluted …(expletive) who 
gave her consent to the spilling of this innocent blood,' and the English officials in 
India castigated for being 'the accursed men who on receipt of her permission 
commenced committing general slaughter on the pretext of the cartridges'. Had it not 
been for the 'bold Sepoys who butchered the English and put an end to all their power', 
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the latter 'would in a short time have killed everyone who refused to become a 
Christian'. Extending an appeal to all sections of Hindustani society, the proclamation 
urges the 'Kings, Vizirs, Rajahs and Nawabs to slay the English in the field of battle'. 
The general population - men, women, slaves, and children are urged to 'put the 
accursed English to death by shooting them with arrows, guns, stones, bricks, vessels,' 
and to destroy or hurt them in any other manner, including 'slapping them, beating 
them with shoes, flinging dust in their eyes, scratching and dragging them, gouging out 
their eyes, breaking their noses'.90   
The third prominent religious leader active in Avadh, Maulvi Muhammad Sarfaraz Ali, 
was equally contemptuous of the British for the damage they were believed to have 
wrought upon Hinduism and Islam in India. In a letter to Maharajah Jang Bahadur of 
Nepal on the authority of Birjis Qadr, Sarfaraz Ali described the British as 'impure 
infidels, tyrants, and enemies of the religion, both of Hindus and Mussalmans', who 
'have fought against the army of the faithful, and slain thousands of Hindus and 
Mussalmans without cause'. He complained to the Maharajah about his alliance with the 
'infidels', and criticised it as 'unbecoming the dignity of Princes and Kings'. Asserting 
that 'the chiefs of every tribe should fight for their religion as long as they live', the 
Maulvi asked Maharajah Jung Bahadur to 'make arrangements so that these enemies of 
the faith may abandon their present purpose, and meet with punishment'. As 
compensation, Jang Bahadur was assured: 'by this means you will obtain renown in this 
world, and in the next; secondly you will give satisfaction to our government, and it will 
be the means of increasing friendship between us'.91  
The most comprehensive document detailing the ideology of the Ulama  opposing the 
British was the 'Futteh Islam' (Victory of Islam).92 In common with nearly all other 
proclamations by the royalty and senior members of the royal Avadh government, this 
pamphlet mirrors the intense hatred and distrust of the British, and of Christianity. 
Thus, 'the execrable Christians are openly committing oppression and tyranny', by 
'killing innocent men, plundering their property, setting fire to their houses and burning 
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them down, sometimes with children inside. These accursed Christians are so ungodly 
and inhuman that they forcibly press many poor people into their service…use them as 
shields in the battlefield…exposing them to shots, behind whom the Christians can 
operate in relative safety', but 'in fact these outrageous acts are a prelude to the downfall 
of these accursed people'. The people are reminded that 'this accursed lot have 
considered themselves as equal to the great Pharaoh, but they will, please God, be 
butchered in the same manner'. Fellow Hindustanis are warned that 'if they [the British] 
succeed in re-establishing their authority, great misfortunes will befall the Hindus, 
Mussalmans, Sepoys, Kings and Viziers'.   
The pamphlet also accuses the British of defiling the local faiths by 'attempting to 
deprive the sepoys of their religion by applying impure substances to the cartridges',93 
but 'such measures led to their destruction like dogs' at the hands of their subjects, who 
were as a result, 'converted into enemies'. The people are cautioned that a 'delay in the 
annihilation of these Christians is involving the loss of many innocent lives, a 
circumstance which renders the waging of a religious war with the execrable Christians 
one of our bounden duties, enjoined by the Prophet'; and that 'whoever will not take 
advantage of this opportunity to wage a religious war, will repent in future as such a 
chance will never come again.' A rejoinder is made to the rebel troops: 'it is you sepoys 
who have kindled the flames, and these cannot be extinguished but by you'. Specific and 
detailed instructions are provided for combat strategy, tactics, and logistics to 
successfully engage the British, and the sepoys and other combatants are assured that 
'God be praised, the necessary material for the execution of that duty has through His 
assistance been now put in our possession, i.e., the guns etc., required for a religious 
war', which are 'through Divine favour now in the possession of the Muslim Kings of 
Delhi and Lucknow; may God save the Kings of the Muslims and make them 
victorious.' However, there is some apprehension about the fighting ability of the 
Sepoys: 'you are now flying before a small body of Europeans, whom even the 
shoemakers and spirit-sellers can put to death'; and 'it is unlawful for holy warriors to 
take flight'; but they are encouraged to 'rise quickly in the name of God, and go forth to 
slay the infidels'. Those engaged in combat against the British are reminded that 
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according to the Quran, even 'one hundred pious Muslims can, by the power of God, 
overcome two hundred infidels', but 'this blessing can be obtained if a holy leader is first 
appointed and then a religious war be undertaken'.  
The author 94 of Futteh Islam further explained the Islamic requirements of leadership in 
the following way: 'Appoint a Quraishi [one belonging to the Quraish tribe of Arabia] to 
lead you', but 'if you do not find one at this time when the infidels are in 
power…appoint another Mussalman who is a chief and in power…and solemnly 
declare yourselves as his followers'. The preference for Quraishi leadership is justified as 
'the Arabs are the bravest of all nations in the whole world and the Quraishis are the 
most courageous amongst the Arabs. Hence God made the last Prophet a descendent 
of the Quraishi family and caused the Quraishis and all other Arabs to be his 
descendants and the followers of his faith, in order that when the Arabs and the 
Quraishis should be zealous for their religion, such religion might be propagated 
throughout the world. Certain sages have therefore pronounced it unlawful to appoint 
commanders except of the Quraishi family'. Quraishi descendants in Hindustan are 
identified as 'Syuds, Siddikies, Farookies, Osmanees, Alvees, and Abbassee Shaikhs', but 
'if a Quraishi cannot be found', especially 'at a time when infidels are in power', then 
'any Mussalman chief endowed with even a few qualities of a leader and observing the 
tenets of Muslim law can, as a matter of necessity, be selected as chief'.  
An attempt is then made to invite the Hindu populace to join such a Muslim holy 
enterprise: 'The Hindus should join the (Muslim) Chief with a view to defend their 
(Hindu) religion, and should solemnly pledge themselves to be faithful; the Hindus and 
Mussalmans as brethren to each other, should also butcher the English, inasmuch as 
formerly the Mussalman Kings protected, as they felt incumbent to do, the lives and 
property of the Hindus with their children in the same manner as protected those of the 
Mussalmans, and all the Hindus with heart and soul were obedient and loyal to the 
Mussalman Kings. The Hindus will remain steadfast to their religion, while we retain 
ours. Aid and protection will be offered by us to each other. The accursed Christians 
were anxious to make both the Hindus and the Mussalmans, Christians…the people of 
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every city, whether Hindu or Mussalman, should be unanimous in attacking 
simultaneously this accursed nation'.      
Conscious of the popularity of Sufism among a large segment of Indian Muslims, the 
author of Futteh Islam further stresses that 'the solemn promise of a sepoy to his 
commander on the occasion of a religious war is as binding as that of a person to his 
spiritual guide…when a man makes such solemn declaration to his spiritual guide, he 
feels that he will derive spiritual benefit from him; he entertains strong feelings of 
attachment and devotion toward him; looks upon all his acts as correct and good and 
considers it easy under his (the spiritual guide's) orders to sacrifice his life, property and 
honour in the path of God. In like manner, the sepoys in obeying the orders of their 
commanders (who is regarded as a spiritual guide) will, with readiness devote their lives 
to the service of the Almighty'. 
Unlike these three Ulama, who happened to be Sunnis, the Shi'a clergy of Avadh did 
not apparently issue any proclamations of Jihad. Yet, their religious role in the conflict 
was not insignificant. Given the importance of religious ideology in the 1857 rebellion, 
the active role of Avadh royalty, especially that of Begum Hazrat Mahal, and the British 
annexation of Avadh, most Shi'a were affected just as adversely as others, and were thus 
not inclined to be quietist under the circumstances. The thousands of tradesmen and 
labourers who fought the British in Avadh alongside rebel Sepoys would most likely 
have included not only Sunnis and Hindus, but also Shi'as. Some first-hand accounts of 
the rebellion suggest that the Shi'as did indeed participate widely in the disturbances.95 
This was especially so after the fall of Lucknow, when Taluqdars joined the revolt in 
great numbers. Although Hindu rajas dominated in much of the anti-British activity in 
the countryside, some Shi'as played a crucial role. Mahdi Husayn, the governor of 
Sultanpur, for instance emerged as the key figure in southern Avadh for organising rebel 
forces in the districts, as did the Shi'a Taluqdars of Mahmudabad and Bhatwamau.96  
The Shi'a rural leaders gave no evidence of holding back because holy war was 
illegitimate during the Occultation. Of the twenty-three prominent Shi'a Ulama in 
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Avadh, twelve actively served with Begum Hazrat Mahal's government, and nine 
regularly attended the court. Mirza Muhammad Ali used his influence to get for his 
brother command of the Fateh Jang Platoon under Husamu'd-Dawlah. Sayyid Asghar 
Husayn and Mir Khadim Husayn were employed in the Najib battalion, and Maulvi 
Hakim Hamzah Ali by the assistant to Mamun Khan.97 Little evidence is available about 
the activities of Shi'a Ulama outside Lucknow, but it is known that Jafar Ali Jarchavi, a 
renowned Shi'a scholar of  Lucknow, was arrested with a few other Shi'a notables of his 
town in Bulandshahr in 1857 for participating in the rebellion.98 
However, there were exceptions to Shi'a participation. Sayyid Ijaz Husayn Kinturi, an 
employee of the British bureaucracy, helped the British despite their tearing down his 
house near the residency.99 Sayyid Ali Deoghatavi, the Shi'a prayer leader in Faizabad, 
denied involvement in the revolt.100 The most celebrated instance of a major Shi'a 
scholar keeping his distance from the rebel government was that of Mujtahid (chief Shi'a 
adjudicator and head of the Shi'a community) Sayyid Muhammad Nasirabadi of Avadh. 
One of his sons served with the EIC, but another was a rebel. Sayyid Muhammad 
himself would make several private visits to the Begum and Birjis Qadr, along with his 
close disciples to pray for success against the British.101 Yet, he never declared a holy 
war throughout the rebellion. 
An explanation for Sayyid Muhammad's seemingly contradictory behaviour may lie in 
the events taking place in the winter of 1857, when the British siege of Lucknow had 
commenced, and his doctrinal rival, the Sunni Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah was increasing 
his influence in Avadh. These developments may have led him to believe that a British 
victory was perhaps desirable. Indeed, when asked by many of his followers to grant a 
fatwa for Jihad against the British, he was emphatic that this could not be sanctioned by 
any passage or warrant of the Quran, that war against the infidels could only be 
justifiable when waged by a Shi'a Imam and not otherwise.102 It was also reported that in 
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his own circle, the Mujtahid condemned the war as quite unjustifiable and against the 
spirit of the Law as contained in the Quran.103 
On the other hand, the chief mujtahid permitted his disciples to preach Jihad, and enter 
the rebel government's service. Accordingly, a number of Shi'as, including younger 
members of his family, became Jihad advocates. However, since he had given a ruling in 
the 1830s allowing Jihad when the lands of Islam were attacked, and since many Iranian 
Mujtahids had sanctioned Iran's wars against Russia earlier in the century, Sayyid 
Muhammad adopted a cautious public position during the Indian rebellion. According 
to Gubbins, perhaps he felt uncertain of who was going to triumph in the conflict - the 
British, or the rebels, or  his extensive investments in British Government securities 
might have divided his loyalties.104  But Cole suggests that by refusing to recognize the 
struggle as a Jihad, Sayyid Muhammad could have been attempting to set apart his 
religious leadership from that of his Sunni religious rival, Ahmadullah Shah, and points 
to a similar conflict  in Allahabad, where the Shi'a Ulama refused to call for Jihad, 
although the Sunni Maulvi Liaquat Ali did so unequivocally.105 In Cole's view, 
ideological ambivalence as well as traditional religious rivalry with their Sunni 
counterparts were the likely causes of different Shi'a positions on the rebellion.  
Although Cole appears to discount the role of the Taqiyya or dissimulation factor in 
Shi'a ideology, the concept offers a more plausible explanation as a religious belief and 
strategy of action for the Lucknow Mujtahid and other Shi'as who adopted an 
ambivalent attitude during the rebellion. Taqiyya, which means 'prudence', 'carefulness' 
or 'wariness' is an article of faith among the Shi'a community, which allows members of 
the community to 'conceal their true beliefs in a time of crisis or persecution'.106 The 
concept of Taqiyya has its source in the Quran (3:28): 'Let not the believers take 
unbelievers for their allies in preference to believers. Whoever does this has no 
connection with Allah, unless it be that you but guard yourselves against them out of 
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fear'.107 In practice, it has come to mean that Muslims may exercise their faith in secret, 
or put off any expression or act till such time the imminent threat to their person has 
passed. Taqiyya thus 'guarantees, when necessary, the safety of the individual Muslim or 
community'.108 In the Shi'a faith, hiding one's beliefs is moreover, justified on the basis 
that true belief is in the heart, known only to God.109 Another way of interpreting 
Taqiyya is as a heuristic device that is available to Muslims to conduct their relations 
with outsiders.110 This is the mode in which it was applied by the Shi'a Ulama in Avadh, 
particularly the chief  Mujtahid, as it allowed him to take varied positions on Jihad, 
depending on whom he was addressing, or dealing with during the rebellion years.   
 
Conclusion 
The Sepoy army at Avadh failed to defeat a much smaller British force despite having 
the additional advantage of fighting on home ground and enjoying wide public support, 
including the full backing of Begum Hazrat Mahal. In that respect, they enjoyed a more 
favourable position than their Delhi counterparts, who in the end were abandoned by 
Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar. Although the Avadh Sepoys were committed to the 
cause of restoring Bahadur Shah Zafar, and retained loyalty to the exiled Avadh Nawab 
even in his absence, they did not seem as dedicated to their own supreme commander, 
the Begum. This is attributable in part to the loss of cohesion and confidence within 
their own ranks that had set in as soon as their regimental culture broke down with the 
rebellion, and which in turn brought about a sense of alienation and indiscipline. Their 
interference in the state administration through the Sepoy Council was also an 
impediment to their primary responsibility of combating the British. The Begum on her 
part, remained resolute in her opposition to the British, and made repeated efforts to 
galvanise the Sepoys, but received little response. Her efforts to gain the support of 
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neighbouring Nepal did not materialise either, as the Maharajah of Nepal remained a 
resolute British ally and took an active part in putting down the Avadh rebellion. The 
Avadh Ulama were passionate in rallying the population against the British through 
repeated proclamations of Jihad that demonised the enemy and encouraged strong 
Hindu-Muslim unity against a common enemy. But their Jihad pronouncements 
suffered from internal contradictions, as evidenced by the dichotomies between their 
pronouncements and behaviour during and after the rebellion, which blunted the 
message of Jihad that they had set out to transmit and implement. Ironically, Maulvi 
Ahmadullah Shah, the most active religious leader among them, who was also the most 
effective military commander in Avadh, lent only half-hearted support to the Begum as 
he was harbouring political ambitions of his own. The collective commitment to 
Royalism therefore, also lost its edge. However, the royalist, cultural and religious 
ideologies did play a role by providing the initial stimulus to the three actors to rise 
against the British, and to carry on the resistance for at least two years. 
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Chapter 3: Punjab 
Introduction 
This chapter opens with a survey of the societal order and political environment in pre 
1857 Punjab, providing the context in which Muslim ideology and behaviour were 
formed towards the 1857 rebellion. The three sections that follow explore the ways in 
which Muslim Sepoys, royalty and Ulama of Punjab understood and applied the 
ideologies of royalism, culturalism and Jihad during the 1857 conflict. It is argued that 
whereas the Punjabi Muslims shared a similar interpretation of culturalism with their 
adversaries in Avadh and Delhi, it was pursued with greater consistency by the Punjabis, 
especially the Sepoys who were more committed to the military and tribal dimensions of 
culturalism. On the other hand, there was a lack of attachment to the concept of 
Mughal royalism on the part of all three groups. The province had always been treated 
as a fringe territory by the Mughal Emperors, and when Mughal influence all but 
disappeared due to successive Afghan, Sikh, and British inroads, whatever affinity may 
have existed for the Mughals was also gone. The ideological approach to Jihad by the 
Punjabi Muslim Sepoys and Sufi elite was unique, in that it was never given formal 
effect, yet that did not seem to adversely affect their religiosity, nor apparently create 
any ideological confusion given the determination with which they fought their 
adversaries.  
     
Background  
Muslim presence in the Punjab was initially established in the eighth century with the 
arrival of the forces of the Arab general Muhammad Bin Qasim in Multan via Sindh.1 A 
much larger influx in the region occurred between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries, 
which is associated with the military campaigns of various Turk and Afghan generals, 
and the Mughal invasion of Babur. A number of Muslim missionaries and Sufis from 
Central and West Asia also arrived during this period, including such luminaries as Shah 
                                               
1 Maclagan, Gazetteer of the Multan District: 18. 
96 
 
Mir Surkhposh, Muhammad Ghaus, and Farid Ganj-i-Shakkar, who became founders of 
the Suharwardi, Qadri, and Chishti orders in the Punjab.2  Internal migration 
contributed to Muslim numbers when a wave of Baluchis, Rajputs and Jats entered the 
region from neighbouring Baluchistan, Sindh and Rajputana in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries.3 By the mid nineteenth century, the total Muslim population had 
reached seven and a half million.4 Agriculture, government service and soldiering were 
the mainstay of the majority, while a substantial number worked as artisans and 
labourers in village communities and cities. By contrast, the Hindus and Sikhs, the two 
principal non-Muslim inhabitants, formed the minority population with five and a half 
million.5 The Sikhs started replacing Muslim domination of agriculture and soldiering by 
the end of the eighteenth century. The Punjabi Hindus, who mostly belonged to the 
Khatri and Arora castes, were mainly engaged in trade and banking, and maintained a 
relatively large presence in Lahore, Multan and other urban centres.6  
Most of the Muslim population lived in rural areas, formed into village and agnate 
communities.7 The tribal structure was composed of numerous clans, with members of 
a clan generally owing allegiance to a single chief.8 Due to a relatively egalitarian 
religious order and greater horizontal and vertical mobility than its pre-Muslim 
structure, the Muslim tribe functioned more as a social class than a rigid caste.9 The 
Rajputs, Jats, Baluchis and Pathans formed the major tribes with a high social, political, 
and military reputation among the Punjabis.10 The Pathan settlers, who had immigrated 
with successive Afghan incursions into the region, included the Sherwani Afghans of 
Maler Kotla, and the Pathans of Mianwali, Multan, and the Derajat among others. The 
Pathans were initially organised as patrilineal communities that projected ancient Pathan 
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culture and a preference for military life.11 They settled alongside local Punjabi Muslims 
and gradually adopted indigenous languages and customs, but retained a pride in their 
heritage and continued to function as a military and land-owning class. The Jats, Rajputs 
and Baluchis were similarly associated with agriculture and the military profession. The 
chiefs of all four major tribal groups were selected by individual clans, who often had to 
fight through force of arms or personality to retain their leadership in the face of 
occasional challenges. Known as Maliks, Sardars or Khans, who were also invariably 
jagirdars or zamindars, the chiefs wielded extensive local influence and the ability to 
organise and lead their armed followers in combat.12 However, except for occasional 
forays to encroach upon a neighbour's territory or seek revenge for a perceived wrong, 
there was no large-scale warfare between the tribes.13  
The religious elite among the Punjabi Muslims consisted of Pirs, Sajjada Nasheen and 
Syeds. The Pirs or Sufis, who had the same elevated status in Punjab as the Ulama in 
Delhi and other parts of Northern India, were located at the apex of society and highly 
revered for their descent from Prophet Muhammad. Their khanqas  and shrines served 
as platforms for initiating disciples, accepting offerings, bestowing blessings, and 
providing guidance on various issues concerning personal and collective affairs.14 
Visitors and murids (sworn devotees) treated these centres as places of pilgrimage where 
they could seek spiritual enlightenment or renewal, individual blessings, and mannat 
from a living Pir or his Sajjada Nashin.15 The piri-muridi,16 evolved into a cult among 
Punjabi Muslims, which was so pervasive that nearly all families, and sometimes an 
entire tribe had a patron Pir.17   
Sufi leaders of the Punjab did not seem to be as concerned with issues of Islamic 
jurisprudence as with the everyday spiritual needs of their constituency.18 Consequently, 
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doctrinal matters and the transmission of standard religious learning were left to the 
purview of Maulvis, who were placed lower in the religious order. The Maulvi-Sufi 
differentiated order catered to the religious requirements of Muslims who were attracted 
to the streams for the separate benefits that each brought. Maulvis administered birth, 
marriage, burial and other rites, and provided advice on inheritance, property, and 
personal disputes. Unlike Pirs, however, these religious figures did not possess a cult 
following. Another branch of the religious elite, the Syeds, were located between the 
Maulvi class and the Pirs. Syeds constituted a very small proportion of the Punjabi 
population and like Pirs, held an elevated social and religious position.   
The Punjabi Muslims lacked central leadership or political institutions of their own, and 
were governed by non-Muslim or foreign Muslim rulers throughout their history. In 
such an environment, local tribal and religious structures substituted for political-
military units. These power centres were diffused across the clan chiefs, who also 
happened to be the landed elite, and the Pirs or Sajjada Nashin, who dominated the 
religious order. The role of individual and group interests and choices hence played an 
important part in the political conduct of these elite.19 They were not however, entirely 
autonomous in the exercise of influence. Shared beliefs, values and concerns of the clan 
members, who also constituted the community of disciples of Pirs and Sajjada Nashin, 
had to be considered and projected in the interests of solidarity, survival, and traditional 
values.   
The political history of Muslim Punjab can be divided into three broad phases. Under 
Turk, Afghan and Mughal rulers, the area was administered as the provinces of Multan 
and Lahore with separate governors.20 The foreign rulers treated it as an outlying 
territory, which only assumed greater importance for a short duration during the reign 
of Emperor Akbar, when it became a staging ground for campaigns against insurgent 
Pathan tribes to the north. Mughal authorities preferred to recruit frontier Pathans, 
Afghans, Persians, Turks, Hindu Rajputs and Ranghars (Muslim Rajputs of Rajputana), 
rather than Punjabi Muslims for their armies.21 The latter were also largely ignored for 
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important political positions at the royal court at Delhi.22 As Mughal and Afghan power 
went into decline during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, centrifugal 
tendencies began to emerge in the Punjab. Clan chiefs carved out or consolidated 
existing zones of influence in which they became largely independent, while the 
principalities of Maler Kotla in East Punjab and Bahawalpur to the South severed their 
feudatory ties with the Mughal and Durrani Afghan rulers.  
Another consequence of the Mughal-Afghan decline was the rise of the Sikhs in the 
Punjab. Sikh dominance was a critical turning point in Punjabi history, as for the first 
time since the advent of Islam in the region, control of the region had passed to a non-
Muslim power, whose warriors moreover had a history of conflict with their Afghan 
and Mughal predecessors spanning over a century. The Sikhs resented the support local 
Muslims had rendered to the Afghan King, Ahmad Shah Abdali during his military 
campaigns in the Punjab.23 Muslim support for the British during the Anglo-Sikh wars 
(1845-1846; 1848-1849) intensified Sikh resentment. On their part, the Punjabi Muslims 
harboured anti-Sikh feelings for the religious restrictions the Sikhs had imposed upon 
them after coming to power.24 Under Sikh control, local Muslims not only lost some of 
their religious freedoms, but also the privileged land-owning status they had hitherto 
possessed.25  
The political situation underwent another transformation when the British displaced 
Sikh rule during the political instability following the death of Maharajah Ranjit Singh. 
The entire Punjab, excluding Maler Kotla, Bahawalpur, and the Cis-Sutlej states, was 
annexed by the British following their victory in the Anglo-Sikh wars. Significant 
changes ensued in the newly acquired territory, now termed British Punjab, as the EIC 
officials put into place a system of governance and public relations that had little 
resemblance with past arrangements. These measures included an efficient 
administrative system, professional policing, and vastly increased employment 
opportunities, particularly in the military. British officials managed to restore peace in a 
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hitherto turbulent Punjab, adopt a policy of non-interference in local customs and 
religious beliefs, and maintain neutrality towards Muslims and Sikhs.26  
Sepoys 
When news of the rebellion reached Punjab, numerous Muslim tribal chiefs and their 
followers promptly came out in support of the British government against the rebel 
Sepoys. In Central Punjab, the chiefs of Kasur provided foot and horse soldiers for 
guarding strategic ferries on the Sutlej and Ravi rivers, and performing other military 
and police duties.27 Nawab Ali Raza Khan from Lahore, whose ancestors had arrived in 
India with the army of Nadir Shah of Iran, supplied a troop of armed horsemen for the 
campaign against the Sepoy army at Delhi.28 Muslim chiefs of Gujranwala supplied 
levies for various operations in support of the British authorities.29 In Southern Punjab, 
powerful Tammandars (clan heads) of the Baluch tribes of Mazari, Khosa, Dreeshak and 
Leghari in Dera Ghazi Khan district furnished infantry and cavalry for manning military 
outposts in their areas of influence. Several hundred cavalry volunteers from Multan 
enabled the British to disarm the Sepoy regiments in the area that were suspected of 
revolt.30 Ghulam Hassan Khan, a Pathan chief of Dera Ismail Khan, raised an entire 
cavalry regiment among local Baluchis and Pathans for service with the British in Avadh 
and Delhi. Also known as the Multani cavalry, it saw action at a number of theatres of 
war in 1857.31 Another spirited response came from three Rajput chiefs of the Tiwana 
clan from Shahpur district, who mustered hundreds of their clansmen for military 
operations against rebel Sepoys in Northern India and the Punjab.32 Northern Punjab 
was similarly active, where a leader of the Khattar tribe,33 Muhammad Hayat Khan, 
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rallied to the British cause with a band of warriors that he had rallied especially for the 
purpose,34 who then joined Brigadier-General John Nicholson's Punjab Moveable 
Column for the siege and assault of Delhi.35  
Apart from representation in clan levies and local police, a large number of Rajput, 
Pathan, Jat, and Baluch tribesmen joined the regiments that the British had started 
raising since their annexation of the province.36 The First Baluch, an infantry regiment, 
was almost entirely made up of Punjabi Muslims, and it became part of Nicholson's 
Moveable Column that fought against the rebel Sepoys at Delhi.37 The Tenth Punjab 
Infantry similarly attracted a significant number of Muslim tribesmen, and took an 
active part in various anti-rebel campaigns in West Punjab and Delhi.38 The Eleventh 
Punjab Regiment, which had been raised just before the rebellion performed an 
important role in guarding the Multan cantonment, and dispersing the rebel Sepoys in 
the region.39  
The timely and overwhelming support of these Muslim combatants was crucial to 
British success against the rebel Sepoy army. Despite a successful assumption of power 
following the Anglo-Sikh wars, the Punjab Board of Administration faced a precarious 
situation when the 1857 rebellion broke out. As signs of disaffection rose among native 
regiments of the Bengal Army in the Punjab, the British were not in a position to 
counter the threat with the limited European troops at their disposal.40 The loyalty of 
local Muslims, including those already enlisted in the military units formed during the 
Anglo-Sikh wars could not be relied upon, as they might be susceptible to the appeals 
being made by Bahadur Shah Zafar and his Sepoy leadership to overthrow the British.41 
If the Sepoys in the British regiments of the Punjab had heeded these calls, it is highly 
unlikely the British could have succeeded in quelling the rebellion on their own. 
However, none of these fears materialised as the Punjabi Muslims, including their Sikh 
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counterparts in the province, flocked to the British side against fellow Indians in 
overwhelming numbers. Dispersed across various military formations and theatres of 
war, the Muslim Sepoys fought ferociously and were successful in every campaign 
against the rebel Army. A list of the killed and wounded indicates the enthusiasm with 
which the Punjabi Muslims fought during the assault on Delhi that destroyed the 
epicentre of the Indian rebellion and led to the deposition of Emperor Bahadur Shah 
Zafar.42  
The decision by these Muslims to stand by the British during the rebellion years was 
motivated by an interwoven ideology of tribalism, militarism, and religiosity. Converted 
from the Hindu warrior castes, Muslim Sepoys of the Punjab put great value on military 
virtues and took immense pride in their ancestry. Like their Hindu counterparts, they 
formed the bulk of the warrior and landowning class. The Rajput, Jat, Pathan and 
Baluch cultures to which they belonged were designed to foster a martial spirit and 
deem any occupation other than that of arms, government service, and land ownership 
as derogatory to their dignity.43 A martial tribesman increased his prestige in the 
community by congregating with others of his kind rather than with those that he 
considered non-martial.44 Nostalgia about past exploits and a fierce pride in lineage and 
tradition permitted even a poor tribal member to consider himself equal in status to any 
powerful landholder or influential member of his clan.45   
Unlike in Delhi or Avadh, the military impulse of the martial tribes found a suitable 
outlet in a professional army. The Sepoys developed strong military camaraderie with 
their British officers, and the relationship became stronger through the experience of 
combat during the Anglo-Sikh wars and then the 1857 rebellion. British commanders, 
with whom the men were in frequent contact, often exposed themselves to risk 
alongside the Sepoys. The British officers did not insist on too much discipline, which 
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fostered high morale and inclined the men to fight more effectively.46 They also carried 
the curved sword with which they were more comfortable, and could use to better 
effect than the standard British issue in the Indian army.47 Service in the Irregular 
regiments was particularly attractive, where the soldiers and native officers wore 
uniforms conforming to their local style, which they preferred over the strictly 
European uniforms.48  
Unlike the Bengal Army which rebelled in Delhi and Avadh, a sense of esprit-de-corps 
developed among the troops in Punjab as a result of favourable terms of service, long 
association, shared responsibilities, and common interests. Service pay was excellent, 
with each cavalry trooper in a Punjabi regiment receiving twenty-five rupees per month, 
which was much higher than what his counterpart in an EIC regiment was paid.49 The 
men had an opportunity to serve with their own clansmen in separate companies of the 
regiments as against the practice of composite units in the presidency armies.50 While 
this strengthened the cultural ties between members of homogenous companies and 
platoons, it minimised inter-ethnic tension across the regiment, replacing it with healthy 
competition. Even as the overall command was exercised by British officers, the 
soldiers were directly led by experienced native officers who were often their clan 
chiefs, acquaintances and relatives. Such an arrangement instilled confidence and raised 
the morale in the ranks. The Sepoys respected their British officers as they had treated 
them well and were hence worthy of their trust.51 During the course of service, the men 
also developed a strong attachment to the concept of organised militarism as 
symbolised by regimental flags, distinctive dresses, marching bands, parades, badges of 
honour and other accoutrements.52 Such a military culture of horizontal cohesion, or the 
bonds between the Sepoys, and vertical cohesion, or the strong relationship with their 
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native and British officers stood in contrast to the incohesiveness that was rampant at 
both levels in the rebel Bengal Army. As shown in the previous chapters, the Sepoy 
crisis of organisation and leadership in Delhi and Avadh was marked by the breakdown 
of familiar military structures and a relative lack of cohesion, exacerbated by 
inexperienced and weak leadership. 
An attachment to militarism that oriented the Punjabi Muslim Sepoys and their chiefs 
toward the British military establishment also provided an opportunity to redress the 
sense of deprivation they had been experiencing from Sikh domination of military 
service.53 The Muslims were not in a position to pose a military challenge to the Sikhs, 
much less to the Anglo-Sikh collusion that was materializing following the enlistment of 
Sikh warriors of the former Khalsa army in the regiments the British were raising in the 
province. Yet, they could channelize their antipathy for the Sikhs by competing with 
them on a neutral platform such as the British military structure, where the Muslims 
could demonstrate their martial prowess while avoiding a direct confrontation, the costs 
of which would have been prohibitive. The institution of the British regiment provided 
just such an avenue, with the result that within a few short years leading up to the 
rebellion, the Muslims had joined these military units in substantial numbers, even 
forming the majority in the cavalry.54  
Alliance with the British was motivated by another grievance that the Punjabi Muslims 
held against the Sikhs. These Muslims had experienced the exorbitant tax policies and 
high-handed attitude of the Sikh soldiers and revenue collectors,55 who sometimes razed 
entire villages.56 But the changes they experienced with the British annexation were a 
welcome development. For the first time in their history, peasants and farmers, who 
comprised the bulk of the population, received permanent title to their land and the 
benefit of fixed and fair revenue.57 Significantly, the British military and civil authorities 
introduced a system of land grants for selected Sepoys with good service, which, on top 
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of the promise of regular pensions, served as an incentive to seek military service, just as 
it had in the Bengal Army.58 Employment was also opened up in the popular police, 
judiciary and other departments of the new colonial government.59  
Punjabi Muslim native officers and Sepoys had an agricultural background, and they 
valued their estates and small farms, not only for economic benefit, but also for the 
respect and confidence associated with ownership of land in Punjabi society. 
Attachment to land was an important feature of tribal ideology. The tribal communities 
considered land as a source of security, which additionally determined their status and 
provided a sense of belonging and identity. Such a concept of 'place attachment' refers 
to the range of thoughts, beliefs, feelings and behaviour that are evoked in reference to 
a specific geographic location. As Milligan explains, connections to a physical locality 
occur in two interconnected dimensions, which he terms the interactional past, and the 
interactional potential.60 The former refers to the memories and previous experiences of 
interactions associated with a site, while the latter is the imagined or anticipated 
experiences perceived as likely or possible to occur in a site.61 For the tribal Sepoys and 
their chiefs, the threat to, or loss of landholding status that they faced from the Sikhs 
threatened not only a disruption of their livelihood, but also a complete social and 
cultural dislocation from their environment. This factor pushed them towards the 
British, whose land settlement and revenue policies as discussed above had created trust 
and goodwill among the Muslim tribal-military community, one of the consequences of 
which was the Punjabi Muslim decision to collaborate with the British during the 1857 
war.62  
A cultural ideology that valued military service, land holding status, and tribal affinity 
was not an impediment to religiosity. Punjabi Muslim Sepoys remained deeply 
conscious of their religious ideology. Upon their conversion to Islam, the tribesmen had 
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adopted the common rituals and beliefs associated with the new faith, yet they 
continued to retain a strong belief in the social and military superiority that was 
associated with their pre-Muslim traditions. As observed in numerous campaigns of the 
1857 rebellion, Muslim Sepoys regularly performed the ritual prayer and routinely rode 
into battle with the Qur'an in their saddle-brows,63 even as they knew that many of their 
enemies were fellow Muslims who would be invoking the same divine help in combat.64 
The paradox of resorting to religion in combat against their co-religionists was resolved 
by treating the latter as aliens with whom very little besides Islam was shared. There 
were few Delhi and Avadhi Muslims among the Punjabi Muslim population. Their 
language and cultural norms were alien to the local population. Some of them were 
employed as clerks or other petty officials in the Punjab government, with whom the 
Punjabi Sepoys, who were mostly confined to their villages or military garrisons, had 
little interaction. There were also some Indian Muslim military deserters in the Punjab 
from EIC regiments who had taken refuge in the province under various guises, and 
were hence held in disdain by the locals for having abandoned a service that was 
considered to bestow respect and honour.65 Such perceptions created an image of 
Hindustanis as the 'Other', which enabled Punjabi Muslims to cope with the ideological 
confusion they would otherwise have experienced in identifying fellow Muslims as foes.  
It is significant that no call for a collective Jihad was ever made to inspire Punjabi 
Muslims in combat during the rebellion years. Yet, neither had any fatwas or appeals 
been issued by local religious authorities forbidding Jihad against the rebel force. The 
Punjabi Muslims were highly susceptible to the religious and political influence of their 
Sufi leadership.66 As the Sufis openly supported the British drive against the rebel 
Sepoys, even though refraining from a declaration of Jihad against the rebels, local 
Muslim Sepoys and officers, a large number of whom were disciples of these Sufis, took 
that as a cue to sanctify their combat participation. By contrast, the process of Jihad 
transmission in Delhi and Avadh occurred somewhat differently, and with different 
consequences. Although the Delhi and Avadh Ulama had made clear and impassioned 
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calls for Jihad, these did not have the same powerful impact on the Sepoys there. As 
discussed in those chapters, the Ulama community in Northern India was divided on 
the legitimacy of Jihad against the British, and a large number of them stayed away from 
the conflict. Thus the message of Jihad the Sepoys received from the external 
environment was a mixed one, and this in turn had a demoralising effect on their 
combat spirit. Punjabi Muslim Sepoys on the other hand, received no ambiguous 
messages from their religious elite who appeared unanimous in supporting the war, and 
taking part in combat themselves. At the same time, the Punjabi Muslims remained 
indifferent to the religious grievances that their counterparts were so emphatically 
expressing against the British, which clearly suggests that they either questioned their 
credibility, or considered them of minor importance. At any rate, in the Punjab itself, 
the British appeared to have done none of what they were being accused of in Northern 
India, so it did not raise any alarm among the Punjabis. Their Sufi leadership too, never 
expressed any concern about British violation of Islamic norms and sensibilities. All of 
this created a sense of religious security among the Punjabi Muslim Sepoys and their 
native officers, which enabled them to ignore the messages that the rebel elements were 
communicating to them to desert the British and join the resistance under Bahadur 
Shah Zafar.67 It also raised their morale or will-to-fight against their foes, whether 
Hindu or Muslim, in combat. An instance of this religious zeal was evidenced at 
Hurdwar on 17th April, 1858, when the men of the Multani regiment of cavalry became 
'flush with excitement' during an assault on a rebel force and 'raised their hands towards 
heaven', as they pounced upon the enemy with the Muslim war cry of 'Allah-o-Akbar' 
(God is great).68   
Punjabi Muslims had nothing at stake in the revival of Mughal rule. Punjab was treated 
as a fringe territory by the Mughals, even when the empire was at its zenith under 
Emperors Akbar and Aurangzeb.69 Opportunities for military employment under the 
Mughals were non-existent for most Punjabis as the Mughals and their agents preferred 
Hindu Rajputs, Persians and Afghans.70 It was therefore unlikely that the pattern would 
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change in the event Mughal rule was restored. Moreover, when the rebellion came, it 
was viewed in the Punjab as an affair which was restricted to a few areas of Hindustan, 
and which the Mughal Emperor and his Sepoys had launched for their own interests.71 
It therefore had no bearing on the Punjabis, whose primary concern was with local 
conditions and how these could be manipulated or tailored to align with their own 
ideological motives and priorities. As the Mughals had long since retreated from the 
Punjab in the face of successful Afghan and Sikh inroads, whatever policies and 
ideologies the Punjabi Muslims pursued had only to take into account the attitude and 
conduct of the Sikhs, and their successors, the British. Under these conditions, the 
Mughals had become irrelevant for the security and well-being of Punjab. Consequently, 
the Punjabi public, which included the Muslim Sepoys, felt no affinity for, or 
commitment to the concept of Mughal royalism. Their own royalty as represented by 
the potentates of Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla was similarly uninclined towards 
Bahadur Shah Zafar and the Begum of Avadh, which reinforced the general sentiment 
of the Punjabi Muslims against the Hindustani royalty. 
 
Royalty  
Among the autonomous states of Punjab that supported the British, Maler Kotla state 
was founded by a Muslim dynasty, whose founder, Bayazid Khan, was a Sherwani 
Pathan from Afghanistan who served as a senior officer in the Mughal army. As an 
acknowledgement of his military services, Emperor Aurangzeb had granted him 
princely title and the right to turn his jagir into an imperial principality.72 His successors 
gradually expanded the territory and established a significant military presence in the 
Cis-Sutlej region of the Punjab in the ensuing years. When the 1857 rebellion broke out, 
Maler Kotla's share in the total military force formed in Punjab on the British call was 
limited, but it was significant because of its proximity to the strategic Grand Trunk 
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road, which formed the main corridor between Delhi and Punjab.73 If the Nawab had 
risen against the British, this vital supply line could have been disrupted, hindering 
British provisions and troops being rushed to reinforce the siege of Delhi. The action 
would also have assisted the safe passage of  the rebel Bengal Army Sepoys making their 
way to Delhi from their garrisons in the Punjab. Adopting such a course however, 
would have entailed considerable political and military risk. Maler Kotla was surrounded 
by Sikh states, all of whom had pledged unequivocal support to the British, and were 
supplying large numbers of Sikh youths and military veterans to put down the Sepoy 
rebellion.74 Given the protracted Muslim-Sikh hostility following the long Sikh rule over 
a predominantly Muslim Punjab, any action on Maler Kotla's part to aid the rebel 
Sepoys could have brought swift retribution by the Sikhs and the British. Moreover, 
Maler Kotla had long since become independent of the Mughal crown, and there was 
little, if any, interaction with the Emperor that might have prompted the Maler Kotla 
Nawab to risk the protection the British had afforded for an uncertain alternative 
arrangement. The Nawab moreover, was not inclined towards revival of ties with a 
royal, who, because of his pensioner status, the Nawab considered lower in social status 
than his own. As Cooper has observed, this tendency was pervasive among the princely 
states which had broken away from the Mughals,75 and whose economic and military 
status, along with the display of cultural symbols of royalism had come to eclipse those 
of the Mughal royalty. 
Accordingly, the Nawab of Maler Kotla ignored the pro-Mughal rebel faction in the 
1857-59 uprising, and instead opted for collusion with the British.76 The 1857 rebellion 
was not the first instance of Maler Kotla's involvement in military conflict on behalf of 
the British. The state had previously allied with them during the Anglo-Maratha war in 
1803, followed by the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1815-16, when Nawab Muhammad Wazir 
Ali Khan personally participated in the campaign against the Gurkhas in Simla Hills.77 
Maler Kotla had also provided a military contingent to the British during the First 
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Anglo-Afghan war of 1839, and was substantially involved in the Anglo-Sikh wars with 
hundreds of its soldiers fighting under British command.78 The ties were first formalised 
when Maler Kotla sought and obtained the status of British protected state in 1809.79 
The alliance provided security to Maler Kotla and the other Cis-Sutlej states against any 
hostilities by the Sikh kingdom.80 These links served as an incentive for Maler Kotla to 
remain attached to the British and offer military assistance during the rebellion, more so 
as none of its larger and more resourceful neighbours displayed any inclination to 
switch loyalties to Bahadur Shah Zafar and his Sepoy army. Consequently, the state's 
political ideology was dictated by the need for security, which could only be ensured 
through a balance of power strategy.  
Maler Kotla's realpolitik was supplemented by a religious ideology that drew inspiration 
from the Suharwardi Sufi tradition. The state's Suharwardi linkage can be traced to 
Shaikh Sadruddin Sadri Jahan, who was mentored by Baha ul-Din Zakariya (d. 1262), or 
according to some accounts, by his grandson Rukn ud-Din Abu'l Fath (d. 1335) of 
Multan, both of whom were leading Sufis of the Suharwardi order in the region.81 
Bahlol Lodhi, the Afghan Sultan of Delhi in 1454, awarded Sadri Jahan a large jagir 
(estate) as dowry, 82 which enabled the Sufi to combine his spiritual authority with 
temporal influence.83 This practice was similar to that of his Suharwardi patron saints 
who owned large jagirs. It was based on the belief that wealth and worldly authority were 
not obstacles in the spiritual path.84 Sufi elite could utilise these assets for the benefit of 
the community of believers, and for various expenses associated with Sufi hospices and 
Jagirs. They also occasionally exercised political influence, including the decision to 
resort to armed warfare when deemed in their own interest or that of their followers,85 
or under pressure of powerful allies and adversaries. The royal family of Maler Kotla 
valued such a legacy of the founding Suharwardi Shaikhs. It consequently did not 
                                               
78 History of the ruling family of Sheikh Sadruddin, Sadar-i-Jahan of Malerkotla, 1449 A.D. to 1948 A.D: 46. 
79 George B. Malleson, An historical sketch of the native states of India in subsidiary alliance with the British 
government  (London: Longmans, Green, and co., 1875). 340. 
80 William Lee-Warner, The protected princes of India  (London; New York: Macmillan and Co., 1894). 134. 
81 Anna Bigelow, 'Sharing the sacred: practicing pluralism in Muslim North India',  (Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2010), 33. 
82 'Sharing the sacred: practicing pluralism in Muslim North India', 33. 
83 'Sharing the sacred: practicing pluralism in Muslim North India', 33. 
84 Hamid Naseem, Muslim Philosophy: Science and Mysticism  (New Delhi: Sarup & Sons, 2001). 327. 
85 Muslim Philosophy: Science and Mysticism: 327. 
111 
 
perceive the need to seek religious or political inspiration from religious orders of 
different persuasions such as the Waliullah tradition espousing Bahadur Shah Zafar's 
cause in 1857.  
A tradition of militarism combined with realpolitik was an enduring motivation in Maler 
Kotla's policies. Pursuit of internecine conflict and wars against outsiders was the norm 
for Sherwani Pathans in their original homelands. After arriving in Maler Kotla, they 
retained a feeling of pride in their ancient Pathan culture. A strong sense of valour and 
glorification of combat built into their ancient ways was to remain an abiding influence 
on their military conduct in Punjab. Shifting alliances and loyalties were a tactic of 
military and political opportunism, which brought recognition and legitimacy from 
members of the tribe, and forced both potential allies and adversaries not to take them 
for granted. Consequently, when the Mughal Empire declined in the mid-eighteenth 
century, Maler Kotla drew away from the centre and supported Ahmad Shah Abdali's 
invasion of the Punjab.86 It also occasionally switched between allies and foes among its 
neighbouring Sikh states of Patiala, Nabha, and Jind.87 Later, when Maharaja Ranjit 
Singh established his kingdom in the Punjab, Maler Kotla sought and obtained British 
protection to forestall a Sikh advance, while maintaining a degree of autonomy.88  
Bahawalpur, the other much larger Muslim principality, was founded by Sadiq 
Muhammad Khan who received the title of Nawab from Nadir Shah of Iran, when he 
invaded the Punjab in 1739.89 The Nawab belonged to the Abbasi Daudputra tribe, 
which claimed descent from the Abbasid Caliphs, and came originally from Sindh where 
it had probably arrived from Arabia.90 Compared with Maler Kotla, Bahawalpur's 
conduct in the rebellion had greater political and military implications for the restored 
Mughal government at Delhi, the British, and for Bahawalpur state itself .  
As the largest Muslim principality in the Punjab, Bahawalpur's strategic significance was 
much greater than that of Maler Kotla, and equalled that of neighbouring Multan, 
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Lahore and Rajputana. From such a location, it could have interdicted the movement of 
vital British supplies and troops to Delhi or Multan. Bahawalpur could also have 
provided sanctuary to the rebel Sepoys in the Punjab, or sent in its volunteers and 
battle-worthy army to support them. The British military establishment did not seem to 
be in a position to divert its meagre resources to force Bahawalpur's cooperation. Yet 
this vulnerability was not exploited by the state, whose resources could have been used 
to support the anti-rebel effort. The Nawab had a fully trained and experienced standing 
army of seven thousand men, besides a reserve of seven to eight thousand, including 
twenty nine hundred cavalry troopers.91 This considerable force could have been very 
effective in any anti-British operation undertaken independently, or in collaboration 
with the disaffected Bengal Army troops in the Punjab, particularly in neighbouring 
Multan.  
However, as in the case of the Nawab of Maler Kotla, Nawab Fateh Muhammad Khan 
chose to support the British with the military force at his disposal,92 thus precluding the 
possibility of a major military challenge to the British in the Punjab. Bahawalpur state 
forces comprising two battalions took an active part in quelling the 1857 uprising in 
Avadh, and in effectively occupying and policing Sirsa district on the Punjab border.93 
They were additionally engaged in patrolling duties within the state boundaries and 
adjoining areas throughout the 1857-58 period. Earlier, in 1848, the Bahawalpur military 
had been actively involved on the British side in the Second Anglo-Sikh war with some 
three thousand soldiers pitted against the Sikh garrison at Multan, where they 
performed a decisive role in the defeat of the Sikh governor, Dewan Mulraj.94 
Bahawalpur's close ties with the British were first formalised through the treaty of 1833. 
Article One of the treaty established friendship and alliance between the East India 
Company and Nawab Muhammad Bahawal Khan and his heirs, and declared that the 
friends and enemies of one party shall be friends and enemies of both.95 This was 
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reinforced by a treaty in 1838 which stipulated that the Nawab and his successors shall 
be absolute rulers of Bahawalpur, and British jurisdiction shall not be introduced into 
that principality.96   
When the rebellion commenced in Northern India, the Nawab apparently considered 
annexing Multan to his territory in order to avail of the ambiguous military situation in 
Southern Punjab, but was advised against it by his vizier.97 He seems to have been 
persuaded that it would be more prudent to remain allied with the British as they were 
more likely to prevail against the rebel Sepoy army in the end. Superiority of British 
statecraft, leadership and military tactics as evidenced in the Anglo-Sikh wars, successful 
British neutralisation of the Afghan threat on the Punjab frontier, and a steady hold 
over much of India up to that point made it unlikely that the British would fail in the 
current crisis. In its own neighbourhood, Bahawalpur could not afford to alienate the 
powerful Rajahs of Rajputana and the Cis-Sutlej potentates who were partners in the 
British effort to quell the rebellion, and could have attempted to neutralise the state if it 
took any measures against their interests. On the other hand, lending support to the 
British was likely to yield political and military dividends to Bahawalpur in the form of 
enhanced security and regional influence. By contrast, it could not expect any security 
from a Mughal government that itself appeared to be struggling, and was in a very 
vulnerable military position following the rebellion. Moreover, the Bahawalpur Nawabs 
had no historic ties with the Mughal Emperors, especially since the death of Emperor 
Aurangzeb, when  Mughal power began to erode, and none with the distant Avadh.   
Bahawalpur's realpolitik motives were reinforced by cultural and religious 
considerations. There were few Indians, whether Hindu or Muslim, amidst the local 
population. Their language and cultural norms were alien to the local Muslims. The 
Hindus were mostly engaged in trade and manual labour, which did not command 
respect in Punjabi Muslim society, which considered these professions socially 
undesirable.98 Derisively labelled by local Muslims as Kirar and Bania (words synonymous 
with extortionist traders and money-lenders respectively in Punjabi usage), the Hindu 
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stereotypes enabled the Muslim Sepoys to generally view Hindus as social outcasts who 
thus became the 'Other'. Indian Muslims by comparison, were treated little better, as 
they too tended to be employed in non-military or menial work in the state.99 The 
British too formed the 'Other', but were considered in a more favourable light. The East 
India Company's civil and military officials strictly adhered to a policy of non-
interference in the state's internal affairs, and appeared to respect mosques, Sufi 
hospices, and Muslim customary laws and practices. At the same time, there were no 
reported attempts by European missionaries or traders to pursue their activities in the 
state. British officials and other European visitors to Bahawalpur were careful in 
observing the formalities associated with the Nawab's court, which served to 
acknowledge and complement the respect and honour he held among his subjects.100 
Moreover, the British had restored to the Punjabi Sufis all the jagirs (land grants) that 
had been taken away from them during the Sikh rule. Given the tremendous popularity 
of these Sufis among Punjabi Muslims, especially of the descendants of Makhdum Sher 
Shah, Jalal-ud-Din Surkh-posh, the Suharwardi patron saint of Bahawalpur, an element 
of goodwill and admiration had developed for the British in Bahawalpur society.101 That 
these Sufis did not forbid cooperation with the British, and in fact encouraged Muslim 
military participation against the rebel forces in 1857 amounted to a tacit legitimisation 
of the war by Bahawalpur state as a pro-British Jihad. 
The nature and impact of religiosity, culture, and royalism in the princely states of 
Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla had a number of similarities as well as differences with the 
royalty in Delhi and Avadh. The Nawabs of Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla viewed their 
status as superior to that of Bahadur Shah Zafar, whom they considered inferior 
because of his 'pensioner' status, which made him dependent on the British. Yet, as 
shown above, it was an impression that apparently remained with them even after the 
Emperor was restored by the former Bengal Army Sepoys. Such a perception was an 
important aid in formulating their image of the royal leadership in Delhi as the 'Other', 
which, as we have seen is important in identifying a foe in order to neutralise or defeat 
him. Bahadur Shah Zafar, and by extension Queen Hazrat Mahal, on the other hand, 
                                               
99 Shah, Sadiqnamah: The history of Bahawalpur State: 34. 
100 Sadiqnamah: The history of Bahawalpur State: 36. 
101 Din, Gazetteer of the Bahawalpur state with map 1904: 16. 
115 
 
faced the dilemma of 'othering' the very states such as Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla 
whom they were seeking as allies against the British, but who were proving to be 
unwavering in the latter's support. All four states however, had a similar concept of 
royalism or the principle of monarchical sovereignty as part of their ideology. Begum 
Hazrat Mahal of Avadh sought the nearest state of Nepal which had the wherewithal of 
becoming an ally against the British, given its functional fighting force. Bahadur Shah 
Zafar similarly sought alliances with other states to the point of offering to share 
sovereignty with them to create a constellation of states that could together meet the 
formidable British threat. This display of realpolitik in the service of royalism was no 
different from that of Maler Kotla and Bahawalpur, who as we have seen, observed a 
cautious approach towards the Sikhs, alternating between alliance and war, but 
remained staunchly on the British side when it became apparent that the new rulers of 
Punjab were more powerful and resolute than their predecessors.  
In terms of religiosity, Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla's unanimous support from the 
religious luminaries of the Punjab contrasted with the situation in Delhi and Avadh. In 
Avadh, Hazrat Mahal was handicapped on this account due to the influential Maulvi 
Ahmadullah Shah's parallel government and his staunchly Sunni identity, which may 
have been another source of friction given the Begum's strong Shi'a background. 
Bahadur Shah Zafar's external religious support was comparatively more widespread 
and vociferous, but it was rendered ineffective due to the contradictions within the 
Ulama community on the application of Jihad against the British, and indeed on the 
very nature of Jihad and the use of religion in the conflict as evidenced by the 
innovative ways in which religion was being interpreted both by the Emperor and his 
Ulama supporters. The Sufis of the Punjab avoided these contradictions, yet indirectly 
but overwhelmingly placed their lot with the British, which encouraged the states of 
Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla, which had strong connections to Punjabi Sufism, to act 
accordingly. 
 
Ulama 
The Ulama of the Punjab were as forthcoming and enthusiastic in supporting the 
British as the Nawabs of Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla, the Sepoys, and their chiefs . 
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The Sufis belonging to the Suharwardi order performed a leading role in suppressing 
the rebel Sepoys of the Bengal Army stationed in Southern Punjab. Makhdum Shah 
Mahmud Qureshi, who was a successor of the popular saints Baha Uddin Zakariya, and 
Rukn-e-Alam, both of whom were patronised and visited by Mughal Emperors and 
Afghan kings,102 captured and killed hundreds of deserting rebel Sepoys at Multan after 
rounding them up with the assistance of his numerous followers.103 Another Sufi figure, 
Makhdum Shah Ali Muhammad and his disciples pursued and killed nearly three 
hundred Sepoys on the banks of Chenab river.104 A group of Sepoys who had found 
their way to Haveli Koranga after escaping from Multan were cornered and killed by 
Mehr Shah, a local Sufi leader, with the help of his disciples and chiefs of the local 
Rajput and Jat tribes.105 Subsequently, a number of Sufi elite accompanied the British in 
an attack on one Ahmed Khan Kharral and his band of pastoral Jats, which was the 
only incidence of revolt by the Punjabis, albeit on a minor scale against the British in 
Southern Punjab.106 Ahmed Khan Kharral was killed and his force destroyed, except for 
the few who managed to escape to a nearby jungle.107   
Such behaviour clearly shows that the popular Sufis did not endorse the Indian struggle 
against the British as a war of religion, or of Mughal restoration, and the rebellion thus 
had no legitimacy for them. The doctrinal meaning of Jihad was unclear, and the Indian 
Muslim community, including the religious authorities remained divided over its 
interpretations, and whether or not it was applicable against the British in 1857. This 
left room for a religious order or its head, or the Muslim community at large to safely 
take either position, as it would not be alone and risk universal rebuke. Paradoxically, it 
also diluted the impact of armed Jihad because of the lack of unity of purpose. 
Suharwardi Sufis as a group were, at any rate, much less concerned with the doctrinal 
issues surrounding Jihad as opposed to the Waliullah-Naqshbandi order which was 
influential in Northern India, and some leading members of which had unequivocally 
called for Jihad against the British. While the Jihad effort in Delhi and Avadh had 
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suffered because of the ambivalent Ulama attitudes and behaviour, the Sufi Ulama of 
Punjab, by avoiding the question of Jihad altogether, did not have to cope with the 
ideological contradictions inherent in the concept. In keeping with the spiritual tenets of 
their faith, the Sufis were more concerned with mysticism, spiritual regeneration, and 
devotional practices rather than with such questions as doctrinal nuances of Jihad, the 
strict Sharia code, literal interpretations of the divine texts, and ritual practice, which 
were more characteristic of the Waliullah Ulama. 
There was another important point of contention between the Sufis and other schools 
of thought. Ever since its inception in Southern Punjab, the Suharwardi Sufi leadership 
tended to operate independently of other Sufi orders and religious luminaries active in 
other areas of India. The tradition can be traced to Baha Uddin Zakariya, the founder of 
the order in Multan who would discourage others, including even Sufis to encroach 
upon his area of influence. An instance of this was his displeasure at the advent of one 
Shams Tabrez, a zealous and popular Sufi in his own right, into Multan. It is said that 
Baha Uddin went to the extent of forbidding his disciples to deny food or any other 
form of support to the Sufi visitor.108 Although the Waliullah Ulama had not yet 
established a noticeable presence in the Punjab by the mid-nineteenth century, their 
followers were making inroads into the North-West Frontier,109 - a development that 
will be discussed in the following chapter on the North-West Frontier - from where the 
spread of Waliullahi influence to the Sufi zone of spiritual authority in the neighbouring 
Punjab could not be ruled out. Consequently, the Suharwardi Sufis would have feared 
the possibility of professional competition, which would have been an additional factor 
in their unresponsiveness, and in fact opposition to the Indian Ulama's calls for Jihad. It 
is also likely to have led the Sufis to consolidate their relations with the British as part of 
a balance of power strategy designed to strengthen their position against such external 
influences.   
The Punjabi Sufis were beholden to the British for restoring their properties which had 
been confiscated during the reign of Maharajah Ranjit Singh.110 These properties, 
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besides giving them the status of landed elite, were critical sources of influence as they 
enabled the Sufi elite to distribute resources among their disciples, host pilgrims, attract 
followers and, as a result expand their religious and temporal influence and authority. 
Since such facilities were instrumental in attracting existing and potential disciples and 
dispensing of favours, they required large recurring expenditure. The needs were met 
from charity, waqf properties and jagirs attached to shrines and hospices, the sources for 
which were individual donors as well as governments.111 The income from these was a 
potential means of support for the person of the Sufi as well, an indication of which is 
the lavish lifestyle of some of them, including the most exalted Suharwardi pir of the 
Punjab, Baha Uddin Zakariya.112 Since maintaining the properties was very expensive, 
the Sufis relied on continued British goodwill and release of funds. The arrangement 
suited the British equally, as support from the Sufi  elite brought respect and 
cooperation not only of the latter,  but also of the public and the Muslim element in the 
British Army of the Punjab, which held the Sufi leadership in high esteem. 
Considering the extensive popularity and veneration they enjoyed, the Sufi elite's active 
role in the war served to legitimise the military involvement of Muslim tribes and their 
chiefs in the conflict. Their role allayed any misgivings the local Muslims might have 
had in taking up arms against fellow Indians, many of whom were Muslims. Similarly, 
the Sufi elite were able to capitalize on their social status, venerated religious standing, 
political skill, and reputation for pious behaviour to support a pro-British war. Given 
that the Sufis, and by extension their discipleship were benefiting from the concessions 
and protection being accorded by the British as against what they had experienced 
under the Sikhs, this by itself could have been sufficient cause for them to conceptualise 
the 1857 conflict as a religious war, but not strictly speaking Jihad.   
 
Conclusion The Punjabi Muslim society in the mid-nineteenth century valued an Islam 
that complemented, or at a minimum did not clash with its cultural ideology of tribalism 
and militarism, was spiritually self-satisfying, and sanctioned by its revered religious 
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figures, implicitly or explicitly. The British method of rule, which was direct and 
informal, and which tended to be fair and mindful of the socio-cultural and religious 
practices of Punjabi Muslims brought the latter much closer to the British than would 
otherwise have been the case. Moreover, realpolitik dictated that they align with the 
British in order to prevent being eclipsed by the Sikhs, who were their traditional rivals 
and posed an existential threat to Punjabi Muslims. The Indian rebels of 1857 and their 
political and religious leaders became the 'Other' for the Punjabi Muslims as they had 
not been tested as fellow soldiers, allies, or patrons, and hence could not be trusted; nor 
was there any cultural affinity between them. The pro-British stance of leading Sufis 
kept the Punjabi Muslim Sepoys calm and unsympathetic to the cause of the 1857 
rebels. The Sufi participation in physical combat served to allay any doubts the Punjabi 
Sepoys might have been harbouring about the religious justification for the war. On 
their part, the Muslim states of Bahawalpur and Kotla shared the political, religious and 
cultural orientation of the Sepoys, as well as the Ulama. They were moreover, motivated 
by a royalism that was based on political realism, which similarly orientated them 
towards the British, and away from the rebel movement of Northern India and its 
leadership. 
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Chapter 4: The North-West Frontier 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the issue of why the North-West Frontier sepoys, Ulama and 
royalty failed to rise against the British during the 1857 rebellion, and instead provided 
them strong support against the rebel movement in Northern India. Considering their 
overwhelming numbers and military capability, the Pathan Sepoys and tribal levies could 
have taken the initiative to eject the British from the Frontier at a time when the latter 
appeared to be very vulnerable,  yet they made no such move. Similarly, except from a 
small area, almost all the Ulama in the Frontier, despite their pre-eminent position in 
Pathan society and a history of involvement in past wars, appear to have taken little 
interest in any of the events surrounding the rebellion. The rebellion also presented an 
opportunity for Afghanistan to take back Peshawar from the British, which was the 
principal seat of Afghan governments in the past. Yet, the Afghan Amir did not attempt 
to use the Indian rebellion to his country's benefit, and the Afghan border remained 
quiet throughout the conflict. This chapter argues  that Pathan beliefs and attitudes 
related to the military, tribal, and to a lesser extent, religious dimensions of ideology, 
influenced these choices during the rebellion years. 
 
Background 
The North-West Frontier, located in the extreme north west of the Indian sub-
continent in present day Pakistan, is  inhabited almost exclusively by Pathans 
(alternatively called Pushtun, Pakhtun), a people who invariably follow the Muslim faith, 
claim lineage from a common ancestor, speak Pashto, the language common to all 
Pathans, and profess commitment to their collective tribal belief system of Pakhtunwali 
(literally, the way of the Pathans). Muslim influence first reached the Frontier through 
warlords, kings and missionaries from Central and West Asia, sometimes in the tenth 
century. One of the first to arrive was Sabuktagin, an Afghan general of Turk origin 
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who led his army on military campaigns in India during the years 986-991.1 The second 
wave commenced in 1009 with Mahmud of Ghazni, Sabuktagin's son, followed by 
Muhammad Ghori, his successors, and subsequently the so-called royal slave dynasty.2 
The last phase is associated with Babur, the founder of the Mughal dynasty, whose 
victory over Ibrahim Lodhi, the Pathan Sultan of Delhi, in the battle of Panipat (1526) 
brought more Muslim soldiers, traders, and missionaries. However, by the late Mughal 
period, and the interregnums of  Nadir Shah of Persia, (1739-1747), and the Afghan 
warlord Ahmad Shah Abdali, Muslim inflow had decreased.   
When Abdali's control of the Punjab weakened, the Sikhs who had long resisted Mughal 
and Afghan authority, managed to seize the territory in 1799 under the leadership of 
Maharajah Ranjit Singh.3 By 1818, the Maharajah had extended his Punjab Kingdom to 
the North-West Frontier after conquering Peshawar.4 The Sikhs lost control of the 
Frontier and the rest of Punjab to the British in 1849 following successive defeats in the 
Anglo-Sikh wars of 1845-1846 and 1848-1849.5 The British governed the Frontier as 
part of their administrative territory of Punjab, but the borderlands between 
Afghanistan and the Frontier extension of British Punjab remained un-demarcated as 
heretofore,6 and the Pathan tribes straddling both sides continued to move across freely 
as they had through the millennia.  
Upon British annexation in 1849, the North-West Frontier was managed as part of the 
Punjab province by a special board of administrators appointed by the EIC.7 The board 
was abolished in 1853 and substituted with a chief commissioner, and judicial and 
financial commissioners.8 Assisted by a select group of civilian and military officers, 
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these officials wielded extensive authority over the formulation and execution of various 
fiscal, judicial, political and military policies.9 Key members of this civil-military 
bureaucracy had already spent a number of years in the region before the British 
takeover, and were able to develop extensive knowledge of the region, its various tribes 
and clan chiefs, as well as the religious and cultural characteristics of Pathan society.  
Six districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, and 
Hazara were created as Frontier districts, also termed settled districts, distinct from the 
contiguous tribal territories.10 However, no attempt was made to extend British control 
to the tribal territory in the north, which was home to numerous mountain tribes of the 
Pathans.11 The Punjab government performed the dual function of administering these 
districts and managing affairs with the mountain tribes.12 British officers who came in 
contact with the tribesmen had been carefully selected for their courage, perseverance, 
tact, and local knowledge. Under their supervision, a number of military expeditions 
were launched in the tribal territory prior to the 1857 rebellion.13 The expeditions were 
designed to probe the limits of British influence in the ungoverned areas, or take 
punitive measures against crimes by tribesmen in the settled districts, and usually took 
the form of blowing up defensive towers, burning crops, and confiscating livestock.14 
When a tribe agreed to pay a certain amount in fine or give up a few rifles, the British 
would withdraw their troops.15 Sometimes, the encounters were indecisive, with the 
tribesmen engaging the EIC troops and levies in classic guerrilla warfare, and then 
retreating to their rugged mountain strongholds where the government troops could not 
effectively pursue them.  
Pathan religious society was organised as a hierarchy, with Syeds, or persons claiming 
descent from Prophet Muhammad, at the top. Then came the Akhundzadas, 
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descendants of holy men having local or tribal repute. Last in importance were the 
Sahibzadas, descendants of Mullahs (priests) who had acquired a reputation for sanctity.16 
The Syeds and Mians tended to avoid military conflict or political involvement for the 
most part.17 The Akhundzadas were also owners of agricultural land, and many of them 
headed the tribes to which they belonged. They had greater influence among the public 
during periods of political and military conflicts.18 The Sahibzadas and Mullahs, who 
generally performed ritual duties in the mosques and villages, did not occupy any 
position of political or religious significance, although they would occasionally use the 
pulpit to convey popular religious sentiment with overt or covert political content.19  
 The Pathan society constituted one of the largest segmentary lineage systems in the 
world, organised into a number of tribal divisions.20 Throughout their history, the 
Frontier Pathan tribesmen had an ambivalent relationship with outside powers. Some of 
them joined the foreigners as soldiers, diplomats, traders, and colonists, while others 
remained engaged in internecine warfare, or clashes with the authorities.21 However, 
their kinsmen in the lowlands, who were associated with agriculture, commerce, and 
government service, and whose towns and agricultural holdings were occasionally under 
foreign control, were comparatively more susceptible to external influence.22 The 
Pathan tribe acted as a political unit, and usually contained a conglomerate of clans 
bound together by allegiance to a common chief.23 Nearly every tribe had a nucleus of 
two or more clans that claimed descent from a common ancestor, although the 
cohesiveness between the various clans of a tribe was not strong.24 It was not 
uncommon for a clan or some of its members to quarrel with their brethren, and leave 
the tribe to claim the protection of a neighbouring chief, whereupon they became his 
neighbour, and he was bound to protect them as they were to obey him.25 The tribe also 
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had a military component in the form of lashkar, a term applied to a band of warriors 
varying in numbers from a few hundred men to sometimes thousands.26 The lashkar 
operated as a rapid and flexible force that could be employed for Jihad, inter-tribal 
warfare, raiding ventures into the Punjab or further afield, or even against a particular 
policy of the government of the day.27  
A major British aim in the North-West Frontier region was to secure written 
agreements with the mountain tribes whereby they would be responsible for the security 
of their territory and keep a check on other raiders, for which the government would 
provide allowances to them through their Maliks (tribal chiefs).28 Under these 
arrangements, the tribes were not considered as subjects, and the measures appeared to 
be designed only to prevent them from carrying out looting raids on settled districts, 
and generally to keep the strategically sensitive border area peaceful.29 Additional 
incentives included recruitment offers in the tribal militia, levies and military units that 
the British were forming in the Frontier region.30 Consequently, no British effort was 
made to permanently occupy the tribal lands, or to interfere with the autonomous 
governance the tribesmen enjoyed inside their homeland. 
The British military policy in the Frontier also intended to secure the un-demarcated 
northern border with Afghanistan to prevent any threat from Afghanistan, Persia, or 
Russia.31 Accordingly, new units were raised with Pathan, Punjabi Muslim, and Sikh 
soldiers for patrolling the area, while a network of local levies and police was created to 
safeguard internal security. The main military component, named as the Punjab 
Irregular Force, was to perform a decisive role in support of the British during the 
rebellion years of 1857-59. In May 1857, this force consisted of four regiments of 
Punjab Cavalry; one Corps of Guides Cavalry and Infantry; five batteries of Artillery; 
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four regiments of Sikh Infantry; five regiments of Punjab Infantry; and one regiment of 
Gurkhas.32  
 
Sepoys   
When news of the rebellion in Northern India reached the Frontier, the city of 
Peshawar alone had sixty thousand armed Pathans who bore their weapons with fierce 
pride in keeping with the Pathan tradition of carrying guns - a practice that the British 
had been careful not to curb considering the strong resistance it was likely to invoke.33 
Thousands of their fellow Pathans in the Frontier highlands were similarly armed, who 
were moreover expert raiders with a long history of warfare. Whether in concert or 
separately, these hillsmen and urban or lowland Pathans could have posed a serious 
military challenge to the British authorities in May 1857. The armed city dwellers could 
have risen in a civil rebellion, much like the peasants and townsmen across Avadh,34 
while the mountain tribes, whose membership according to one estimate was no less 
than 100,000 at the time,35 could have resorted to raiding forays against selected targets 
such as cantonments, isolated military posts, and military convoys. If such a civil or 
military uprising had started, it is very doubtful the British would have been able to 
cope with their limited resources. There were no more than 15,000 European troops in 
the Punjab and Frontier in May 1857, as against some 23,000 local Sepoys serving with 
the native regiments that had been locally raised by the British, and 42,000 mostly 
disaffected Sepoys of the Bengal Army stationed in the region.36 Even if the British 
were to commit their entire European force in the area, it would have been insufficient 
to overcome the overwhelming armed opposition.   
As the situation unfolded, no rebellion by the Pathans materialised, except for a few 
incidents that will be discussed later. The Pathans in fact, turned out in very large 
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numbers in response to appeals by British officials to enlist in the paramilitary and 
combat units being earmarked for quelling the rebellion in Northern India, and 
bolstering internal security.37 Numerous clansmen under the leadership of their chiefs 
cooperated with the British in safeguarding the cantonments, keeping peace in the 
countryside, and furnishing men for the irregular levies and regular regiments.38  These 
men, who brought in their own arms and horses, were, in addition, employed to arrest 
any fakeers (mendicants), or others suspected of being spies.39  
A review of the activities of influential tribal chieftains and their retainers reveals the 
extent of collaboration with the British authorities. Nawab Muhammad Akram Khan, 
one of the leading Maliks of district Hazara in Peshawar division strengthened the 
garrisons by posting guards in his territory, and promptly furnished a contingent of 
armed horsemen for service with the British.40 He led his clansmen in person during an 
operation against the Syeds and Hindustanis of Sittana in 1858, which was the only 
occurrence of Jihad against the British in the Frontier.41 Abdul Rahman Khan, a relative 
of the Nawab, similarly supplied a body of horsemen for service in 1857, which 
prevented the crossing through Hazara of the rebel 55th BNI from Swat into Kashmir; 
and later took part in combat against the Sittana Mujahideen in 1858.42 Other members of 
this influential family, along with their armed retainers and clansmen, took part in 
suppressing the Dhund outbreak at Murree in the Punjab, and remained engaged until 
asked to withdraw by the authorities.43  
The Hazara chiefs, Mir Zaman Khan, Kalandar Khan and Abdullah Khan assisted the 
British throughout the latter's rule.44 They had accompanied an expedition in 1852 
against the tribes of the Black Mountain and the Khagan Syeds.45 In 1857, they 
contributed horsemen and foot soldiers to the levies which were being raised for duties 
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against the rebel Sepoys in Northern India.46 Nawab Khan, another Hazara chief, who 
had previously fought against the Sikhs at Multan during the Anglo-Sikh war, was 
similarly forthcoming in helping the British.47  
Haji Muhammad Afzal Khan, the chief of the powerful Saddozai clan in Peshawar 
district obtained an appointment as Rissaldar in Stoke's Irregular Cavalry when the 
rebellion broke out.48 Another notable, Aslam Khan, became a Rissaldar in the 5th 
Bengal Cavalry, and took part in many battles during the rebellion years.49 He was 
subsequently appointed Vizier of Afghanistan with the title of Nazam-ud-Daula, while 
three of his sons were appointed as governors of Kabul, Lughman and Jalalabad.50 One 
of them served with Herbert Edwardes, Commissioner of Peshawar; another son joined 
the British force in the siege of Delhi, while the third assisted the British authorities in 
maintaining order in the district.51  
Fatah Khan, a Peshawar chief, conducted negotiations on behalf of the British with the 
Bonerwal Swatis (inhabitants of the region of Buner in Swat in upper North-West 
Frontier), who were in sympathy with the rebel Sepoys and the Sittana fighters.52 He 
commanded a troop of horse attached to an irregular regiment, and performed active 
military service for two years in Northern India.53 Another member of the family, Abbas 
Khan, was appointed Rissaldar in the 2nd Punjab Cavalry on the recommendation of 
Herbert Edwardes in 1857; and he remained with this regiment throughout the siege of 
Lucknow, and subsequently in Rohilkhand, taking part in a number of battles.54 Sardar 
Muhammad Khan Bahadur, a descendant of King Nadir Shah of Persia, who held much 
influence over the tribes of the Peshawar valley, fought alongside the British throughout 
the First Anglo-Afghan war, and after annexation of the Punjab, joined the Corps of 
Guides as Daffadar, rising to the rank of Rissaldar-Major during the rebellion.55  
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Nawab Sirbuland Khan of Hoti was instrumental in saving the life of Lieutenant Home, 
the British civil officer at Mardan during the rebellion, sheltering him for three days, 
when the Sepoys of the 55th Bengal infantry rebelled; and he subsequently thwarted 
rebel Sepoy movement by inducing villagers to harass them and deny them any 
supplies.56 The men of this rebel regiment perished in large numbers shortly afterwards, 
while attempting to make their way from Swat into Kashmir.57   
A chief of the Saddozai tribe, Sardar Bahadur Habib Khan, who had been the personal 
orderly of Major George Lawrence at Kohat, joined the Coke's Rifles with the rank of 
Subedar and fought in five different Frontier expeditions, besides participating in the 
campaigns in and around Delhi throughout 1857-58.58 
The keenness with which the Pathan tribal chiefs of settled districts collaborated with 
the British was due in part to the close ties that had developed when the Pathans allied 
themselves with the British during the Anglo-Sikh wars. Conditions under the Sikhs had 
been particularly difficult for the Pathans as they could not reconcile with Sikh 
occupation, and were unable to dislodge the Sikh army from the Frontier, a situation 
which resembled that of their neighbours in the Punjab. Consequently, when British-
Sikh relations soured after Ranjit Singh's death, leading to British intervention in Sikh 
affairs and the Anglo-Sikh wars, the Pathans, as also their Punjabi Muslim counterparts, 
were quick to join the British military effort.   
Ties with the British were further strengthened when, upon annexing the Frontier, the 
EIC authorities introduced a number of changes in the system of governance, including 
land settlement and revenue assessment. As with their Punjabi neighbours, land 
ownership, along with military service and trade, was the mainstay of Pathan society in 
the settled districts.  Pathan land-owning status was jeopardised under the Sikhs who 
frequently acquired fertile farmland either through conquest, or  heavy taxation which 
forced many of the owners to sell off their property as it became economically 
infeasible.59 By contrast, agriculture began to flourish when the British annexed the 
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territory and introduced new policies that included fair land assessment. Thus land 
assessment exercises conducted by the British officials met with full co-operation by the 
Pathans throughout the Frontier districts, who promptly paid the revenue.60 The new 
arrangement brought a degree of prosperity as money did not have to be set aside for 
bribery and extortion any more. Land was not merely considered a source of income in 
Pathan society; it also bestowed social status, power, and pride just as it did in the 
Punjab. Land ownership greatly contributed to clan survival and welfare. It served an 
organising function by allowing the landed elite, small farmers, and their retainers to 
strengthen bonds of social cohesion among themselves, and with other farming 
communities.61 Land also conferred political power, as the owners, because of the 
dependence of retainers and peasants on them, could mediate on the latter's behalf with 
the authorities. Such an arrangement fostered an element of trust and co-operation 
between the tribal chiefs, their associates and dependents, and the local British officials. 
However, the land factor was not as important in the conduct of the mountain Pathans 
towards the British, as their agricultural properties were located in areas in which the 
British government exercised no control. They were instead drawn towards the British 
for the favourable terms and subsidies they could extract from the latter in exchange for 
keeping a check on their raids and disruption of British military and commercial 
convoys.62 At the same time, these tribes, as also their kinsmen in the lowlands, 
benefited from the opportunities that the British had opened up in commerce and 
government service.63 The British presence thus served as a source of revenue for these 
Pathans. 
The Pathan military culture also acted as a major factor that brought them closer to the 
British. Apart from farming, the North-West Frontier was a major source of soldiery in 
keeping with the Pathan tradition of coveting military service, valued by both the valley 
and urban area Pathans, and by their kinsmen in the mountainous territories. During 
Sikh rule, recruitment among the Pathans was almost non-existent due to the 
acrimonious relations between the two communities. While the Sikhs bore bitter 
memories of the long Afghan occupation of the Punjab and Frontier which had 
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witnessed many military clashes between soldiers and armed civilians of the two 
communities, the Pathans had to endure Sikh hostility and attacks on their property 
when the latter became masters of the Frontier.64 The security environment changed 
dramatically with the British annexation, during which Pathan tribal levies played a 
crucial role by supplying a significant portion of the 18,000 army that defeated the Sikh 
force at Multan during the Anglo-Sikh war of 1848-49.65  
Pathan recruitment trend resumed when the British started establishing a stronger 
military presence in the region. As Pathan interest rose, enlistment, which was initially 
taking place in the police and levies, expanded to the regular and irregular regiments of 
the army.   This post 1849 development in military collaboration is best exemplified by 
the Punjab Irregular Force. The cavalry and infantry wings of the force, collectively 
known as the Corps of Guides, were composed almost entirely of Pathans, and reputed 
as one of the ablest fighting formations in all of India.66  Induction in the Guides cavalry 
and infantry regiments was not restricted to lowland Pathans, as their counterparts from 
the mountainous areas also joined in very large numbers, as did some Punjabi Muslims 
and Sikhs.67 Led by experienced British and native officers, the Force was designed to 
initiate or respond to any tactical situation without constant recourse to central 
authority, or the cumbersome military chain of command.68 Indeed, the force was even 
outside the purview of the British commander-in-chief of India.69 Such a degree of 
autonomy suited Pathan customs and mode of warfare - or in short, their familiar 
military culture.  
The Sepoys in such a setup were directly led by their own officers, who were fellow 
Pathans and men of distinction within their clans. The irregular composition of the 
Guides Corps allowed the native officers to exercise much greater authority than their 
counterparts in the native regiments of the EIC.70 The Pathan officers were in direct 
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command of their troops and greatly outnumbered the European officers, of whom 
only two were assigned per regiment: the commanding officer and his adjutant.71 The 
entire unit lived and operated as a tightly knit clan, albeit one in which individual 
initiative and daring was encouraged. Its training and mission replicated the hit-and-run 
tactics of the raids and ambushes that were regularly employed by the Pathans in their 
own tribal lashkars. Moreover, the uniforms of the soldiers and their officers conformed 
to local custom with only minor adjustments that were sensitive to the Pathan dress 
code.72 A major attraction for the men was the freedom they generally enjoyed from the 
stringent discipline and repetitive parades that their counterparts in the Bengal Army 
were routinely subjected to, and which the British officers assigned to the Guides Corps 
did not insist upon.73  
Raised in 1846, the Guides were already battle hardened by May 1857, having taken part 
in the Second Anglo-Sikh war and a number of expeditions in the North-West Frontier. 
Subsequently, they became part of the Punjab Moveable Column that was tasked with 
attacking the rebel army at Delhi and seizing the city. After their arrival at Delhi in 
August 1857, where they joined the Delhi Field Force that had been in place since early 
June 1857, the Guides went immediately into action.74 The situation at Delhi, and at 
numerous other places where the fighting took place presented a paradox with the 
Pathans being pitted against fellow Indians, many of whom were Muslims. What 
motivated them under the circumstances was esprit de corps, or military morale that 
comes from unit cohesion, and has been shown to be an important determinant in the 
soldier's will to fight,75 as discussed in the previous chapters. The cohesion of the 
Guides Corps and its correlation with military effectiveness stood out in this respect.  
But other motivations were also possibly at work. The Pathans tended to view people 
belonging to other parts of India as inferior, labelling them 'Hind-ko' (of Hindustan) in 
a pejorative sense.76 The negative image of the opponent was partly a result of  the 
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cultural gap between the Pathans and other Indians. Frontier Pathans had never served 
with the Bengal Army, as membership in those regiments was limited to high caste 
Hindus and the Muslims of Northern India. Besides, the Frontier and the adjoining 
Punjab territory were not part of the British acquisitions before 1849, and there were 
few Hindus or Muslims from the distant lands of Northern India in the region prior to 
that time. Although the frontier-based Pathans and the Bengal Army Sepoys were 
fighting on the British side in the Anglo-Sikh wars, they were organised separately under 
British command. There was therefore little or no interaction between the two 
communities that might have fostered strong camaraderie of the kind that comes from 
common military service, especially under combat conditions. An additional factor that 
created a negative image of Hindustani  Sepoys in the Pathan mind-set was the military 
campaigns these Bengal Army Sepoys had carried out against the Afghan kinsmen of 
Frontier Pathans during the recently concluded First Anglo-Afghan war (1839–1842). 
Pathan-Hindustani acrimony can actually be traced to the much earlier encounters 
between the two groups. Weak and ineffective as the Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah 
Zafar appeared in 1857, he and his Hindustani  Sepoys were fighting to restore the 
Mughal civilization that the Pathans had frequently opposed in the past. Beginning in 
1585, the Mughal Emperor Akbar had launched a full-scale military operation against 
the Pathan tribes.77 In a major encounter, the Pathans encircled and annihilated the 
Mughal army, killing two thousand Mughal soldiers, including their commander Birbal, 
Akbar's favourite courtier.78 A Mughal force under Raja Man Singh carried out punitive 
action in 1587, rounding up fourteen thousand Pathans, killing some of the leaders, and 
enslaving many others.79 However, the war continued for nearly half a century.80 The 
area could never be brought under full control throughout the Mughal period, except 
for some major towns and the valleys of Peshawar and Kohat.   
Another cultural dimension that helps explain the  Pathan sentiment against the 1857 
rebel Army is the principle of retributive justice, or revenge (badal), which is enshrined 
as a core tenet of the Pathan tribal ideology of Pakhtunwali. Defined as the way of the 
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Pakhtuns,81 or 'Pashtun-ness', Pakhtunwali is the ancient tribal code of  all Pathans, and 
serves as a guide for individual and collective conduct.82 Along with badal, it has another 
component that is especially relevant to conflict situations: nang (honour).83 Nang means 
that a Pathan's life is devoted to honour, he has to gain it under any circumstances, even 
at the cost of his life. If he loses face, or is subjected to a taunt, or is attacked or 
defeated by an enemy, it is incumbent upon him to redeem his honour.84 If he fails to 
do so, he is ostracised from the clan, and even the family.85  
Adherence to this code binds the Pathans together under their approved chiefs, 
especially in times of war. Pakhtunwali has points of convergence as well as divergence 
with the concepts of militarism and Jihad. It fits particularly well with the requirements 
of militarism, which, as we have seen in the previous chapter, promotes and idealises 
military service. A Pathan combatant, including a Sepoy serving with a British regiment 
could avoid the discipline aspect of militarism by being very patient, even waiting a 
lifetime to get back at someone who may have wronged him before choosing the right 
time and place to strike back, often leaving no proof.86 It was thus possible for a Pathan 
Sepoy to strike an enemy when he left service or proceeded on leave, keeping the 
mission secret from fellow Sepoys and commanders. What guided him in the act of 
badal was not necessarily the actual severity of the deemed offence, but his personal 
perception of how strongly he felt about it. Thus, one Pathan for example, may put 
another to death merely for sneering at him, while another individual  may not feel the 
insult as deeply. It is hence quite possible that some Pathan Sepoys serving during the 
rebellion, whose ancestors had been subjected to alleged persecution or war by the 
Mughals would have seen the 1857 rebellion as an opportunity to get back at the Army 
of a restored Mughal Emperor. Others, whose friends and relatives, including clan 
members across the border in Afghanistan who had been attacked by the mainly Bengal 
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Army Sepoys in British employ during the Anglo-Afghan war of 1839-42, would have 
had similar cause for badal against the rebel Bengal Army.    
Along with Pakhtunwali, the Pathans were deeply attached to Islam. With Islam, 
Pakhtunwali holds in common the values of equality, hospitality, and bravery, yet Islam 
forbids violence in personal disputes, as against Pakhtunwali, which seems to promote or 
encourage revenge in such matters. Similarly, Islam has a host of strict preconditions 
and procedures on the permissibility and regulation of Jihad,87 whereas  Pakhtunwali has 
no formal code of war. How then would Pathan warriors in the 1857 rebellion have 
dealt with the dichotomy between Pakhtunwali and Jihad? One view is that in order to 
avoid  confusion between the two ideologies, a Pathan tended to give them equal 
weightage. In such a case, Pakhtunwali was felt as a religion, just as Islam. In other 
words, for some individuals at least, Pakhtunwali assumes the status of a 'fifth creed of 
Islam', alongside the four established ones of Hanafi, Sh'afi, Maliki, and Hanbali.88 
Thought of this way, Islam and Pakhtunwali form an ideological repertoire from which 
the occasion and the particular emotion that it triggers at the moment determines which 
aspect of which creed would be drawn upon. Others who do not experience the 
ideological tension, and believe for example, that only Jihad equips them with the 
spiritual strength to face potentially fatal situations, would consciously or spontaneously 
turn to Jihad as the source of inspiration. But this would become a stress-producing 
rather than a stress-relieving experience if both antagonists were Muslim, and both 
strongly believed in Jihad. Relating to the 1857 conflict, how might the Pathan Sepoys 
have been motivated to fight an opponent Army with substantial number of Muslims in 
its ranks? The question is important, especially since, unlike the case in the three regions 
discussed in the previous chapters, where a number of Ulama had encouraged or 
practically taken part in Jihad against their opponents on different sides of the 1857 
rebellion, this extrinsic source of religious inspiration was absent in the North-West 
Frontier, except in an isolated case which will be discussed presently. 
One possible way to resolve the Muslim versus Muslim Jihad dilemma was to resort to 
individual prayer and invocation, which would have spiritually prepared them for the 
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impending confrontation. Other acts of religiosity, such as war cries and recitation of 
Quranic verses before or during combat were also available to bolster morale. Pathan 
Sepoys were actually observed by their British officers to be deeply committed to their 
Islamic beliefs during the 1857 rebellion. They were prompt in their prayers and other 
rituals of the faith. An example of this was the Guides Corps, whose Muslim Sepoys 
observed fasts for the entire month of Ramazan, which was spent in a gruelling march 
from the North-West Frontier military station of Mardan to the theatre of war in 
Delhi.89 Although Muslims are exempt from fasting when on a journey, or taken ill, the 
Guides Sepoys did not avail of the concession. Upon reaching Delhi, the Guides were 
deputed to meet an assault from the rebel 3rd Cavalry, which, as will be recalled, had 
earlier mutinied at Meerut. A Muslim Rissaldar of the Guides became engaged with a 
Rissaldar on the opposite side, who was most likely a Muslim as well given the 
preponderance of Muslims in the rebel Cavalry. As reported by an observer, 'After a 
few rapid cuts and guards, the head of the mutineer regular was swept from his body, 
and the Guide seizing the bridle of the dead man's horse … sprang into the saddle, 
turned to his men, as he lifted his dripping sword over his head, and exclaimed, 'Allah-
u-Akbar! and by the blessing of the Prophet, may we all get mounted in a similar 
manner'.90 No Sepoy accounts exist from which it can be determined how far these 
spiritual aids helped raise the morale of the pro-British Pathan Sepoys, but considering 
there were no reported desertions or acts of malingering, or complaints by them during 
the long and difficult combat situations - a condition that was the opposite of what 
existed among many of their counterparts in Delhi and Avadh -  this form of intrinsic 
Jihad would have played a vital role in raising their fighting spirit through the rebellion 
years.  
Considering that no prominent Ulama among the Pathans called on Pathan Sepoys, or 
the general population to rise against the British in the name of Jihad, there was no 
extrinsic influence on the Sepoys to oppose the British given the mutually beneficial 
Pathan-British collaboration. At the same time, being staunch Muslims who were 
known to be uncompromising on the essentials of the faith, which included a belief in 
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Jihad, they turned to Jihad as an inner source of motivation. Such a recourse minimised 
the state of ideological confusion, and at the same time, served as a survival strategy in 
combat just as it did for the Sepoys in Delhi, Avadh, and the Punjab.  
 
Royalty 
The territory comprising the North-West Frontier did not have a history of monarchic 
government, and was administered by governors appointed by various Afghan, Mughal, 
and Sikh rulers. Yet, the Amirs of Afghanistan retained a historic connection with the 
region. Peshawar was the summer capital of the Amirs, who used to rotate it with Kabul 
as the winter seat of government, until the former was lost to the Sikhs in 1834.91 Even 
after Afghanistan had to cede control of it to the Sikhs, who were replaced by the 
British, the bonds endured because of family ties, ethnicity, and religion. However, this 
did not always translate into political influence. The tribal diversity and ancient feuds 
within Pathan society on both sides of the border precluded lasting co-operation or 
loyalty. There were periods in Pathan history though, when charismatic leaders from 
Kabul successfully maintained close links with the tribes, and were able to muster 
thousands of Pathan warriors from the Frontier for their military campaigns in India or 
within Afghanistan. However, since Ahmad Shah Abdali, no Afghan ruler was able to 
organise the North-West Frontier Pathans in large numbers for the pursuit of war. 
None of the Afghan royalty after Abdali held the charisma and leadership qualities that 
could attract the traditionally independent tribal hordes.  
The Indian rebellion of 1857 appeared to present a political and military opportunity 
that the Afghan Amir, Dost Muhammad, might have exploited. As discussed above,  
the British were facing a precarious military situation in May 1857. Their range of 
operations was overstretched between Delhi and the Frontier, and because Delhi had to 
be retaken as quickly as possible, British military authorities were forced to move many 
of their regiments to that theatre, rendering the North-West Frontier vulnerable. In 
Kabul, there was a strong sentiment among some influential circles and members of the 
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public to capitalise on the situation by attacking and expelling the British from India.92 
Dost Muhammad appeared at first to succumb to the pressure, but his son, Muhammad 
Azim Khan cautioned him about the British power, and consequently, Dost 
Muhammad, if indeed he was seriously contemplating the move, changed his mind.93   
The bitter and costly experience of the recent Anglo-Afghan war (1839–1842) would 
have convinced Dost Muhammad that the British, notwithstanding their current 
difficult situation, were quite capable of overcoming military challenges. Although they 
had suffered a disastrous defeat in the first phase of the recently concluded Anglo-
Afghan War (1839-1842), the British returned to Afghanistan with a vengeance in 
August 1842, when they successfully relieved their beleaguered garrisons at Kandahar 
and Jalalabad, recovered their prisoners taken earlier, and destroyed Ghazni and parts of 
Kabul before making a successful withdrawal through the Khyber Pass.94 Moreover, 
Dost Muhammad was released and reinstated in Kabul. He thus had first-hand 
experience of British military capability and the resolve with which they had pursued it 
in both India and Afghanistan, mostly with the help of its Bengal Army. 
Afghanistan had not only to contend with the reality of British power, but also 
safeguard itself from the ever present Persian threat. To forestall Persian aggression and 
obtain British support, Dost Muhammad signed a treaty of peace and friendship with 
the British government in 1855. Article 1 of the treaty declared 'perpetual peace and 
friendship' between the two parties. Article 2 assured Dost Muhammad that the East 
India Company 'engages to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His 
Highness's possession and never to interfere therein'. The Third Article carried a 
binding clause for the Amir: 'His Highness Ameer Dost Mohummud Khan, Walee of 
Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, engages on his 
own part, and on the part of his heirs, to respect the territories of the Honorable East 
India Company and never to interfere therein; and to be the friend of the friends and 
                                               
92 George P. Tate, The Kingdom of Afghanistan: A Historical Sketch  (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 
2001). 195. 
93 The Kingdom of Afghanistan: A Historical Sketch: 195-96. 
94 For details of the campaigns see Joseph Greenwood, Narrative of the Late Victorious Campaigns in 
Afghanistan: Under General Pollock; with Recollections of Seven Years' Service in India  (London: H. Colburn, 
1844). 209-46. 
138 
 
enemy of the enemies of the East India Company'.95 This was followed by another 
mutual agreement in January 1857 upon the breakout of war with Persia. The British 
declared that 'Whereas the Shah of Persia contrary to his engagement with the British 
Government, has taken possession of Herat, and has manifested an intention to 
interfere in the present possessions of Ameer Dost Mohummud Khan, there is now war 
between the British and Persian Governments, therefore the Honorable East India 
Company, to aid Ameer Dost Mohummud Khan, to defend and maintain his present 
possessions in Balkh, Cabool, and Candahar against Persia, hereby agrees out of 
friendship to give the said Ameer one lakh of Company's Rupees monthly during the 
war with Persia'. The treaty carried a binding clause for the Afghan Amir as well:  'This 
Agreement in no way supersedes the Treaty …on 30th March 1855  by which the 
Ameer of Cabool engaged to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies 
of the Honorable East India Company; and … in the spirit of that Treaty, agrees to 
communicate to the British Government any overtures he may receive from Persia, or 
from the allies of Persia during the war, or while there is friendship between the Cabool 
and the British Governments'. 96 Apart from the financial subsidy to cover the 
expenditures of war with Persia, the agreement offered the services of British officers as 
advisors and observers to the Afghan government, albeit with the assurance that they 
would not interfere with the domestic affairs of Afghanistan.97  
The British guarantee to assist Afghanistan in the event of an attack on its territory by 
Persia provided a much needed reassurance as Afghanistan was not confident of 
averting a Persian advance with its existing resources. The 1855 treaty came just in time, 
because in the same year the Persians invaded Afghanistan with the object of taking 
Herat. The British, as expected, responded to Afghanistan's call for aid, and under 
British pressure, Persia withdrew. In 1857, Afghanistan declared war on Persia, and re-
captured Herat, which had been under Persian annexation. This freed Dost Muhammad 
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to start consolidating his kingdom further, and uniting what had previously been many 
independent local rulers under his dynasty.98 In 1857 therefore, Dost Muhammad's 
preoccupation with Afghanistan's security, for which he greatly depended on the British 
prevented him from playing any role in the adjoining Punjab Frontier. 
The treaties and the political conditions that had necessitated them meant that Amir 
Dost Muhammad of Afghanistan had little choice than to remain neutral in the 
rebellion in neighbouring India. The cultural and religious ties that he and the Afghan 
public felt with Pathans on the other side of the border, many of whom belonged to the 
same tribes, could not override realpolitik considerations. The latter dictated that 
Afghan security was paramount, and under the circumstances it was only the British 
government which was in a position to provide the necessary safeguards. Since the 
British were at war with the rebels, including the Hindustani Ulama and their followers 
operating in a pocket of the North-West Frontier, Afghanistan could ill-afford to 
endanger its relationship with the British authorities by siding with or even indirectly 
supporting the anti-British Jihad in the Frontier.  The Amir acted similar to the Nawabs 
of Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla under study in the previous chapter. Like them, his 
primary concern was with enhanced security for his state, which, given the hostile 
external environment, only the British seemed able to provide at the time of the 
rebellion. The balance of power politics this royalism that this royalism led to was again 
similar to the strategies employed by his counterparts in the Punjabi Muslim states.  
 
Ulama 
At the time of the rebellion of 1857, there was no indigenous religious movement in the 
Frontier as in Delhi and Avadh, which could have appealed to the Pathans to throw off 
British rule by force. An exception was the Jihad activity of a few Ulama at the 
settlement of Sittana in the Swat region of the Frontier, who formed part of a group 
that was initially led by Syed Ahmad. As an icon of Jihad, and leader of the Islamic 
revivalist movement in India at the time, dedicated to an that sought to reassert Muslim 
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power, the Syed arrived in the Swat region of the Frontier circa 1826 to wage a Jihad 
against the Sikhs.99 Syed Ahmad had declared Hindustan dar-ul harb, but decided to 
launch his armed Jihad only against Sikh rule in the North-West Frontier.100 He might 
have believed that a Jihad against the Sikhs was more feasible considering the 
overwhelming Pathan population in the area who viewed the Sikhs as oppressors and 
were likely to welcome the leadership of a committed Muslim leader who could help rid 
them of Sikh domination.101 The local Ulama do not appear to have played a significant 
leadership role in this Jihad, although at least some of them, including a number of 
Pathans who nevertheless saw this mainly as an opportunity to strike against the Sikhs, 
rallied to the Syed's side.102 Operating from the Sittana base, these fighters, led by the 
Syed fought a number of battles against the Khalsa army with mixed outcomes, and were 
ultimately defeated in an encounter with a Sikh force in 1831, during which the Syed, 
along with a number of his Mujahideen were killed.103  
The movement did not extinguish with the death of Syed Ahmad. Some of his 
supporters rallied again, and were joined by other Hindustani Muslims and a few local 
Pathans. They resumed their activities at Sittana, which became a centre of the 1857-58 
anti-British uprising in the Frontier. When the rebellion broke out, some of the 
deserting Sepoys of the Bengal Army regiments in Peshawar and Mardan converged at 
Sittana to join the fighters there.104 The British moved against them with a force that 
was composed of the Guides Corps and Pathan levies which attacked their positions in 
the mountains. The Mujahideen were surrounded and put up a desperate resistance, but 
were ultimately destroyed.105 The local Pathans allied with the Sittana Hindustanis were 
not sufficiently motivated for Jihad, as unlike the Hindustanis, most of them chose not 
to make a last stand, and either gave themselves up or escaped from the battle.106  
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The Hindustani Ulama and fighters had claimed that they wanted to establish Islamic 
rule throughout India. But they were unsuccessful in obtaining the level of local Pathan 
support required to sustain the Jihad from their base in the North-West Frontier. A 
major reason was the uncompromising attitude of the Hindustani Ulama on the 
implementation of Islamic laws among their Pathan followers in the years just preceding 
the rebellion, when they were busy waging war against the Sikhs in the region. 
Orthodox Islamic practices such as widow remarriage, and discouraging lavish dowry 
payments that these Ulama tried to enforce were highly unpopular as they did not blend 
with Pathan tribal customs.107 When the rebellion struck, the principal opposition that 
the Ulama and their Mujahideen followers faced in Sittana appeared from the influential 
Abdul Ghaffur, the Akhund of Swat (1794-1877). A venerated figure, whose religious 
repute dated from his earlier days as a wandering ascetic, the Akhund settled down in 
Swat in 1845.108 Some ten years later, he selected Syed Akbar Shah as the Wali (ruler) of 
Swat.109 When the Sepoys of the 55th BNI fled from Nowshera,110 they found refuge in 
Swat with the support of Akbar Shah's son and successor, Mubarak Shah. But soon, the 
Akhund and a large number of his supporters expelled these rebel Sepoys.111 The 
Akhund had earlier been averse to overtures by Sultan Muhammad, the elder son of 
Amir Dost Muhammad of Afghanistan to launch a Jihad against the British. He is 
reported to have responded, 'Infidels though they [the British] no doubt were, they were 
better rulers for the people of the country than the Dooranees [the Afghan Amirs].112 
The perception was all the more significant, because unlike much of the Frontier and 
the other regions  under analysis in the previous chapters, Swat was quite independent 
of British influence at the time.113 
It cannot hence be assumed that the Akhund was under any British pressure, or was 
prompted in his beliefs by expectation of gains from the British, or conversely from 
Afghanistan. Instead, he appeared to be exercising religious agency. While there may 
have been an anti-Jihad sentiment among his discipleship, of which he would certainly 
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have been aware, he was known to exercise autonomy in both his political and religious 
dealings as part of his personal ideology, with little regard to what kind of reactions it 
might evoke.114 As Raverty argues, he made the rebel Sepoys leave in keeping with his 
belief in discouraging guests and visitors to the state from staying longer than a few 
days, rather than from any other motive.115 On the other hand, he wholeheartedly 
welcomed anyone for a fixed period of hospitality, which explains why he had 
welcomed the rebel Sepoys when they first arrived in Swat.116 Similarly, the Akhund 
took exception to Mubarak Shah's efforts to exercise authority in line with his religio-
political beliefs rather than limitations imposed by the external environment. As Sultan-
i-Rome points out, relations between the two soured because the Akhund and much of 
the Swat population found the tithes imposed by Mubarak Shah as an exploitative 
measure which was unacceptable for them.117  
Even if the Swat Ulama, including the Akhund had perceived the British as an enemy 
against whom Jihad was incumbent and led such a war, it is very doubtful that they 
would have made much of a difference to the outcome of the rebellion, whether in 
Northern India, or the North-West itself. As argued above, except for the isolated case 
of Swat, there was either a neutral or pro-British sentiment in the region among the 
Ulama community, and even actual enthusiasm among the Pathan public to fight on the 
British side. Moreover, as in the Punjab, there was no perception of religious 
persecution or the violation of local religious beliefs and practice by the British in the 
North-West Frontier. Moreover, like the Punjabis, they either did not believe in the 
cartridge story, or considered it a minor affair, which, in any event, neither they nor 
their supporters had experienced, and which therefore did not concern them. In other 
words, for them just as their Punjabi counterparts, Islam was in no danger from the 
British. On the other hand, it will be recalled that in the case of Delhi and Avadh, 
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religion-in-danger was the dominant theme in the ideology and conduct of the Ulama in 
those regions.   
Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed the ideological motivations of key sections of Pathan society 
who remained loyal to the British throughout the rebellion years, despite the 
opportunities to rise against the latter. It has shown that Pathan Sepoys involved in the 
British campaigns against the rebel Sepoys of 1857 were motivated by an ideology of 
militarism and tribalism, which they associated with honour and pride. The strong ties 
that had been established with the British as a result of collaboration in the Anglo-Sikh 
war, as well as favourable local policies that benefited the Pathan population set the 
basis for military collaboration, for which they found a suitable outlet in the EIC 
military establishment. The 1857 rebellion also provided the Pathans an opportunity to 
compete on favourable terms in the military labour market, which had been 
monopolised by the Sikhs before the British advent, and which was in keeping with 
their . The Pathan Sepoys used the concept of Jihad intrinsically in order to reinforce 
the inspiration they drew from militarism for relieving the stress of combat. Such 
ideological usage of Jihad was similar to the way it functioned among their 
collaborators, the Punjabi Muslim Sepoys, and also their counterparts, the rebel Sepoys 
at Delhi and Avadh as argued in the previous three chapters. For the Pathan Sepoys and 
their chiefs, intrinsic Jihad was the only available source of religious motivation in the 
absence of any edicts or indirect encouragement by their Ulama to rise against their 
British employers, and lend support to the Hindustanis. The royalty, in the person of 
the Amir of Afghanistan by contrast, appeared to be driven solely by a political ideology 
of realpolitik based on considerations of state security and survival. Although the Amir 
did wield some political and military influence among the Frontier Pathans because of 
ancient historic ties, he was too occupied with serious security concerns for his own 
state to involve himself in the affairs in India by motivating his Frontier kinsmen to rise 
against the British. Moreover, his security treaties with the British, which had been a 
guarantor against Afghanistan's external enemies were a strong disincentive to 
becoming a party to the 1857 war. The Ulama of the Frontier played no noticeable role 
in the rebel movement, primarily because of the doctrinal confusion on the issue of 
whether Jihad was applicable against the British who had no record of religious 
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persecution against the Muslim population, especially in the North-West Frontier, and 
because they were also cognizant of the strong local sentiment that happened to be 
favourable to the British, and opposed to the Hindustani Sepoys and the Mughal royalty 
they were fighting to restore.  
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Conclusion 
This study set out to discover the ways in which ideology motivated the behaviour of key 
sections of Muslim society on warring sides of the 1857 Indian rebellion. It has chosen to 
focus specifically on the Muslims because of the central role they played in key events of the 
1857 rebellion. The research questions it posed were how the ideologies of royalism, 
culturalism and religiosity were understood and applied by the Sepoys, royalty, and Ulama 
during the conflict; the points of convergence and divergence between these ideological 
dimensions and behaviour; and the impediments in the ideological pursuits and attempts to 
cope with these.  While the extant literature mostly focuses on the ideological inspirations for 
the rebels, this study also seeks to understand the motivations of those who actively 
supported the British. To show these contrasting situations, it chose four regional case 
studies: Delhi and Avadh, which experienced the most intense resistance against the EIC; 
and the Punjab and the North-West Frontier, where collaboration with the British was most 
pronounced.  
The study has argued that in Delhi and Avadh, the restitution of the Mughal monarchy 
played a major role in motivating the rebels. Here the royalty, the Sepoys and the Ulama – 
the three major groups of actors in the rebellion - shared an understanding and affinity for 
restoration of Mughal rule. The cause was widely disseminated and it carried much appeal for 
the different sections of Muslim and Hindu society. However, there was no shared vision of 
what kind of a monarchical government the rebel factions wanted; nor a sustained or 
uniform commitment for the efficient functioning of the restored Mughal authority at Delhi, 
which adversely affected their capacity to conduct a successful war against the British. The 
rebellion of 1857 was the most critical turning point for Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar, 
whose position as a largely ceremonial ruler was transformed into that of a  de facto 
sovereign when the rebel Sepoys approached him and he was proclaimed as the Emperor of 
Hindustan.  
After assuming de facto control of Delhi, he made efforts to gain alliances with neutral and 
British protected states in order to offset the British political and military power, which was 
still intact despite the mass revolt of the Bengal Army. As an instrument of his political 
ideology, the balance-of-power strategy was devised to build upon the extensive anti-British 
sentiment generated by the Sepoy surge in Northern India. However, despite the flexible 
147 
 
distribution of power which he had proposed to the Indian states to make it attractive for 
them to join, their responses tended to be evasive or not forthcoming. The princely states 
had long since broken away from the Mughal centre and entered into subsidiary alliances 
with the EIC, which were proving beneficial to them in terms of political stability and 
military security. The external environment hence precluded a restoration of the old empire 
as it existed during the era of the great Mughals.  
The Mughal royalist strategy might still have succeeded if it had been executed with 
resoluteness and a degree of success in military operations against the British. Paradoxically 
however, while Bahadur Shah Zafar was attempting to woo other states, he was reportedly 
engaged in secret communication with the EIC authorities to retain his throne. Apparently, 
the failure of his forces to defeat the British, or to even break the siege of the city by the 
latter, coupled with the lack of a positive response by the regional states convinced him of 
the futility of continuing the struggle, and led him to surrender to the British. The situation 
clearly suggests that due to a systematic corrosion of power the symbol of Mughal monarchy 
had by the middle of the nineteenth century lost its effectiveness as an ideological tool, 
despite the Sepoys desperately trying to invoke it and Bahadur Shah Zafar seemingly 
enthusiastic in trying to renew it. Due to the latter's weaknesses and ambivalence, the 
prospect of going back even to the decentralized Mughal polity of the eighteenth century was 
no longer a powerful enough motivation. It failed to inspire not only the many Indian 
princes, but also his close aides to counter the EIC, the new focus of political power in 
nineteenth century India. 
In Avadh, Begum Hazrat Mahal, the wife of the exiled Nawab of Avadh, Wajid Ali Shah, 
who had assumed power when the Sepoy rebellion reached Lucknow, was more consistent 
in her aims and conduct during the rebellion. Despite having to deal with an undisciplined 
Army, and the occasional indifference and resistance of the Ulama and other figures in the 
state, the Begum persisted in attempting to assert her royal status and right to rule 
throughout the conflict. She frequently engaged with the people directly and through a 
number of proclamations in her endeavours to lead, unite, and inspire them against the 
British forces. She was able to re-establish the sovereignty of Avadh state despite the 
contradictions that had arisen due to the Nawab's failure to assert himself in the face of 
British pressure. Although aware that as a woman she might not be acceptable as a sovereign 
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ruler, she nevertheless succeeded as the de facto sovereign while her son, whom she 
successfully arranged as the regent, remained a nominal figure.  
Unlike Bahadur Shah Zafar, the Begum often took to the field to lead her troops and raise 
their morale. Even when the bulk of her army became dispirited due to British military 
successes, and her advisors and associates began deserting or surrendering, the Begum chose 
to retreat to the jungles of Nepal with the remainder of her Sepoys rather than give herself 
up to the EIC authorities. Like Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar, she also adopted a balance of 
power strategy in pursuit of a royalist ideology so as to seek political and military alliances. 
Consequently, she and her representatives made a number of overtures to the Maharajah of 
Nepal to leave the British camp and join Avadh in the anti-British rebellion. The reason her 
attempts failed on this account was different than in the case of the Mughal Emperor. 
Whereas Bahadur Shah Zafar's commitment in pursuit of sovereign Mughal status was 
questionable considering his attempts to collaborate with the British during the rebellion, the 
Avadh Begum remained resolute in the defence and consolidation of the restored Avadh 
monarchy. That she failed to overcome the British was due to the lack of concerted support 
of some influential members of her own government, who appeared to be undermining her 
authority to lead; the occasional unwillingness of her troops to be led by her; and to the 
refusal of the kingdom of Nepal - a firm British ally -  to come to her aid.      
Delhi and Avadh Sepoys similarly acknowledged and respected the concept  of royalism. The 
rebel Sepoys at Delhi had been the ones to persuade Bahadur Shah Zafar to exercise his 
authority as the Mughal sovereign, and assure him of their unequivocal support. However, 
they did not have a political programme or vision beyond his restoration. The Administrative 
Court that they had set up at Delhi was only meant to be a coordinating and management 
body to assist the Emperor, which too could not function effectively due to duplication of 
duties with the royal princes who were frequently at odds with the Sepoy leadership. Bahadur 
Shah Zafar was either unwilling or unable to resolve the tussle, which ironically hampered 
the effort that the Sepoys were making to sustain his rule. Like their Delhi counterparts, the 
Avadh Sepoys were devoted to the principle of royalism, specifically Bahadur Shah Zafar's 
right to rule as the Emperor vested with supreme authority, and Avadh as a princely 
province owing allegiance to the Mughal centre. However, the Nawab's decision to go into 
exile rather than resist the British, and especially his orders to the Avadh citizenry not to 
resist the British, considerably weakened the basis for resistance. In his absence, the Sepoys 
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were unable to transfer complete loyalty to the Begum as the sovereign. An element of 
friction therefore remained in their relationship with the Begum during the rebellion years. 
This negatively affected the Sepoys' capacity to concentrate on the professional aspects of 
soldiering, and in turn created a situation that worked to the benefit of the British.  
A number of Ulama from Delhi and other areas of Northern India had also extended 
unequivocal support to Bahadur Shah Zafar during the rebellion by issuing proclamations 
calling upon the people to rally behind the Emperor in the Jihad against the British, and in 
some cases taking part in armed combat themselves. Equally significant was the fact that 
another section of the Ulama took a rather ambivalent position, neither openly supportive of 
Bahadur Shah Zafar, nor of the British. However, even those who were publicly loyal to the 
cause of Mughal royalism were entertaining personal doubts about the feasibility of the 
Mughal cause. This was revealed in the mutiny trials held in the aftermath of the failed 
rebellion, where nearly all of the Ulama who had been active in the rebellion either denied 
their involvement outright, or stated that they were reluctant participants acting under the 
pressure of public opinion or the orders of the Emperor, rather than of their own volition. 
On their part, the Ulama at Avadh, some of whom had previously been active in Delhi and 
other parts of India, appeared to be supportive of both Bahadur Shah Zafar and Begum 
Hazrat Mahal. In several proclamations, the Ulama appealed to the population to resist the 
British in support of the Mughal and Avadh monarchs, assuring them that both royals had 
arranged sufficient resources for the people to fight effectively against the British. However, 
as it transpired, some of these Ulama were pursuing personal political ambitions rather than 
acting in support of the centres at Delhi and Lucknow. The actions of Maulvi Ahmadullah 
Shah, who was leading a large number of fighters in Avadh during the rebellion is especially 
illustrative of this trend. The Maulvi set up his own government within a year of the 
rebellion, which included a number of prominent persons who had earlier been active in 
Delhi, and which was running in parallel to the royal government of Avadh. This led to 
much friction between him, the Avadh Begum, and her advisers, which adversely affected 
the efficiency of the Avadh rebel movement in Avadh. Thus in both Delhi and Avadh, where 
royalism was invoked as an ideology of rebellion, its effectiveness in motivating the rebels 
into focused action against the British seems to have been limited. 
On the other hand, in the Punjab, where the rebellion was particularly weak, Muslim affinity 
for royalism was limited to the perpetuation of the princely states of Bahawalpur and Maler 
150 
 
Kotla. Both the states were concerned with their own security in 1857, rather than that of the 
restored Mughal kingdom and the regency of Avadh. The latter had no relevance for the 
Punjab royalty as it was too distant and had never been a factor in their external politics. The 
situation was not very different with respect to the restored Mughal power at Delhi. The 
Bahawalpur Nawabs had, in fact, never been under Mughal suzerainty, as since its 
foundation the state was a satellite of the Afghan kingdom. The most critical security threat 
for Bahawalpur was the subsequent Sikh kingdom which had ousted the Afghans from the 
Punjab. This development drove the state into seeking British assistance, and subsequently in 
allying itself with the British against the restored Mughal and Avadh powers in 1857. Maler 
Kotla similarly chose to remain allied with the British during their rule in the Punjab. With its 
small size and limited resources, it was considerably more vulnerable than Bahawalpur. 
Surrounded by powerful Sikh principalities, the Nawabs of Maler Kotla had to often rely on 
them for their protection, and avoid any measures that would be construed as hostile. It was 
precisely this ever-present threat that pushed the state into seeking British protection when 
the latter annexed the Punjab. Consequently, both Maler Kotla and Bahawalpur could not 
avoid aligning with the British in 1857, more so because the restored Mughal and Avadh 
entities appeared unable to replace the British as the predominant power.  
The North-West Frontier, though without a history of monarchy, had been under direct and 
nominal Afghan and Mughal control through different phases of its history. Since the mid 
eighteenth century however, when these powers were replaced by the Sikhs, the Frontier's 
sole security concern as with the Punjab, was the Sikh presence and control of local 
resources. Thus the Frontier Pathans too sought British assistance to neutralise the Sikh 
influence, which remained a potential threat even after the British advent because of the 
traditional Sikh dominance of agriculture and the military service. The royalty of Afghanistan, 
which still held some influence over the area because of ethnic ties, was preoccupied with its 
disputes with Persia, and had become militarily dependent on the British, seemed in no 
position to lead or instigate a rebellion in the Frontier against the British. Like the states of 
Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla, Afghanistan had no links with the Mughal centre at Delhi since 
the Sikh domination of neighbouring Punjab, and it had moreover, a history of troubled 
relations with the Mughals which precluded it from coming to the aid of a restored Mughal 
emperor in 1857.  
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The Muslim Sepoys in the Punjab and North-West Frontier had  not experienced Mughal 
rule or close interaction because of the Afghan and Sikh influence; nor were their ancestors 
associated with the armies of the Mughals, which used to draw recruits only from the martial 
Hindu and Muslim tribes of Northern India, as well as immigrant Persians and Afghans. 
There was thus not even an indirect connection of Punjabi Muslim Sepoys with Mughal 
royalty, and none with the Avadh royalty with whom there was no shared history 
whatsoever. Instead, their attachment lay with their own tribal chiefs, or the regional rulers of 
Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla, and subsequently with the British who were the dominant 
power in the Punjab following  Sikh rule, and with whom they had regularly performed 
military and other government service. All the principal tribal chiefs and Sufi Ulama who 
commanded the largest following in the Punjab, which included the traditional Sepoy 
recruitment areas, had clearly displayed a political preference for the British, which served to 
assure the Punjabi Muslim Sepoys that they were on the right side of the Anglo-Mughal 
contest in 1857.   
The Punjab-based Sufi Ulama on their part, avoided support for a Mughal Emperor and 
Avadh regent whose grip on power appeared to be weak, and under whom a viable political 
system had failed to materialise. On the other hand, the Punjabi Sufis had strong ties with 
the Nawabs of Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla and with the tribal chiefs of Punjab, who were 
their traditional patrons and disciples. A close relationship with the British followed when 
the latter assumed power after defeating the Sikhs, as the British patronised them, and in 
turn benefited from Sufi cooperation. The Ulama of the North-West Frontier too remained 
uninclined towards the resurrected Mughal rule. The Frontier Ulama orientation and 
commitment towards royalty was limited to the maintenance of traditional ties with the 
Afghan Amirs. In such an environment, the Frontier Ulama remained indifferent to the 
rebellion. Although a few of them were periodically active against the British at the time, the 
issues were limited to tribal autonomy, such as disputes over British rites of passage through 
tribal land, which were hence unrelated to any of the matters concerning the 1857 rebellion.  
Culturalism was an important component of the ideology of the royalty, Sepoy, and Ulama in 
Delhi and Avadh. Both the monarchs were deeply conscious of the cultural content of their 
conduct, especially since it was the only medium through which they could express a vestige 
of authority, and which  continued to be a source of respect for their thrones. Norms, such 
as bestowing robes of honour on distinguished individuals, requiring presentations of 
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jewellery and weapons by visitors to the Mughal court, and deference to their superior status 
as monarchs were highly valued by all Mughal Emperors and Avadh Nawabs. Consequently, 
when the British attempted to violate these values, it evoked a strong reaction. The 
grievances that the Mughal and Avadh royalty harboured against the British on this account 
served as an impetus for them to rise against the latter when the opportunity arose in the 
form of the Sepoy rebellion. In the case of Bahadur Shah Zafar, such fixation with 
culturalism, while it aided his perception of the British as the despised Other, also ironically 
complicated his relationship with his own Sepoys, whom he resented for their unruly 
behaviour and failure to observe the protocols associated with the Mughal court. For the 
Avadh royalty, the British refusal to let Nawab Wajid Ali Shah retain his throne and the 
symbolic power associated with it, even on a nominal basis and despite his numerous pleas, 
was perceived not merely as a political defeat, but as the ultimate disgrace.  
Cultural sensitivity and the need to redeem individual and group honour guided Sepoy 
attitude and behaviour as well. When the Sepoys were punished for refusing to practice with 
the controversial cartridges by being fettered and having their uniforms stripped in full public 
view, the reaction had come immediately. The men, who were mostly Muslim Sepoys, 
appealed to their colleagues to avenge the disgrace by attacking the British wherever they 
could be found. This had the desired effect as the Sepoys at Meerut, including their peers in 
Avadh proceeded to attack and kill any European they could find and to seize or raze 
government property. The wanton destruction which spread to Delhi and other parts of 
Northern India somewhat diminished their popularity among other sections of the Muslim 
elite and members of the public. The unleashing of indiscriminate violence was not merely 
from a sense of lost pride and honour at being mistreated thus by their officers. It also 
paradoxically reflected a state of confusion that set in once their military culture that was 
associated with the British, and was so vital a part of their lives broke down with the act of 
mass rebellion. As their regiments disintegrated, so did Sepoy cohesion, sense of purpose, 
military discipline, and leadership, both horizontally, that is, within the Sepoy ranks, and 
vertically, or between them and their leaders. The rebel Sepoys at Delhi and Avadh were 
unable to replace the familiar military culture with a viable alternative from which they could 
draw inspiration, and continued to operate as an incohesive body. As a result, demoralisation 
set in, which adversely affected their war fighting ability in the 1857 conflict.   
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While the Sepoy grievances against the British were centred on the issue of the polluted 
cartridges and the harsh British treatment on that account, the Ulama of Delhi and Avadh 
ostensibly faced a wider socio-cultural threat in the form of several educational and 
administrative measures being undertaken by the British. These included curtailed funding 
for madrassa education, the rapid establishment and support for government and Christian 
missionary schools, and the lack of employment opportunities in the judicial and clerical 
professions, which the Ulama and madrassa graduates had traditionally dominated. The 
Ulama, however, coped with these challenges in diverse ways. While some went into 
seclusion, others sought or retained employment with the EIC. Another category consisted 
of those who attempted resistance by persisting with whatever missionary work and 
traditional education they could still undertake. Even among the latter Ulama however, many 
of whom were to initiate Jihad against the British in 1857, there was a division between those 
who tended to be anti-Hindu and others who believed in a culture of mutual respect and 
cooperation with that community. Then there were those who believed in keeping clear of 
the British because of the alien culture, which was repugnant to many Muslims and Hindus. 
Yet, there were also a significant number of Ulama who frequently interacted with the 
British, and were reconciled to their presence in India. The latter category paradoxically 
included some prominent figures associated with the traditionalist Waliullah School, some of 
whose icons were prominent in the subsequent 1857 Jihad against the British. In other 
words, the cultural threat posed by the British was perceived differentially by the Delhi and 
the Avadh Ulama, and their responses were varied too. 
Culturalism functioned yet more differently among the Punjabi Muslim Sepoys and the 
Frontier Pathans. Like their counterparts in the Bengal Army, they formed the bulk of the 
warrior and landowning class, and highly valued  military virtues. Their tribal cultures 
fostered a martial spirit and considered any occupation other than the military and farming as 
undignified. The military impulse of the martial tribes sought and discovered a suitable outlet 
in the professional army that the British had introduced, and when the latter offered the 
opportunity, they began enlisting in large numbers in the EIC regiments that were being 
raised in the area. Ties with the British, first established in peacetime, were strengthened in 
mutual combat experience during the Anglo-Sikh wars. A powerful motivation for 
gravitating toward the British was the perceived threat of Sikh dominance of military service, 
which could more effectively be countered by competing with them on the neutral platform 
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the British had provided, rather than incurring the prohibitive costs of open warfare with the 
warrior Sikh community. A sense of esprit-de-corps developed among the Muslim Sepoys  as a 
result of favourable terms of service, shared responsibilities, and common pride in the British 
instituted regiments. An added incentive was the salaries of these Sepoys, which were much 
higher than those of their counterparts in the presidency armies, and the men had an 
opportunity as well to serve with their own clansmen in separate regimental companies as 
against the practice of composite units in the Bengal Army. Such a military culture became a 
source of motivation for the Punjabi Muslim and Pathan Sepoys, which united and sustained 
them as a fighting force during the 1857 rebellion, though on the side of the British. 
As opposed to such conditions, a shared military culture with the Hindus and Muslims of 
other areas did not exist. The cultural distance was exacerbated by the lack of common or 
linked ethnic and social networks. There were few Delhi and Avadh Muslims in the Punjab, 
most of whom were employed as petty officials in the Punjab government, or as Sepoys on 
deputation from the Bengal Army, with whom the Punjabi Sepoys, who were mostly 
confined to their villages or military garrisons, had little interaction. There were moreover, a 
number of Indian military deserters from EIC regiments who had taken refuge in the Punjab 
under various guises, and were hence held in disdain for having abandoned a service that was 
considered to bestow respect and honour. The stereotyping created a general image of Indian 
Muslims and Hindus as the 'Other', which enabled Punjabi Muslims and Pathans to cope 
with the ideological tension they would have otherwise experienced in treating co-religionists 
and fellow Indians as foes. The Sepoy military ideology in the Punjab and Frontier remained 
solidly grounded in a military culture that though introduced by the British, perfectly suited 
Pathan and Punjabi Muslim martial traditions and beliefs associated with their tribal 
identities. As a military ideology, this culture successfully withstood the stresses of the 1857 
war.     
As an ideology, religiosity was a critical identity marker and motivator for the Muslim Sepoys, 
royalty and Ulama of Delhi and Avadh, who regularly invoked it in their statements and 
proclamations during the rebellion. While they strove to adopt and disseminate the values 
and norms associated with the faith, they also experienced tensions and contradictions in 
their understanding and experience of Islam, which became apparent in the 1857 conflict. 
For the Muslim Sepoys, as also their Hindu colleagues, the greased cartridge issue had 
provided the initial religious stimulus, which was subsequently taken up by the Ulama and 
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the royalty of Avadh and Delhi. A closer examination of the cartridge issue however, reveals 
that except in the case of Hinduism, it did not have much significance from an Islamic 
viewpoint, as handling prohibited substances under unavoidable circumstances does not 
deprive Muslims of their faith. Yet, the Muslim Sepoys genuinely believed their collective 
religious identity had been seriously compromised through the incident. The misperceived 
belief is attributable to heuristic information-processing, or a subconscious tendency on their 
part to process only the surface information prohibiting pork, without making an effort to 
consider the religious caveats on the issue. Either they were under pressure of a highly 
stressful situation which called for quick decision-making, or they did not favour the 
qualifications associated with the belief, as it clashed with a more entrenched and 
straightforward conviction that pork was proscribed in Islam. In order to seek an extrinsic 
source of motivation, the Muslim component of the Sepoy army, both at Avadh and Delhi 
leant towards the Ulama for religious inspiration. However, the ambivalent cues from the 
wider Ulama community in Northern India on the applicability of Jihad against the British 
became a source of ideological dissonance instead.  
Another complicating issue was ironically the zeal for Jihad on the part of some sections of 
Delhi Muslims and a few Ulama, whose insistence on displaying Jihad symbols and carrying 
out open rituals of cow slaughter were resented by the Hindu majority colleagues of the 
Muslim Sepoys. As  a source of inspiration, Jihad therefore, did not have a powerful impact 
on these Sepoys at the collective level. On the other hand, the religious zeal of the Muslim 
Sepoys does appear to have been sustained by recourse to a personal belief in Jihad as a 
weapon of war. This spirit found expression in at least some armed encounters with the 
British forces in which mixed bands of rebels, which included Muslim Sepoys, were reported 
to have fought to the death with religious war cries.  
The Ulama from Northern India, who belonged to a variety of religious denominations, 
issued a number of proclamations and edicts deriding the British for defiling Hinduism and 
Islam, and appealing to the two communities to avenge the slights to their faiths. Apart from 
the cartridge incident, the zeal of European missionaries, circulation of Christian tracts 
deemed offensive to Hinduism and Islam, establishment of missionary societies, and the 
conversions, albeit limited, that were taking place, had caused much resentment in the Ulama 
community. Significantly however, the Ulama as we know were not the first to rise against 
British rule. They joined in only after the Sepoys had rebelled. Their motivations and role 
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also remained ambiguous as some of them appeared to manoeuvre on both sides, while 
many of the leading Ulama subsequently denied any role or wilful  complicity in the rebellion 
when tried by the British. Nonetheless, the spirit of Jihad did inspire some Ulama at the 
personal level, as evidenced by their passion during combat and refusal to surrender or 
recant their beliefs and acts, a special example of which was Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah of 
Avadh.   
The Delhi and Avadh royalty enjoyed consistent support by a number of local Ulama in their 
struggle against the British. The support was vital for Bahadur Shah Zafar as it provided the 
needed sanction for a religious war against the British, which he attempted to fully utilise in 
his proclamations and directives during the rebellion years. However, his eagerness to attract 
the Hindu masses and the Hindu rebel Army, which constituted the majority of his 
supporters, led him to innovate and conflate the popularly understood concept of Jihad, that 
is, armed warfare by the Muslim community to protect Islam, in ways that contradicted the 
Jihad message that some of his Ulama were delivering in their sermons. Consequently, the 
Emperor's religious call failed to attract mass Muslim following and would have been a 
source of confusion for that portion of his own Muslim Sepoys which might otherwise have 
felt more inspired from a clearer Jihad signal. In the case of Avadh, the Begum is not known 
to have inspired her Sepoys with religious war cries or displays of symbols eulogising Jihad as 
she led them into battle. This does not necessarily mean she was not inspired by religion in 
her war against the British. But her failure to do so certainly suggests that for her, like most 
other Muslim combatants in both Avadh and Delhi, Jihad served more as a personal or 
intrinsic source of motivation than as an extrinsic motivator.  Religiosity was a critical 
component of the Punjabi Muslim and Pathan elite ideology as well, but in different ways 
and to different effect. The Sepoys appeared to be devoted to religious requirements and 
rites, much like their co-religionists in Delhi, Avadh and the rest of India. During the 
rebellion, they were observed to regularly pray and invoke the name of Allah in battle. The 
British were sensitive to their religious sentiment, and appeared to endorse it. However, it is 
significant that unlike the case in Delhi and Avadh, no call for a collective Jihad was ever 
made from any local quarter to inspire Punjabi Muslims and Pathans in combat. Yet, neither 
was any religious edict or appeal issued by local religious authorities forbidding Jihad against 
the rebel Army. While the Ulama of Punjab and Frontier did not invoke Jihad during the 
rebellion, their open and unanimous support of the British, which remained consistent 
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throughout the conflict, served as covert religious sanction, and hence a source of inspiration 
for the Sepoys. Since these Muslim Sepoys were highly susceptible to the religious and 
political influence of their Ulama, the local Sepoys took that as a cue to sanction their 
combat participation. Religiosity thus acted here in a very different way - not so much as a 
mobilizing ideology, but as a source of inspiration, courage, and confidence in a combat 
situation. It functioned yet differently among the Sufi Ulama of the Punjab, who were not so 
concerned with the doctrinal issues and debates on the ideology of armed Jihad as with 
issues of personal piety, meditation rituals and other rites associated with Sufism, which set 
up the basic divide with the pro-Jihad Ulama. Another complicating factor in the relationship 
was the tendency of the Punjab Sufis to guard against encroachments on their religious 
realms, so the attempts by the pro-rebel Ulama to reach out to other Muslims found no 
resonance with them. The Frontier Ulama by comparison, were likewise unaffected by the 
rebellion as they did not believe any religious issues were at stake. Although unlike their 
counterparts in the neighbouring Punjab, these Ulama are not known to have actively 
participated in the conflict on the British side, they did not discourage their huge following 
among local Pathans from joining up with the British against the rebel factions.       
Like the Ulama, the royalty of Punjab and Frontier did not find it necessary to mobilise their 
Sepoys in the name of Jihad, as their prime ideological motive was state survival, which they 
had successfully achieved through British collaboration. The Mughal Emperor's frequent 
invocation of Jihad, and more generally a religious war that could appeal to Hindus as well, 
did not strike a chord with the Pathan and Punjabi populations either, who were more 
susceptible to the influence of their own rulers. The Punjab and Frontier royalty were 
receptive to the influence of their Sufi elite as against the attempts of the pro-Jihad Ulama of 
Northern India to rally all Indians in the war against the British. The princely states of 
Bahawalpur and Maler Kotla had historical links with the Sufi luminaries in the region, and 
these ties remained strong during the rebellion years. Since these potentates depended on the 
religious, cultural, and political support of the local Ulama, and these Ulama had displayed no 
inclination toward the anti-British religious elite of Northern Indian, the Punjab royalty 
remained indifferent to the Jihad appeals of the Delhi and Avadh Ulama and royalty.  
This study has tried to argue that royalism, culturalism, and religiosity functioned as 
interconnected ideologies for the Sepoys, royalty and Ulama of both the pro and anti-British 
camps. However, the salience of each ideology, the level of commitment with which it was 
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pursued, and its endurance varied across the two rival groups, and within group members. 
Contrary to the extant literature, which either exaggerates the ideological impact of Jihad in 
the 1857 rebellion, or conflates it with the notion of a secular or combined Hindu-Muslim 
proto-nationalist call for liberation, this study has shown that Jihad did play an important 
ideological role for the Muslim actors, but in innovative ways, and  at the individual rather 
than at the group level. The role of cultural ideology, though extensively researched in the 
existing literature, tends to emphasise the combined Muslim-Hindu spirit to oust the alien 
power, whereas this study has additionally examined the relatively neglected importance of 
military culture as a motivator in the conflict. Similarly, by studying the role of royalism from 
the perspective of balance-of-power or realpolitik thought, the present research has 
attempted to augment existing explanations of the motives of the Mughal and Avadh 
monarchs. Finally, by incorporating the ideological motivations and related conduct of the 
most under-studied set of actors in the 1857 rebellion - the Punjabi Muslim and Pathan 
Sepoys, potentates and religious elite who almost unanimously supported the British against 
fellow Indians - this study has provided a richer framework for the analysis of Muslim 
ideology in the 1857 conflict. 
 
.
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